*	IN  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF  DELHI  AT  NEW  DELHI
%						     Reserved on: 24th November, 2025                                                 
          Pronounced on: 11th December, 2025

+ 	                 W.P.(CRL) 3778/2025, CRL.M.A. 34088/2025

	JAIVARDHAN DHAWAN	
	S/o Ms. Preeti Dhawan (Pairokar)
	R/o First Floor, Pansheel Enchalve, Gate No.3
	Presently in Judicial Custody	       			         .....Petitioner

Through:	Mr. Puneet Mittal, Sr. Advocate with    Mr. Abhaid Parikh, Mr. Kartik Rathi, Mr. Vipul Agrawal, Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta and Ms. Kashish Jain, Advs.
				Versus
	NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU
	Delhi Zonal Unit, 
	West Block No.1, Wing No. 5, Near Central
	Water Commission, Sector 1, Rama Krishna Puram, 
	New Delhi – 110066 	   			                .....Respondent

Through:	Mr. Arun Khatri, SSC with Ms.Shelly Dixit and Ms. Tracy Sebastian, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

     J    U    D    G    M    E    N    T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “BNSS”) has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner, Jaivardhan Dhawan, challenging the Order dated 31.10.2025 passed by the Ld. Special Judge, ASJ (NDPS), New Delhi in NCB v. Amarjeet Kumar Sinha & Ors., Crime No. VIII/01/DZU/2025, whereby the Ld. ASJ granted an extension of 120 days to the Respondent/NCB, to complete the investigations and file the Complaint/Chargesheet.
2.  The Petitioner has also challenged the Order dated 13.11.2025 by which his Application seeking default bail under Section 187 BNSS read with Section 36A(4) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “NDPS Act”), was dismissed.
3. The case of the Complainant is that on 09.01.2025, based on secret information, a parcel bearing AWB No. 2980318180 was examined at DHL Express Pvt. Ltd., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi, which led to the recovery of 3.6 kg of Codeine Phosphate green-coloured tablets, falling within commercial quantity. The parcel consisted of muddas (stool chairs) being sent from Delhi to the United States of America. 
4. During investigation, the Petitioner and co-accused Amarjeet Kumar Sinha were intercepted on 14.05.2025 and served Notice under Section 67 NDPS Act. On the Petitioner’s disclosure, a search of his residence on the same day, allegedly led to the recovery of 29.89 grams of suspected psychotropic/narcotic tablets. Amarjeet was arrested on 14.05.2025 and the Petitioner on 15.05.2025.
5.  Notice was issued to Anu Singh, whose further disclosure led to recoveries on 16.05.2025 from Ghaziabad. The disclosures of Anu Singh and Gurmeet Singh led to recovery of 8.542 kg of loose white tablets and 2.360 kg of loose green tablets. 
6. Further disclosure by Anu Singh resulted in the apprehension of Ankul Kumar from Haridwar on the night of 16 - 17.05.2025. Also, NCB recovered 1.383 kg of pseudoephedrine and 100 Tramadol tablets from the premises of one Vishwanath Pawar in Dehradun. 
7. Investigation has further revealed that the contraband seized on 09.01.2025, 14.05.2025 and 16.05.2025, had been supplied by one Anupam Shukla of Haridwar, who was arrested on 31.05.2025.
8. It is submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that no commercial quantity was recovered from him and that he has been falsely implicated on the basis of the alleged 29.89 grams of suspected tablets, which were allegedly planted at his residence. The Respondent claims that the alleged recovery of 29.89 grams of suspected tablets was affected from his residence on the same day. The Petitioner was taken into custody on 14.05.2025 and formally arrested on 15.05.2025 and has remained in custody since. It is asserted that no proper grounds of arrest were communicated to him.
9. It is submitted that, contrary to Section 52A NDPS Act and the corresponding rules, sampling of the alleged recovered material was conducted after an unexplained delay of 69 days and was completed only on 23.07.2025.
10. On 30.10.2025, the IO filed an Application seeking extension of 120 days to complete the investigation and file the Complaint/Chargesheet. Since the Application was filed directly by the IO and not through a separate, independent report of the Ld. Special Public Prosecutor, as mandated, the same was withdrawn on 30.10.2025 due to “technical defects.”
11. On 31.10.2025, a Report under Section 36A(4) NDPS Act was filed by the Ld. SPP seeking an extension of 120 days, even though 10 days was remaining for expiry of the statutory 180-day period to complete investigations. The Ld. Trial Court allowed the Application on the same day and granted the extension.
12. The Petitioner has contended that even though sufficient time existed to afford an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner, he was informed or given an opportunity to oppose the Report seeking extension.
13. Significantly, the Petitioner was produced on that day i.e. 31.10.2025 for the purpose of extension of judicial custody till 14.11.2025. Despite this, no Notice was given to the Petitioner nor was he produced before the Ld. Trial Court, physically or virtually, when the Report was considered. Even the custody Order does not mention that Application seeking extension of time had been filed or was being considered. 
14. Not being aware of the extension of investigation period by 180 days, the Petitioner filed an Application on 12.11.2025 to seek default bail under Section 187(3) read with Section 483 BNSS and Section 36A(4) NDPS Act, on expiry of the investigation period on 11.11.2025. No Complaint/chargesheet was filed on that date.
15. The Ld. Trial Court dismissed the default bail Application Vide order dated 13.11.2025, on the ground that extension to complete the investigation had already been granted on 31.10.2025, and therefore, there existed no ground to grant the default bail.
