*	IN  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  DELHI  AT  NEW  DELHI
Date of decision: 06th NOVEMBER, 2025
	IN THE MATTER OF:
+ 	W.P.(C) 4233/2019
	GAURAV KUMAR SINGH				          .....Petitioner
Through:	Mr. V K Sharma, Advocate

				versus

	UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.		     		     .....Respondents

Through:	Ms. Barkha Babbar with Mr. Sushmit Mishra, Advocates 
	AC EXE Jaspal Singh, SI/ EXE Ramesh Kumar
	
	CORAM:
	HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
				JUDGMENT
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
1. The Petitioner has approached this Court impugning the Order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force [“CISF”] Unit, BHEL, Haridwar, Uttarakhand as well as the subsequent orders of the Appellate Authority dated 03.04.2013 and the Revisional Authority dated 09.07.2013, upholding the order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant. By way of the order dated 15.10.2012, the Petitioner was awarded with the penalty of, “Reduction of pay to the minimum stage from Rs. 7,540/- + Grade Pay 2000/- to Rs. 6,460/- + Grade Pay 2000/- for a period of two years with further direction that he will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and after the expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.”
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts as noted from the petition are that the Petitioner was appointed as Constable/General Duty [“Ct/GD”] in CISF on 22.01.2007. Around three years later on 24.12.2010, the Petitioner reported on regular transfer from CISF Unit, Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project [“KHEP”], Uri-1 to CISF Unit, KHEP Koteswar. 
3. On 24-25.06.2012, the Petitioner was detailed for Quarter Guard Duty for which he was deployed for Sentry Duty on the back side of Morcha/Duty Post of the Quarter Guard from 0100 hours to 0500 hours. 
4. The case against the Petitioner is that on 24-25.06.2012 at 01:15 hours, the Petitioner left his duty post and sat down on the stairs leading to the Quarter Master’s room between both the Morcha/Duty posts of the Quarter Guard, without intimation or permission of the Competent Authority or Guard Commander. During this time, Ct/GD S.T. Hansing came out from the Guard Room and saw the Petitioner sitting on the stairs, and thereupon asked the Petitioner to go to his duty post/barricade. In response, the Petitioner gave verbal abuses and manhandled Ct/GD S.T. Hansing.
5. For the above act, the Petitioner was suspended vide order dated 25.06.2012, which was confirmed by the Commandant on 30.06.2012.
6. After conducting a preliminary enquiry on 22.08.2012, the Memorandum of Charge dated 19.07.2012 was issued by the Commandant, wherein the following charges were framed against the Petitioner:
"Force No.073090016 Constable/GD Gaurav Kumar Singh of CISF Unit KHEP Koteswar while deployed for sentry duty on the back side Morcha duty post at Unit Quarter Guard from 0100 hrs to 0500 hrs in the intervening night on 24/25.06.2012, willfully left his duty post unattended at about 0115 hrs without information and permission from competent authority or Guard Commander and sat down on the stairs leading towards Quarter Master's room located in between both the Morchas. Tire above acts of said Constable/GD Gaurav Kumar Singh at most sensitive and important duty post like Quarter Guard amounts to gross negligence, indiscipline, arbitrariness and misconduct towards his duty. Hence, the charge." 

