$~88 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + CONT.CAS(C) 1642/2025 SATMINLAL HAOKIP & ORS. .....Petitioners Through: Mr. Kaoliangpou Kamei and Mr. Jepi Y Chisho, Advocates. versus SHRI S GOPALAKRISHNAN IAS .....Respondent Through: Mr. Farman Ali, CGSC with Ms. Usha Jamnal, Advocate. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA JUDGMENT(ORAL) % 10.11.2025 C. HARI SHANKAR, J. 1. This petition alleges contempt of an order dated 10 September 2025 passed by this Court, which reads thus: “3. Mr. Kaoliangpou Kamei, learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to order dated 24 March 2025 passed by this Court in WP (C) 3512/20251. He also points out that, by the said order, we had directed the petitioners in that case to be considered for the selection by assessing their required height at 157 cms. 1 Lumptippou Joy Gangmeih v Staff Selection Commission 2 UOI v Lumtippou Joy Gangmeih 4. Mr. Kamei points out that the said order was challenged by way of SLP (C) Diary 40304/20252 which also stands dismissed by the Supreme Court on 25 August 2025 noting the fact that, in the interregnum, the recruitment rules were amended and the height requirement was reduced from 162 cms to 157 cms. 5. In the circumstances, issue notice to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued. 6. Notice is accepted by Ms. Uma Prasuna on behalf of the respondents. 7. Counter-affidavit, if any, be filed within four weeks with advance copy to learned Counsel for the petitioner who may file rejoinder thereto within four weeks thereof. 8. It is seen from the record that all the petitioners are more than 157 cms in height. Accordingly, their candidature shall be processed further subject to the outcome of this writ petition, treating them as having cleared the requisite height.” 2. The petitioners had applied for the post of Sub-Inspector in the CAPF and Delhi Police for which the advertisement was issued on 4 March 2024. They were allowed to participate in paper I of the examination but were not allowed to participate in paper II on the ground that the requisite height for candidates was 162.5 cm, whereas the petitioners did not meet the requisite height though they were above 157 cm. 3. Paper II of the examination, we may note, was held on 8 March 2025. The petitioners were informed on 5 March 2025 that they were not eligible to appear in paper II for failing to clear the requisite height required. 4. Similarly situated petitioners had approached the Court in WP (C) 3512/2025. In the said case, this Court had passed an order dated 24 March 2025, permitting the said petitioners to participate in further rounds of selection, in view of the fact that, for the candidates hailing from the North East, the requisite height was only 157 cm. That order was carried by the Union of India in appeal before the Supreme Court by way of SLP (C) Dairy 40304/2025 which was dismissed on 25 August 2025, in view of the statement made by learned Counsel for the Union of India, before the Supreme Court, that a policy decision had been taken to apply a height requirement of 157 cm for candidates who appeared from the North East. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid orders, Paper II was once again held on 30 April 2025 in which the candidates who were parties in WP (C) 3512/2025 were also considered. 6. The present petitioners, however, filed WP (C) 13949/2025 on 9 September 2025 much after the second attempt at paper II had been given on 30 April 2025. In that writ petition we had passed the order dated 10 September 2025, of which contempt is presently alleged. Para 8 of the order reads thus: “8. It is seen from the record that all the petitioners are more than 157 cms in height. Accordingly, their candidature shall be processed further subject to the outcome of this writ petition, treating them as having cleared the requisite height.” 7. The present contempt petition alleges that, as the petitioners were not allowed to further participate in the selection, there is wilful and contumacious disobedience of the order dated 10 September 2025 and that, therefore, the respondent is answerable for contempt. 8. The respondent submits that both attempts at Paper II had been exhausted, the first having been permitted on 8 March 2025 and the second on 30 April 2025. By the time the petitioners had approached this Court once thereafter, and therefore, it was not possible to accommodate the petitioners for any further rounds of 2024-2025 selection. On the last date of hearing, however, they submitted that the respondent was willing to exempt the petitioners from having to re-appear in paper I and consider their case for paper II for the year 2025-2026 on the basis of height requirement of 157 cm subject, however, to their rights to challenge the order dated 10 September 2025 in appeal. 9. We had, therefore, called upon Mr. Kamei to take instructions. 10. Having heard Mr. Kamei, we are not in a position to hold that there is contumacious and wilful disobedience of the orders passed by us. 11. Contempt is not a decision to be taken lightly. Every disobedience does not constitute contempt. It is only where disobedience is deliberate with an intent to overreach the Court and made contumaciously and that it would amount to contempt3. 3 Refer: Viterra B.V. v Sharp Corpn. Ltd, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8439 [rendered by one of us (C. Hari Shankar, J.) sitting singly], Ram Kishan v Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204 and Baradakanta Misra v Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446 12. In the present case, the respondent’s submission that the petitioners could not be considered further for selection for 2024-2025 as both rounds of Paper II had taken place much prior to the filing of the writ petition, on 8 March 2025 and 30 April 2025, to our mind, disabuses any possibility of there being any wilful, deliberate or contumacious disobedience of our order. 13. Mr. Kamei submits, however, that in view of the orders passed by the Supreme Court, the petitioners have a right to be considered for the year 2024-2025. He advances a suggestion that, even if the petitioners were to attempt Paper II for 2025-2026, their candidature should be considered as for the year 2024-2025. 14. We do not express any opinion on this contention. We are only concerned today with the contempt petition. In view of the facts of the case, we are not in a position to proceed against the respondent for contempt. 15. However, we clarify that this would not preclude the petitioners from moving any independent application for any reliefs for which they may consider themselves entitled to in view of decisions of the Supreme Court. Any such application, if and when made, shall be considered on its own merits. 16. The petition stands disposed of. C. HARI SHANKAR, J OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J NOVEMBER 10, 2025/pa