16. The  Petitioner has challenged the extension of the Investigation period vide Order dated 31.10.2025 on the grounds that the granting of extension without Notice to the Petitioner, violates the principles of natural justice, Article 21 of the Constitution, and settled law. The SPP's Report seeking extension of Investigation period, filed on 31.10.2025, was cryptic and substantially identical to the earlier Application filed by the IO. The SPP’s Report fails to satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 36A(4) NDPS Act.
17. Reliance is placed on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484, wherein the Supreme Court held that an accused must be afforded an opportunity of hearing before extension of time under Section 36A(4), is granted. Similar reliance is placed on Judgebir Singh v. NIA, (2023) 17 SCC 48.
18. The Petitioner had rightfully and timely exercised his indefeasible right to default bail and ought to have been released on appropriate conditions, but has erroneously been dismissed vide the impugned Order dated 13.11.2025 and that his detention beyond 11.11.2025, is illegal.
19. The Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that extension being violative of settled principles, the Petitioner was entitled to Default Bail which has been dismissed without applying the law expounded in M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485, wherein it was held that detention beyond the prescribed period, without filing a Chargesheet, violates the CrPC/BNSS and Article 21.
20. The Petitioner is a well-educated, self-employed freelance software service provider and the sole breadwinner of his family. His 58-year-old mother is suffering from cancer. No contraband was recovered from the Petitioner’s possession. The alleged recovery was from his residence and he asserted his innocence. He undertakes not to tamper with evidence or influence witnesses and to appear before the Court as required.
21. Accordingly, it is prayed that the Order of extension dated 31.10.2025 and Order dated 13.11.2025 rejecting the Default Bail, be set aside and the Petitioner be released on Default Bail.
22. Reply/Counter-Affidavit has been filed by the Respondent, stating that the Petition is misconceived, legally untenable and an attempt to derail the investigation.
23. The extension of investigation period was granted after due compliance with mandatory safeguards, including submission of an independent, reasoned Report by the Ld. SPP outlining the progress of investigation and necessity for extension. The Ld. Trial Court passed a reasoned Order, consistent with Article 21 of Constitution. 
24. The Respondent submits that the right to default bail is neither automatic nor absolute; it arises only upon expiry of the statutory period without a valid extension. The Application for extension was filed within the statutory period and the accused were duly present through video conferencing when the Application was considered, as reflected in the order dated 31.10.2025. The extension was granted well before the expiry of the 180-day period.
25. According to the Respondent, the Petitioner’s reliance on various judgments is misplaced, as those cases pertain to situations where the statutory period had expired. In the present case, the statutory period had not lapsed and no right to default bail had accrued. 
26. It is denied that no contraband was recovered or that the alleged tablets were planted. The investigation began with the lawful seizure of 3.6 kg of Codeine Phosphate tablets from the DHL parcel booked at the instance of the Petitioner. The SPP’s Report fulfils the requirements of Section 36A(4) NDPS Act and records the progress of the interstate, organized trafficking operation.
27. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present Petition be dismissed. 
Submissions heard and record perused. 
28. The present case arises from a raid conducted by the Respondent on the basis of secret information on 09.01.2025 at Kirti Nagar, New Delhi. It is the case of the Respondent that, on 14.05.2025, the Petitioner and the co-accused, Amarjeet Kumar Sinha, were intercepted and based on their alleged disclosure, 28.89 grams of suspected tablets were recovered from the house of the Petitioner. 
29. The Petitioner has challenged the Order dated 31.10.2025 granting the extension of investigation period beyond 180 days and Order dated 13.11.2025 rejecting his default bail. 
30. The Petitioner was formally arrested on 15.05.2025, and remanded to custody. According to the Petitioner, the statutory period of 180 days for completion of investigation was to expire on 11.11.2025. It is an undisputed fact that no Complaint/Chargesheet was filed within this period. However, on 31.10.2025, the Ld. Special Public Prosecutor filed a Report under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act, seeking extension of time, and the Ld. Trial Court allowed the request on the same day, granting an additional 120 days for filing the Complaint/Chargesheet. 
31. According to the Petitioner, the period for filing the Chargesheet/Complaint expired on 11.11.2025, and he moved an Application for default bail on 12.11.2025. However, the said application was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court on the ground that an extension had already been granted on 31.10.2025.
32. A significant issue arises that arises for consideration in this petition is the validity of the Order dated 31.10.2025, extending the investigation period for filing the Complaint/Chargesheet for further 180 days, without any notice to the Petitioner and consequently, whether the Petitioner is entitled to default bail, in view of the expiry of the statutory period of 180 days from 15.05.2025, which came to an end on 11.11.2025.
33. Section 187 of BNSS, (earlier Section 167 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), provides as under:
“S. 187: Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.
          ….
(3) The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section for a total period exceeding—
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter.”