7. The Petitioner acknowledged the receipt of the Memorandum of Charge on 24.07.2025. Vide a separate Memorandum dated 06.08.2012, B.S. Badwal, Assistant Commandant, CISF Unit, Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Limited [“THDC”], Tehri, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges levelled against the Petitioner.
8. A preliminary hearing on charges was conducted before the Inquiry Officer at CISF Unit, THDC, Tehri at about 10:00 hours on 22.08.2012, wherein the Petitioner denied all the charges levelled against him. The Petitioner declined to take assistance of any member of the force as Defense Assistant.
9. Enquiry was initiated on 30.08.2012, wherein the prosecution examined 7 witnesses.
10. PW-1, Sub-Inspector (Executive) [“SI/Exe”] Khushal Singh deposed as follows:
(i) On 24.06.2012 at around 0125 hours, the Petitioner informed PW-1 that he had a quarrel with Ct/GD ST Hansing. Immediately, PW-1 directed Ct/GD Rohit Singh to go to the Quarter Guard to see what happened there.
(ii) Thereafter, both PW-1 and Ct/GD Rohit Singh went to the Quarter Guard, and upon enquiring, both the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing accused each other of assaulting. 
(iii) Ct/GD S.T. Hansing then told PW-1 and Ct/GD Rohit Singh that the Petitioner was sitting on the stairs and when he advised the Petitioner to go to his duty post, the Petitioner abused him by saying, “…Tu mujhe duty karna sikhayega.”
(iv) PW-1 made an entry to the effect of the instances described to him in General Diary at Sl. No. 777 dated 25.06.2012 at 01:25 hours, which PW-1 also produced before the Enquiry Officer in support of his deposition.
(v) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-1 clarified that he did not see the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing abusing and assaulting each other.
11. One HC/GD K. A.K. Das was also arraigned in the list of witnesses as PW-2, however, since he was on a long leave, his statement was not recorded in order to avoid delay in the departmental enquiry.
12. PW-3, Head Constable (General Duty) [“HC/GD”] K. Tigga deposed as follows:
(i) On 24/25.06.2012, when PW-3 was posted as the Guard Commander of the Quarter Guard, Ct/GD S.T. Hansing woke him up at about 0110 hours to inform that the Petitioner was unnecessarily arguing with him. Acting upon the same, PW-3 scolded the Petitioner and asked him to proceed to his duty post, while Ct/GD S.T. Hansing was asked to go to the Guard Room.
(ii) PW-3 informed the Company Commander/Shift In-Charge about the incident.
(iii) In support of his deposition, PW-3 produced the duty deployment chart of both the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing before the Enquiry Officer.
(vi) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-3 clarified that he did not see the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing abusing and assaulting each other.
13. PW-4, Ct/GD C.H. Raj Shekhar deposed as follows:
(i) PW-4 was deployed as sentry duty in the front side morcha of Quarter Guard from 01:00 hours to 05:00 hours on 25.06.2012, and had earlier relieved Ct/GD S.T. Hansing from the sentry duty on the front side.
(ii) When Ct/GD S.T. Hansing came to drink water near PW-4, at that time, the Petitioner was sitting on the stairs leading to the Quarter Master room in front of the Quarter Guard, seeing which Ct/GD S.T. Hansing asked the Petitioner to go to his duty post. In response, the Petitioner got annoyed and said, “…teri do din ki Naukri nahi hui hai aur duty kya karna, kaise karna tu mujhe sikhayega,” and thereafter, the Petitioner put his 5.56 mm INSAS Rifle on the stairs and caught hold of Ct/GD S.T. Hansing by his neck and pressed him on the fencing of the Quarter Guard. On seeing this incident, PW-4 immediately called Ct/GD Ranjan Kumar and the Guard Commander. When Ct/GD Ranjan Kumar came out from the Guard Room, his diffused the situation between the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing.
(iii) Upon asking, Ct/GD S.T. Hansing described the incident to the Guard Commander and at the same time, the Petitioner was also intimating about the incident to the Control Room from his mobile.
(iv) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-3 clarified that he did not see any quarrel between both of them.
14. PW-5, Ct/GD Rohit Singh deposed as follows:
(i) SI/Exe Khushal Singh/PW-1 intimated PW-5 about a quarrel in the Quarter Guard, and directed PW-5 to go to the Quarter Guard to ascertain as to why the incident took place.
(ii) When PW-5 reached the place of incident and asked the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing about the quarrel, the Petitioner, despite of PW-5’s objection, informed the Assistant Commandant about the same.
(iii) PW-5 then awoke HC/GD A.K. Das and asked him to go to the Quarter Guard, whereas PW-5 himself went back to the Control Room.
(iv) As per the order of Assistant Commandant, SI/Exe Khushal Singh/PW-1 asked PW-5 to replace the Petitioner at the duty post, as per which PW-5 took over the duty post. 
(v) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-5 clarified that he saw the Petitioner talking on his mobile phone and giving information about the incident to the Assistant Commandant.
15. PW-6, Ct/GD Ranjan Kumar deposed as follows:
