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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of Decision: 29th April, 2025

+ CRL.A. 438/2022

STATE NCT OF DELHI

.....Appellant

Through: Mr. Amit Ahlawat, APP.
SI Bheem Singh, PS: Anti-Corruption
Branch.

versus

SATYA NARAYAN

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Bhuvneshwar Tyagi, Advocate.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):

1. The present appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973¹ is directed against judgment dated 12th February, 2013, passed by the Special Judge-07 (Central), (PC Act), Delhi in C.C. No. 42/12, titled "*State v. Satyanarayan*". By the said order, the Special Judge has acquitted the Respondent for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.²

Factual Background

2. The case of the Prosecution/Complainant, in brief, is as follows:

2.1 The Complainant, Mr. Trilok Singh, was operating seven vehicles,

¹ "Cr.P.C."

² "PC Act"



comprising five RTVs and two Tata Magic Vans, on the route from Tikri Border to Nangloi. These vehicles would complete their trips by turning back through the jurisdiction of Haryana. It is alleged that the Respondent, who was then posted as the Station House Officer (SHO), Bahadurgarh, Haryana, demanded a monthly bribe of ₹2,000 per vehicle from the Complainant to permit such movement. Upon the Complainant's refusal to comply, the Respondent purportedly threatened to impound the vehicles and had earlier issued two challans in retaliation.

2.2 On 3rd August, 2010, the Respondent allegedly directed the Complainant to deliver the bribe money by 5:00 p.m. at Nijampur Mor, Delhi. Choosing not to accede to the demand, the Complainant approached the Anti-Corruption Branch and filed a complaint before Inspector Manoj (PW-9), the designated Raid Officer, in the presence of the Panch Witness (PW-4).

2.3 The Complainant produced 14 GC notes of the denomination of ₹1000/- before the Raid Officer, who recorded the serial numbers of the notes in the pre-raid proceedings (Ex. PW-4/B) which were treated with phenolphthalein powder after the serial numbers were duly recorded. As part of the procedural demonstration, the Panch Witness's right hand was made to touch the treated notes, and the resultant pink coloration of his hand-wash in sodium carbonate solution confirmed the presence of the chemical. The tainted notes were then handed over to the Complainant, while the Panch Witness was instructed to accompany him and overhear the conversation during the anticipated bribe exchange.

2.4 Subsequently, the Raid Officer, along with the Complainant, the Panch Witness, and other members of the raiding team, departed from the



office of Anti-Corruption Branch, in a government vehicle and reached near the vicinity of Nijampur Mor, Tikri Village, around 4:00 p.m. The Complainant and the Panch Witness proceeded towards the designated location, while the remaining members of the raiding team strategically positioned themselves in the surrounding area to monitor the proceedings covertly.

2.5 At approximately 6:15 p.m., upon receiving the pre-determined signal from the Panch witness, the raiding team proceeded to the designated location. The Raid Officer then disclosed his official identity to the Respondent and offered him the opportunity to be searched, which the Respondent declined. Following his directions, the Panch witness recovered the tainted GC notes from the back pocket of the jeans of the Respondent. The serial numbers on the recovered currency notes were matched against those recorded in the pre-raid proceedings (Ex. PW-4/B) and were found to be identical. In furtherance of the formal procedure, the Respondent's left hand and his jeans pocket were rinsed in colourless sodium carbonate solutions. The hand wash and pocket wash samples were preserved in four clean bottles, duly marked "MK" and labelled as LHW-I & II and LSBPPW-I & II, respectively. Along with these bottles, the *pullanda* containing the pants of the Respondent, and the sample seal were taken into custody *vide* the Seizure Memo (Ex. PW-4/E). The Raid Officer also prepared the post-raid proceedings (Ex. PW-4/C), prepared the *rukka* (Ex. PW-9/A), and sent it *via* HC Krishna Dasan to the Police Station Anti-Corruption Branch for FIR registration. A copy of the FIR is marked as Ex. PW-3/A.