34. Further, Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act, reads as under:
“S. 36A. Offences triable by Special Courts:
(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”: 

Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.”

35. Section 187(3) BNSS mandates the completion of investigations in a period of 60/90 days from the date of arrest of an accused. However, 36A(4) NDPS Act gives the period of 180 days for completion of investigations. The proviso to Section 36A(4) however, provides that if the investigation cannot be completed within 180 days, the Special Court can extend the period up to one year, but only if the Public Prosecutor submits a report to show how the investigation has progressed and must clearly state why the accused needs to remain in custody beyond 180 days. 
36. This concept of grant of Bail in case the investigations are not completed within the given time, in common parlance, is known as “default bail.” The expression “default bail” is not defined in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita or earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, rather it is coined as by way of legal pronouncements. The concept is derived from the language of Section 187(3) BNSS, which mandates that on the expiry of the prescribed period of ninety or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused shall be entitled to be released on bail, provided he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and any person so released shall be deemed to have been released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter. 
37. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 3 SCC 77, while examining Section 167 Cr.P.C. in the context of the statutory right to default bail, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“13….. From the above provision, it would be amply clear that the Magistrate may authorise the detention of an accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond a period of 15 days, if he is satisfied that there are adequate grounds for doing so, but no Magistrate is authorised to detain the accused person in custody for a total period exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. In other words, if an accused was ready to offer bail, once the stipulated period for the investigation had been completed, then the Magistrate no longer had the authority to extend the period of detention beyond the said period of 90 days and, consequently, he had no option but to release the accused on bail. The language used in Sections 167(2)(a)(i) and (ii) is that on the expiry of the period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. The direction upon the learned Magistrate or the trial court is mandatory in nature and any detention beyond the said period would be illegal.”