(i) On 25.06.2012, PW-6 was called by Ct/GD C.H. Raj Shekhar/PW-4 to the place of incident, in furtherance of which PW-6 came out of his Guard Room and upon reaching the place of incident, he saw the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing arguing with each other. Upon seeing this, PW-6 took the Petitioner to the back side of the Quarter Guard and pacified him.
(ii) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-6 deposed that he saw the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing arguing in temper and heard Ct/GD S.T. Hansing asking why the Petitioner was manhandling, while Ct/GD S.T. Hansing was only talking.
16.  PW-7, Ct/GD S.T. Hansing deposed as follows:
(i) After completion of his sentry duty at the front side duty post of the Quarter Guard from 21:00 hours to 01:00 hours on 24/25.06.2012, PW-7 went to the Guard Room. Upon coming out, he saw the Petitioner sitting on the stairs leading to the Quarter Master Room in the front side of the Quarter Guard. This prompted PW-7 to ask the Petitioner to go back to his duty post, otherwise it may cause, “…defamation and punishment to all the guard if he is seen here by anyone.” In response, the Petitioner became angry and abused PW-7 by saying, “…do din ki Naukri nahi hui tu mujhe Naukri karna sikha raha hai,” proceeded to catch hold of PW-7’s neck and pressed it towards the fencing.
(ii) On overhearing the scuffle, Ct/GD C.H. Raj Shekhar/PW-4 rushed to the spot and separated the Petitioner and PW-7. Then, the PW-7 wriggled out from the Petitioner’s hold and asked the Petitioner as to why he was using force while PW-7 was only talking verbally.
(iii) PW-7 then informed the Guard Commander, who in turn, pacified both the situation. 
(iv) Upon cross-examination by the Petitioner, PW-7 stated that the Petitioner abused PW-7 on being asked to return to this duty post, despite the PW-7 having done so being a friend of the Petitioner. PW-7 clarified as to why he asked the Petitioner to go back to his duty post, reasoning the same on another GD being made 3 days prior to the incident on a similar issue, which resulted in all the concerned officers being put in the orderly room.
17. After conclusion of the prosecution witnesses’ examination, the Petitioner was examined by the Enquiry Officer. The Petitioner deposed as under:
(i) The Petitioner was deployed for sentry duty at the back side morcha of the Quarter Guard from 01:00 hours to 05:00 hours on 24/25.06.2012. As per usual practice, sentry of back side morcha is required to give a situation report of back side area to the front side sentry just after 10-15 minutes of mounting on duty. Accordingly, the Petitioner went to the front side of the Quarter Guard soon after mounting on duty at about 01:15 hours and just after giving the situation report, he went back to his duty post. 
(ii) The Petitioner declined to have sat down on the stairs, as alleged. Rather the Petitioner stated that his shoe lace was untied while returning to his duty post and therefore, he was tying his shoe lace for which he kept his leg on the stairs.
(iii) The Petitioner further declined to have abused or assaulted Ct/GD S.T. Hansing/PW-7 and claimed to have been falsely implicated under some conspiracy of certain interested prosecution witnesses.
(iv) The Petitioner stated that the General Diary was made by Ct/GD Rohit Singh/PW-5 against the Petitioner and not by the I/C Control Room on the basis of hearsay witnesses who had an ulterior motive of falsely implicating the Petitioner. 
(v) The Petitioner further stated that Ct/GD S.T. Hansing/PW-7 only told the Petitioner to go back to his duty post, but never told him that all guards would be defamed or punished if he was seen on the stairs by anyone else. As such, the Petitioner denies to have manhandled or abused the Ct/GD S.T. Hansing/PW-7.
18. After the conclusion of the departmental enquiry, SI/Exe Raj Kumar, Presenting Officer of the case submitted his brief note to the Enquiry Officer on 12.09.2012, which was also served upon the Petitioner. The Petitioner also submitted his representation on 14.09.2012 against the Brief Note served upon him by the Presenting Officer.
19. On the basis of the statements of the prosecution witnesses, documents presented as well as the brief notes submitted by the Presenting Officer and the Petitioner, the Enquiry Officer by way of the Enquiry Report dated 10.09.2012, concluded that both the charges levelled against the Petitioner stood proven. A copy of this Enquiry Report dated 10.09.2012 was supplied to the Petitioner on 21.09.2012 by the Commandant, which was received by the Petitioner on 22.09.2012.
20. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted his representation against the Enquiry Report dated 10.09.2012 on 02.10.2012. The same came to be rejected vide Order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant, CISF Unit BHEL, Haridwar, Uttarakhand, by way of which, the following penalty was imposed upon the Petitioner:
"Pay of No. 073090016 Constable/ GD Gaurav Kumar Singh is reduced minimum stage from Rs.7540/- + Grade Pay Rs.2000/- to Rs.6460/- Grade Pay Rs.2000/- in the pay Band of Rs.5200-20,200/- GP Rs.2000 for a period of two years with immediate effect. It is further directed that No. 073090016 Constable/ GD Gaurav Kumar Singh will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay". 