2.6 The Raid Officer summoned the Investigating Officer, Inspector Yashpal Singh (PW-7) to the spot, and handed over custody of the



Respondent, along with the case property and relevant documents, for the purpose of investigation. The IO took over the investigation, prepared the site plan (Ex. PW-7/A), and conducted the interrogation and arrest of the Respondent. He also carried out his personal search, medical examination and recorded the statements of the Complainant, the Panch witness, and other relevant witnesses. The tainted exhibits were forwarded to the FSL, and the report received confirms the presence of phenolphthalein is on record as Ex. PX. The IO also procured relevant documents, including the bio-data of the accused (Ex. PW-5/B), his transfer and posting order (Ex. PW-5/D), and the sanction order for prosecution (Ex. PW-1/A). Upon recording the statements of the witnesses and completing all necessary investigative formalities, the IO filed the chargesheet before the concerned court.

2.7 After compliance with Section 207 Cr.P.C. and upon hearing both sides on the point of charge, charges under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act were framed against the Respondent on 23rd November, 2012. The Respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

2.8 In support of its case, the Prosecution examined nine witnesses. PW-1, Sh. V. Kamraja, deposed as the Sanctioning Authority against the Respondent; PW-2, Constable Bijender Singh, was a member of the raiding team; PW-3, retired SI Anand Swaroop, was the Duty Officer at the relevant time; PW-4, Mr. Purshottam Das, served as the Panch Witness; PW-5, Mr. Patram Singh, and PW-6, HC Ram Kumar, deposed regarding other factual aspects of the case; PW-7, Inspector Yashpal Singh, was the Investigating Officer; PW-8, HC Chandan Singh, was the then MHC(M) at P.S. Civil Lines; and PW-9, Inspector Manoj, as the Raid Officer.



2.9 After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the Respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In his defence, the Respondent denied all allegations, including the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. He asserted that he had been falsely implicated due to personal hostility, allegedly arising from his decision to disallow the Complainant's vehicles from operating within the jurisdiction of Haryana. To support his claim of a blemish-free record, the Respondent placed on record 144 commendation certificates awarded to him during his service in the Haryana Police from the year 1977 to 2011. He also emphasized that no departmental proceedings had ever been initiated against him.

2.10 Upon evaluating the evidence, the Trial Court, by impugned order dated 12th February, 2013, acquitted the Respondent. The principal ground for acquittal was that the Prosecution failed to prove the foundational requirement of demand of illegal gratification, an essential element for the offence under both Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act.

2.11 Aggrieved by the acquittal, the State filed the present appeal. This Court, by order dated 5th September 2022, granted leave to appeal, and the instant appeal number was accordingly allocated.

Prosecution's Case

3. Mr. Amit Ahlawat, APP for the State, assails the impugned judgment on multiple grounds, contending that the acquittal of the Respondent is erroneous and unsustainable:

3.1 The reasoning of the Trial Court is vitiated by conjecture and speculation rather than being grounded in a proper appraisal of the evidence adduced. The findings rest upon presumptive doubts and assumptions, rather than an objective analysis of the incriminating circumstances, which were



otherwise established by the Prosecution.

3.2 A cardinal error, according to the State, lies in the Trial Court's excessive reliance on the death of the Complainant, and its inference that the absence of his testimony fatally undermines the Prosecution's case. Even in the absence of the Complainant's deposition, the case is supported by substantial corroborative material, including the pre-raid and post-raid proceedings, the recovery of tainted currency, testimony of the Panch Witness, and the FSL report, which collectively establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt.

3.3 The Trial Court erred in doubting the Complainant's ownership of the vehicles, solely on the ground that supporting registration documents were not filed. Such an omission is inconsequential in light of the fact that the case pertains to a demand of illegal gratification and the extortion threat to impound vehicles, regardless of their formal ownership.