38. In Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453, the Apex Court has observed that the right of an accused to be released on bail after expiry of the maximum period of detention provided under Section 167, can be denied only when an accused does not furnish bail, as is apparent from Explanation I to the said section. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 is a beneficial provision for curing the mischief of indefinitely prolonging the investigation and thereby affecting the liberty of a citizen.
39. In S. Kasi v. State, (2021) 12 SCC 1, the Apex Court held that the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, especially Section 167 Cr.P.C., gives strong importance on personal liberty. The Court noted that if the charge-sheet is not filed within the prescribed 60 or 90 days, as applicable, the accused cannot be kept in further custody. This provision acts as a clear safeguard meant to protect an individual’s right to personal liberty.
40. The concept of default bail ensures that an accused is not kept in custody for an indefinite period, while the investigation remains incomplete. This right flows from Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects personal liberty and permits its restriction only through a fair and just procedure, as held by three judge Bench of the Apex Court in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616 and re-emphasized in the case of  CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 3 SCC 734. 
41. It is important to note that the right to default bail arises only when the chargesheet/challan is not filed within the statutory period and if the Court validly extends the time for investigation on the report/application of the Public Prosecutor. This right ceases the moment the challan is filed within the permitted period or the extended period
42. Once the challan is filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to the accused after the filing of the challan. 
43. In Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410, the Apex Court has observed as under
“48. We have no doubt that the common stance before us of the nature of indefeasible right of the accused to be released on bail by virtue of Section 20(4)(bb) is based on a correct reading of the principle indicated in that decision. The indefeasible right accruing to the accused in such a situation is enforceable only prior to the filing of the challan and it does not survive or remain enforceable on the challan being filed, if already not availed of. Once the challan has been filed, the question of grant of bail has to be considered and decided only with reference to the merits of the case under the provisions relating to grant of bail to an accused after the filing of the challan. The custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If that right had accrued to the accused but it remained unenforced till the filing of the challan, then there is no question of its enforcement thereafter since it is extinguished the moment challan is filed because Section 167 CrPC ceases to apply. The Division Bench also indicated that if there be such an application of the accused for release on bail and also a prayer for extension of time to complete the investigation according to the proviso in Section 20(4)(bb), both of them should be considered together. It is obvious that no bail can be given even in such a case unless the prayer for extension of the period is rejected. In short, the grant of bail in such a situation is also subject to refusal of the prayer for extension of time, if such a prayer is made. If the accused applies for bail under this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail may be arrested and committed to custody according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is settled by Constitution Bench decisions that a petition seeking the writ of habeas corpus on the ground of absence of a valid order of remand or detention of the accused, has to be dismissed, if on the date of return of the rule, the custody or detention is on the basis of a valid order.”

44. From the above discussion, it is clear that the right to default bail arises only when the statutory period for filing the Chargesheet/complaint has expired and no valid extension has been granted. 
45. Another connected aspect is the requirement of giving Notice to the accused, which has been clearly settled by the Apex Court. The Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt (supra), while examining a similar question under the pari materia provision of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, observed as under:
“...(2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (1994) 4 SCC 602. The requirement of such notice to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered is alone sufficient for the purpose.”

46. The Apex Court in Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484, relying upon Sanjay Dutt (supra), has reiterated that when the Court considers a request for extension of judicial custody, the accused must be produced, either physically or through virtual mode. The presence of the accused is a mandatory safeguard because it enables the accused to oppose the request for further remand or extension of time. This requirement is a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the Court’s power to extend custody. The Apex Court further observed that non-production of the accused at the time of grant of extension of time for filing chargesheet is not a mere procedural irregularity, rather it amounts to violation of rights conferred under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
47. The Apex Court in Jigar (supra) has observed as under:
“45. The logical and legal consequence of the grant of extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right available to the accused to claim a default bail. If we accept the argument that the failure of the prosecution to produce the accused before the Court and to inform him that the application of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso added by sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may amount to violation of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The reason is the grant of the extension of time takes away the right of the accused to get default bail which is intrinsically connected with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution which is required to be followed before the liberty of a person is taken away has to be a fair and reasonable procedure. In fact, procedural safeguards play an important role in protecting the liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the Court and the failure to inform him that the application made by the Public Prosecutor for the extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21.”