21. Aggrieved by the order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant, the Petitioner preferred an appeal petition on 26.12.2012 before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Northern Region-2. The appeal petition also came to be dismissed vide order dated 03.04.2013.
22. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal petition, the Petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Inspector General, North Sector, CISF, which also came to be dismissed by way of the order dated 09.07.2013.
23. Consequently, upon the grant of annual increments for the year 2012, the pay scale as mentioned in the Order dated 15.10.2012 was amended vide Corrigendum dated 24.04.2015, which reads as follows:
"It is, therefore, ordered that the pay of No. 073090016 Const/GD Gaurav Kumar Singh is reduced to minimum stage from Rs. 7,830/- + Grade Pay Rs. 2000/- to Rs. 6,460/- + Grade Pay Rs. 2000/- in the pay Band of Rs. 5200-20,200/- GP Rs.2000 for a period of two Years with immediate effect. It is further directed that No. 073090016 Const/GD Gaurav Kumar Singh will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay"

24. It is the above orders dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant being the Disciplinary Authority, 03.04.2013 passed by the Appellate Authority and 09.07.2013 passed by the Revisional Authority which are under challenge in the present writ petition.
25. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, while praying for the setting aside of the Order dated 15.10.2012 passed by the Commandant and its subsequent confirmation orders dated 03.04.2013 and 09.07.2013 has submits as under:
(i) None of the prosecution witnesses examined before the Enquiry Officer had seen the instance as alleged by the Ct/GD S.T. Hansing. Therefore, there was no eye witness to the alleged incident and all the prosecution witnesses have given hearsay statement on the instance of Ct/GD S.T. Hansing.
(ii) Despite there being no direct evidence, the Enquiry Officer concluded the charges levelled against the Petitioner as proven.
(iii) The Petitioner was never offered to be assisted by a Defense Assistant throughout the disciplinary inquiry and when such request was made by the Petitioner, it was ignored.
(iv) The departmental enquiry conducted against the Petitioner was violative of the Principles of Natural Justice and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
(v) The Inquiry Officer did not afford the Petitioner adequate opportunity to produce witnesses in his defense.
(vi) The punishment awarded to the Petitioner is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him.
26. Apart from the above submissions, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed strong reliance on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain,1968 SCC OnLine SC 56, to state that the entire proceedings against the Petitioner are vitiated, having been based squarely on hearsay evidences given by the prosecution witnesses in support of the complaint of Ct/GD S.T. Hansing.
27. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the Respondents, praying for the dismissal of the present writ petition, submits as under:
(i) The High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not function as an appellate court, and its power is confined to the decision-making process. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 310.
(ii) The present case is not a case of no evidence, as PW-4 Ct/GD Rajshekhar was an eyewitness to the entire scuffle between the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing. Additionally, PW-1 SI/Exe Khushal Singh also made a note of the incident in a General Diary report in Rozanmacha No. 777 dated 25.06.2012 at 0125 hours, which was also exhibited before the Enquiry Officer.
(iii) The Petitioner’s contention that he was not offered assistance of a Defence Assistant or Witness during the enquiry is erroneous was asked whether he would want a force member as his Defence Assistant, however he himself denied the said provision.
(iv) The Petitioner’s contention that a copy of the Enquiry Report was not supplied to him is baseless, as he himself acknowledged the receipt thereof on 22.09.2012.
(v) There was no bias against the Petitioner, which is evident from the fact that both the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing were suspended after the incident took place.
(vi) The principles of natural justice were duly followed as the enquiry was conducted in his presence, copies of the witness statements were provided to him and he was also afforded opportunities to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.
28. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record.
29. Before dealing with the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties, this Court reminds itself of the permissible scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
30. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors., 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24, the Apex Court has laid down the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1955) 1 SCR 1104 Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam (1958) SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh AIR 1960 SC 1168.

8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.”

31. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584, the Apex Court observed that interference by the High Court is unwarranted on the ground that another view is possible basis the material on record:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416).”

32. Further laying down the parameters within which the High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, the Apex Court in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 held as follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer.

The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

33. Similarly, in Union of India and Others v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, the Apex Court has made the following observations:
“23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.

24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.”