3.4 The Trial Court incorrectly discounted the timing of the complaint, holding that the Respondent, having taken charge as SHO only on 30th July, 2010, could not have pressured the Complainant within such a short span. This line of reasoning is erroneous, as the demand was made on 3rd August, 2010, just three days later, is entirely plausible and consistent with the allegation that the Respondent used his official position to coerce the Complainant.

3.5 The Trial Court's observation that the Panch Witness did not overhear the relevant conversation is a misreading of the evidence. On the contrary, the Panch Witness, examined as PW-4, unequivocally confirmed that he overheard the Respondent demand and accept the bribe, and also saw the Complainant hand over the tainted currency. The account of the Panch



Witness was both consistent and corroborated by the recovery of the marked notes.

3.6 The Trial Court erred in holding that the factum of demand for bribe was not established. The Court overlooked the fact that Complainant's written complaint is self-explanatory and explicitly sets out the demand made by the Respondent. This complaint, along with corroborating circumstances and witness testimonies, proves both the demand and acceptance of the bribe by the Respondent. Moreover, the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the recovery of the entire bribe amount of ₹14,000/- from the Respondent, further bolsters the case of the Prosecution.

3.7 The Trial Court did not properly appreciate the evidentiary value of the FSL report, which confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein on the Respondent's hands and clothing. This scientific evidence provides irrefutable corroboration of the recovery and contradicts the defence plea of false implication.

Respondent's Case

4. On the other hand, counsel for the Respondent defends the judgment of acquittal, contending that the Trial Court's conclusions are firmly rooted in a judicious appraisal of the evidence on record. It is submitted that the Prosecution failed to prove its case to the standard required under criminal law, namely beyond reasonable doubt. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the Complainant was never examined in court due to his demise, and the written complaint attributed to him was not duly proved in accordance with law, having neither been exhibited through admissible testimony nor corroborated by any independent witness. The Respondent's counsel further argues that the case of the Prosecution hinges solely upon the testimonies of



PW-4 (Panch Witness) and PW-9 (Raid Officer), both of whom failed to establish the twin foundational elements of the offence: demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification. It is pointed out that the Panch Witness' account was riddled with inconsistencies and was unable to clearly confirm overhearing any demand or conversation between the Complainant and the Respondent. As such, the Trial Court was justified in entertaining doubt and extending the benefit thereof to the accused, in consonance with the presumption of innocence and the well-settled principle that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

Analysis

5. The Court has considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the impugned order. The operative portion of the judgment under challenge reflects the Trial Court's unequivocal finding that the prosecution had "miserably failed" to establish the guilt of the Respondent under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The Trial Court ultimately acquitted the Respondent and, before parting, took note of the 144 Commendation Certificates placed on record by the Respondent, recognising his service in the Haryana Police from 1977 to 2011. While such certificates, though not determinative of innocence, may speak to the antecedents of the Respondent, they cannot by themselves override evidentiary deficiencies in the Prosecution's case. The focus, therefore, remains on whether the legal ingredients of the alleged offences were established beyond reasonable doubt. The operative portion of the impugned order reads as follows:

29. *In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation to safely conclude that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused for the charged offence punishable U/S 7 and 13(2) r/w Section*



13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and therefore, this accused Satyanarayan stands acquitted of the said charged offence.

30. Since the accused has been acquitted of the charged offence, his bail bond is cancelled and his surety stands discharged.

31. Before parting with this order, I would like to add it here that the accused had placed on record 144 Commendation Certificates as issued to him by several Higher Authorities in recognition of his outstanding service, in the post of Constable to Inspector in Haryana Police during course of his service tenure from 1977 to 2011.”