48. From these above principles, it is clear that the accused must be present either physically or virtually when the Court considers a request for more time to complete the investigation. This is not a mere formality, but an important safeguard. It allows the accused to know what is happening and to raise objections, if any. If not produced or not informed, the procedure becomes unfair to the accused. Since extending time directly affects the accused’s right to default bail, an order passed without his presence, cannot be treated as a small or technical mistake. It is a serious violation of the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21.
49. The issue that now arises for consideration is whether the Petitioner was afforded a proper opportunity at the time when the application for extension of time was taken up by the Ld. Trial Court.
50. In the present case, while the Respondent submits that the time to file the chargesheet or complaint was extended to 120 days by the order dated 31.10.2025, the Petitioner challenges the validity of this extension and contends that he was neither served any Notice nor produced before the Court, whether physically or through virtual mode, when the Application for extension was considered. The Respondent, however, maintains that the Petitioner was present through video conferencing at the time the request for extension was heard.
51. In view of the disputed facts, it becomes necessary to examine the Order dated 31.10.2025 by which the extension of 120 days was granted. A bare reading of the order shows that there is no reference whatsoever to the presence or of any submission or objection raised by the Petitioner. The attendance recorded by the Ld. ASJ clearly states that the “Accused persons are stated to be in JC”. Had the Petitioner been present, the Order would have reflected that the accused was produced through JC.
52.  Even assuming the Petitioner made no submissions, it is difficult to accept that his presence went completely unrecorded. This strongly indicates that the Petitioner was not present when the Application was considered and that no mandatory notice, whether through physical production or virtual appearance, was given to him. Such omission is in clear breach of the settled legal requirement and renders the extension Order fundamentally flawed.
53. The NCB had made a desperate argument to establish the presence of the Petitioner at the time of consideration of Extension Application by asserting that the Petitioner had been produced before the Ld. ASJ. On the same day and the Judicial remand was extended for 14 days. However, this contention on its face has no merit as the Petitioner may have been produced on the same day, but the record reflects that he was not present at the time the extension Application was filed in the Court and no notice was given before the consideration of this Application. It may have been done on the same day, but not at the same time. Non presence and no Notice is not a mere procedural irregularity, but is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21, as held in the case of Jigar (supra).
54. Therefore, since the extension was granted without producing the Petitioner or even informing him that such a request was being heard, the order cannot be sustained. Not following this mandatory step makes the extension invalid and directly affects the Petitioner’s right to default Bail. Once there was no valid extension, and the Petitioner’s right to default Bail came into force automatically. He was, therefore, entitled to claim default bail as a matter of right.
55. The Respondent has also argued that the right to default Bail arises only upon expiry of the statutory period, and since the Ld. Trial Court had already extended the period for filing the Complaint/Chargesheet, no such right accrued to the Petitioner. However, this submission overlooks a crucial aspect. The Extension having been granted without any Notice to the Petitioner has already been held bad in law and therefore, no extension existed after 11.11.2025. 
56. The Application for default Bail on 12.11.2025 had been dismissed erroneously as the extension Order had been granted to the Respondent, without Notice to the Petitioner. 
57. In view of the above discussion, the Order dated 31.10.2025 was passed by the Ld. ASJ in contravention of the settled legal position, as mandatory notice was not served on the accused when the Application for extension was considered. Therefore, the Order dated 31.10.2025 is set aside. Consequently, the Order dated 13.11.2025, by which the Petitioner’s Application for default Bail was dismissed also cannot stand.
58. Accordingly, the orders dated 31.10.2025 and 13.11.2025 are set aside, and the Petitioner is held entitled to default Bail.
59. Considering the totality of circumstances, the Accused/Petitioner is granted Default Bail/Statutory Bail, on the following terms and conditions:
a)	The Petitioner/Accused shall furnish a personal bond of Rs.35,000/- and one surety of the like amount, subject to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
b)	The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Court as and when the matter is taken up for hearing; 
c)	The Petitioner/Accused shall provide his mobile number/changed mobile number to the IO concerned which shall be kept in working condition at all times; 
d)	The Petitioner/Accused shall not indulge in any criminal activity and shall not communicate or intimidate the witnesses. 
e)	In case the Petitioner/Accused changes his residential address, the same shall be intimated to learned Trial Court and to the concerned I.O. 
Order:
60. The Petition is allowed and accordingly disposed of, along with pending Application(s), if any.
61. The copy of this Order be communicated to the concerned Jail Superintendent, as well as, to the learned Trial Court.


  (NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
   JUDGE
DECEMBER 11, 2025/R


W.P.(CRL) 3778/2025                                                                                               Page 2 of 18