34. Keeping the aforesaid principles in mind, this Court shall now deal with the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the present case is covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India (supra), insofar as the findings against the Petitioner have been arrived at on the basis of hearsay evidence.
35. Facts of the case in the judgment of Central Bank of India (supra) reveal that an employee of the Bank was alleged to have committed misconduct of aiding bills having been drawn on bogus firms to be retired by the drawer’s representative. An enquiry was conducted against the employee, wherein he was found guilty of having committed acts prejudicial to the interests of the Bank and resultantly, the Enquiry Officer dismissed the employee from the service of the bank. The matter then travelled to the Industrial Tribunal, where a dispute was already pending before it, and the Industrial Tribunal, though observing that there was no procedural irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer, held that the findings were perverse, not based on evidence and were a result of conjectures. This finding of the Industrial Tribunal was upheld by the Apex Court, against which the appeal in question was preferred.
36. However, this Court has studied the judgment in Central Bank of India (supra) carefully, and it can be clearly seen that there are several distinguishable factors contained therein from the instant case.
37. The Apex Court observed that certain ingredients of the first charge levelled against the Bank’s employee were proved against him but there was no evidence at all. It was noted that the concerned ingredient required direct evidence from the Bank’s internal auditor, who was not present at the time of the incident. As such, when the internal auditor was examined to prove the ingredient, he based his deposition entirely on a statement made to him by another person. Additionally, that other person, it transpired, had withdrawn the statement on which the internal auditor relied upon. Other than this withdrawn statement, there was no other material available to the Enquiry Officer on the basis of which he could have proved the charges against the Bank’s employee. Thus, the Apex Court concluded that it was a correct conclusion arrived at by the Industrial Tribunal, that the Enquiry Officer having arrived at an inference of guilt was erroneous.
38. In the present case apart from Ct/GD S.T. Hansing, depositions of the witnesses clearly indicate that they were all informed about the scuffle between the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing. PW-1 SI/Exe Khushal Singh was informed by the Petitioner himself, and in turn, PW-1 informed PW-5, Ct/GD Rohit Singh. Thereafter, both PW-1 and PW-5 went to the place of incident and interrogated the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing about the quarrel. PW-1 thereafter proceeded to make a General Diary report about the occurrence, which document was also produced before the Enquiry Officer. Additionally, PW-3, HC (GD) K. Tigga was intimated by Ct/GD S.T. Hansing, upon which PW-3 also went to the site of incident. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, there was in fact an eye witness to the entire incident, being PW-4, Ct/GD Ranjan Kumar, who saw and heard the entire squabble between the Petitioner and Ct/GD S.T. Hansing. In turn, PW-4 also informed PW-6, Ct/GD Ranjan Kumar. 
39. The presence of an eye witnesses coupled with the production of the General Diary report regarding the incident by PW-1 before the Enquiry Officer, cumulatively take the present writ petition outside the ambit of the judgment of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India (supra) and as well as bars interference by this Court in terms of P. Gunasekaran (supra). Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the said judgment does not come to the aid of the Petitioner and reliance on the same is entirely misplaced.
40. Even otherwise, it is well-established that strict application of the rules of evidence are inapplicable in departmental enquiries. On this aspect, reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491, wherein the following was observed:
“4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.”

41. Lastly, on the contention of proportionality of the penalty imposed on the Petitioner, it is apposite to refer to certain decisions of the Apex Court, wherein the law regarding the limited scope of interference by the High Court insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, has been laid down.
42. In Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad, 2010 (5) SCC 775, the Apex Court has held as follows:
“15. In the matter of imposing of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons there for. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.”

43. In Charanjit Lamba v. Army Southern Command, (2010) 11 SCC 314, Court held:
“19. That the punishment imposed upon a delinquent should be commensurate to the nature and generally of the misconduct, is not only a requirement of fairness, objectivity, and non-discriminatory treatment which even those form quality (sic) of a misdemeanour are entitled to claim but the same is recognised as being a part of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is also evident from the long line of decisions referred to above that the courts in India have recognised the doctrine of proportionality as one of the ground for judicial review. Having said that we need to remember that the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is something that rests primarily with the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of a writ court or the Administrative Tribunal for that matter is limited to finding out whether the punishment is so outrageously disproportionate as to be suggestive of lack of good faith.

20. What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the writ court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable than what the disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a writ court may step in to interfere with the same.”

44. The Petitioner herein is an officer of the Central Armed Police Forces and a higher standard of discipline is cast on him. Material on record in the present petition shows that merely because the Petitioner lost his temperament in a situation which was not even a tense one, wherein a concerned officer was merely asking – in a cordial manner – for the Petitioner to move back to his duty post. Even the Petitioner’s defense in the entirely resting upon some purported conspiracy hatched by Ct/GD S.T. Hansing, which appears to be completely unfounded, as he did not describe any previous instance of enmity between them. In these circumstances, there could be no justification on part of the Petitioner whatsoever to respond in the manner he did. Despite of the Petitioner’s temperamental conduct and negligence towards his duty, the authorities have granted leniency in awarding to him the punishment of reduction of pay, which this Court deems to be appropriate and does not view as excessive. 
45. In view of the fact that the enquiry was held by a competent authority, the Petitioner was given ample opportunities of defending himself and cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, Commandant, Appellate as well as Revisional Authority were reasonable, this Court does not find any merit in the present Petition. 
46. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
47. No order as to costs.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J


VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
NOVEMBER 06, 2025
Prateek/AP


W.P.(C) 4233/2019                                                                                                                Page 1 of 24