6. In support of its case, the Prosecution examined nine witnesses. Central to the Prosecution’s narrative was the complaint allegedly submitted by Mr. Trilok Singh, the Complainant. However, the Complainant was never examined during trial. The Prosecution claims that he had been murdered, but this assertion remains unsupported by any documentary evidence, as no death certificate, post-mortem report, or FIR pertaining to his death was placed on record. Though the Court does not presume *mala fides* in the explanation offered, it remains an undisputed fact that the Complainant’s testimony is unavailable, thereby depriving the Prosecution of its most direct and material witness.

7. In the absence of the Complainant’s testimony, the Prosecution sought to prove the contents of the complaint (Ex. PW-4/A) through PW-4, Shri Purshottam Das, the Panch Witness. However, the said witness did not substantively support the Prosecution’s case. In his cross-examination, PW-4 admitted in no uncertain terms that the complaint was not written in his presence, and that he could neither confirm its authorship nor the handwriting therein. The relevant portion of his cross-examination is extracted below:

“Complaint was not recorded in my presence and it was only shown to me in the office when I reached and it might be recorded by the complainant himself. I cannot tell in whose hand complaint Ex.PW4/A when I reached in



the AC Branch. It was in the file when I was asked to read over the same. At that time when it was read over by me, there were five persons but I cannot tell their names.”

This categorical admission strips the document of any evidentiary reliability unless otherwise established by the Prosecution through cogent evidence.

8. However, on this issue, Mr. Ahlawat has referred to the testimony of PW-9, Inspector Manoj, who deposed that the complainant personally handed over the complaint in his presence and signed it, which he then attested. He deposed:

“On 03.08.2010 I was posted in AC Branch as Inspector. Addl. CP directed me to investigate this case and the said complaint was marked to me. The marking of Addl. CP is at point ‘X’. Complainant produced his complaint before me and he put his signatures in my presence. I attested his signature on complaint Ex.PW4/A and the attestation is at point Y.”

While this deposition may establish the act of submission and attestation, it does not, by itself, prove the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint.

9. In *Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi)*,³ the Supreme Court observed that where the complainant is either deceased or otherwise unavailable to testify, the demand for illegal gratification may still be established through the testimony of other witnesses, either oral or documentary, or by relying on circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution. In the present case, the Trial Court has correctly noted in Paragraph Nos. 19 to 21 of the impugned order that the narrative of the Complaint was not corroborated by any other witness, and no circumstances were brought on record to permit reliance upon its contents under Section 32 or any other exception to the hearsay rule.

³ (2023) 4 SCC 731 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1724.



10. For instance, the Complainant alleged in the complaint that he was operating five RTVs and two Tata Magic Vans for passenger transport between Tikri Border and Nangloi. However, neither registration certificates nor any other supporting documentation were collected or proved by the Investigating Officer (PW-7). In fact, PW-7, admitted during cross-examination, that he had neither collected the Registration Certificates of the alleged seven vehicles, nor placed on record any other material to support the Complainant's claim of ownership. Furthermore, PW-9, Inspector Manoj, the Raid Officer, acknowledged during cross-examination that he did not call upon the Complainant to produce any documentary evidence pertaining to the vehicles in respect of which the alleged demand for illegal gratification was made by the Respondent. The justification offered for this omission was the purported urgency of the situation, which, according to the witness, precluded him from insisting on the production of such documents. While practical constraints may occasionally justify some procedural omissions, the complete absence of verification of the underlying factual basis, namely, the motive and context for the alleged bribe, casts a serious shadow over the entire prosecution case.

11. The allegation that the Respondent had previously issued two challans to the Complainant's vehicles as a means of coercion for extracting bribes is another critical component of the Prosecution's case that remains wholly unsubstantiated. No documentary proof of such challans was placed on record by the Complainant or produced by the investigating agency. Despite the opportunity and relevance, neither the Investigating Officer nor the Raid Officer made any effort to independently verify the existence of these challans or collect them from the concerned Traffic Department. This



13. The assertion in the complaint that the Respondent had been harassing the Complainant for over a month is directly belied by official records. As per the posting order of the Respondent (Ex. PW-5/D), he assumed charge as SHO, Police Station Traffic, Bahadurgarh only on 30th July, 2010, just four days prior to the alleged demand and trap, which took place on 3rd August, 2010. The contradiction between the factual chronology and the Complainant's narrative not only undermines the allegation of sustained harassment, but also raises doubts about the overall credibility of the complaint. The Prosecution made no attempt to reconcile this temporal inconsistency, thereby leaving a material gap in its case.

14. Pertinently, in addition to highlighting the inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the Prosecution, the Trial Court rightly placed emphasis on the absence of any credible evidence establishing the *sine qua non* of the offence—namely, the demand for bribe. The settled legal position, as affirmed in a catena of Supreme Court judgments including ***P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P.***,⁴ is that mere recovery of tainted currency notes is not sufficient to convict an accused under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act. The Prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused made a demand for illegal gratification and voluntarily accepted the same. In this regard, the relevant findings of the Trial Court are as follows:

“25. From the perusal of the deposition of said PW4/Panch witness, it is also reflected that said PW4 has admitted that he could not hear the conversation between the complainant and the accused and thus has not deposed regarding demand of bribe by the accused from the complainant. As said PW4 in his cross examination by Ld. Defence Counsel has deposed as under:-

⁴ (2015) 10 SCC 152, see also *V. Sejjappa v. State*, (2016) 12 SCC 150.



“Trilok Singh had made telephone call at about 4:30 p.m. and onwards but I do not know what were the talks between the accused and the complainant on the phone calls. I do not know whether complainant was talking to the accused on telephone or someone else. At the time of talk on telephone, I was only 1-2 feet away from the complainant. It was not audible to me what talks were going on between the accused and the complainant. Last call was made by the complainant to the accused at around 5:30 p.m. At that time Inspector Manoj was at distance.”

26. From the perusal of the deposition of PW4/Panch witness, it is clearly reflected that he has not deposed anything regarding the demand of bribe by the accused from the complainant. No other PW has also deposed regarding the aspect of demand of bribe by the accused from the complainant. Thus, from the perusal of the record, it is clearly reflected that prosecution has failed to establish about the basic element relating to the bribe i.e. **'Demand of Bribe'** by the accused from the complainant. Besides this, the stand of the prosecution regarding the recovery of the tainted GC notes by the Panch witness from the back pant pocket of the accused could not be established as PW4/Panch witness has denied about said suggestion of Ld. Addl. PP in his cross examination. To the contrary, said PW4/Panch witness had deposed regarding the recovery of the tainted GC notes from the ground. As said PW4 has deposed in this respect as under:-

“Some notes were picked up by me and some notes were picked up by Inspector Manoj Kumar and thereafter, same were counted and were found 14 notes in the denomination of Rs.1000/-.”

27. Since the prosecution has failed to establish regarding the factum of the demand of bribe by the accused from the complainant, the presumption as contemplated U/S 20 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 cannot be attracted in this case and my said view is found supported from the judgment as rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case reported as AIR 2007 SC 489 **“V.Venkata Subbarao vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, A.P.”** In Para 24 of the said judgment, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as under

“Submission of the learned counsel for the State that presumption has rightly been raised against the appellant, cannot be accepted as, inter alia, the demand itself had not been proved. In the absence of a proof of demand, the question of raising the presumption would not arise. Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides for raising of a presumption only if a demand is proved”.

28. In the absence of proof of "Demand of bribe" by the accused, I am of the considered view that the accused cannot be held liable for penal provisions U/S 7 and Section 13 (2) r/w Section 13 (1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for which he has been charged with and my said view is found supported from the following judgments:-



- (1) 2006 (1) SCC 401 "*T.Subramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu*"
- (2) 2005 CrL.L.J. 1136 "*State of H.P. Vs. Sukhdev Singh Rana*"
- (3) 2007 CrL.L.J. 2919 "*State of M.P.vs. Anil Kumar Verma*"
- (4) 2006 (3) RCR (Crl.) 796 "*Amrit Lai vs. State of Punjab*"
- (5) 2000 CrL.L.J. 4591 "*State of M.P. Vs. J.B.Singh*"
- (6) 2006 (1) RCR (Crl.) 314 "*L.K.Jain vs. The State*"
- (7) 2005 (4) RCR (Crl.) 716 "*R.V.Subba Rao Vs. State*"
- (8) AIR 1979 SC 1408 "*Suraj Mal Vs. State*"
- (9) 1992 (3) RCR (Crl.) 139 "*Pritam Singh vs. State of Haryana*"
- (10) 2009 (4) LRC 275 (SC) "*State of Maharastra Vs. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede*"
- (11) V (2009) SLT 272 A. *Subair Vs. State of Kerala*

15. The foundation upon which the Trial Court has rested its decision is firmly anchored in settled jurisprudence, which has consistently reiterated that the demand for illegal gratification is an indispensable ingredient of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. It is incumbent upon the Prosecution to discharge the burden of proof that the accused had made such a demand from the complainant. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the findings of the Supreme Court in the judgement in *State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede*,⁵ the relevant portion of which is extracted below:

"16. Indisputably, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the provisions of the Act. For arriving at the conclusion as to whether all the ingredients of an offence, viz., demand, acceptance and recovery of the amount of illegal gratification have been satisfied or not, the court must take into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on the record in their entirety. For the said purpose, indisputably, the presumptive evidence, as is laid down in Section 20 of the Act, must also be taken into consideration but then in respect thereof, it is trite, the standard of burden of proof on the accused vis-`-vis the standard of burden of proof on the prosecution would differ. Before, however, the accused is called upon to explain as to how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. Even while invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the

⁵ (2009) 15 SCC 200.



Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt.”

16. This position has been consistently reaffirmed, *inter alia*, in ***C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.***,⁶ ***P. Satyanarayana Murthy*** and ***Neeraj Dutta***, where the Supreme Court has held that demand being a *sine qua non*, its absence is fatal to the Prosecution’s case.

17. Applying these legal principles to the present case, it was incumbent upon the Prosecution to demonstrate, through cogent and reliable evidence, that the Respondent had made an unequivocal demand for illegal gratification. The Complainant, being the sole author of the allegations, could not be examined during trial due to his unfortunate demise. In the absence of his testimony, the Prosecution’s case rested substantially on circumstantial and corroborative evidence, particularly the testimony of the Panch witness (PW-4) and the members of the raiding team. However, as discussed earlier, PW-4 categorically stated that he neither witnessed the alleged conversation nor overheard any demand of bribe. His deposition further diverged from the Prosecution’s version of recovery, thereby weakening both the element of demand and the credibility of the trap proceedings

Conclusion

18. Viewed holistically, the Trial Court’s analysis does not suffer from any material irregularity. It undertook a threadbare evaluation of the evidence and correctly found that the key factual assertions in the complaint, such as the Complainant’s ownership of vehicles, the alleged prior issuance



of challans, and the purported ongoing harassment, remained unsupported by any documentary or oral evidence. These unproven allegations, coupled with the failure to establish the foundational fact of demand, justifiably led the Trial Court to conclude that the statutory presumption under Section 20 could not be invoked. The appreciation of evidence was both plausible and measured, and cannot be faulted merely because an alternative view is possible.

19. This Court is also mindful of the well-established principle that an appellate court should be circumspect in interfering with an order of acquittal. Unless the findings are shown to be manifestly perverse or legally untenable, interference would be unwarranted. In the present case, no such perversity or misapplication of law has been demonstrated. On the contrary, the Trial Court's conclusions are supported by the evidence on record and the settled legal principles.

20. In light of the foregoing, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The impugned judgment does not call for interference under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

APRIL 29, 2025

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⁶ (2010) 15 SCC 1.