* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgments Reserved on: 31.08.2026 Judgment Delivered on: 30.09.2026 # CNR No. DLHC011088862025 + LPA 18/2026, CM APPL No. 3325/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Appellants versus SHRI HARI SINGH & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010163232026 + LPA 283/2026, CM APPL No. 25523/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI& ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI ASHWANI KUMAR & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010163702026 + LPA 282/2026, CM APPL No. 25518/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI SANJEEV KUMAR & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010406662026 + LPA 676/2026 & CM APPL Nos. 58435/2026 & 58437/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI& ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI OM PARKASH & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010397922026 + LPA 667/2026 & CM APPL Nos. 57288/2026 & 57290/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI& ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI AJAY KUMAR & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010384832026 + LPA 646/2026, CM APPL Nos. 55369/2026 & 55371/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI ROHTAS & ORS. .....Respondents # CNR No. DLHC010388042026 + LPA 652/2026, CM APPL Nos. 55869/2026 & 55871/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI PARDEEP KUMAR & ORS. .....Respondents % Judgment Reserved on: 02.09.2026 Judgment Delivered on: 30.09.2026 # CNR No. DLHC010411752026 + LPA 681/2026, CM APPL Nos. 59061/2026 & 59063/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI& ANR. .....Appellants versus ATTAR SINGH & ORS. .....Respondents % Judgment Reserved on: 15.09.2026 Judgment Delivered on: 30.09.2026 # CNR No. DLHC010435002026 + LPA 720/2026 & CM APPL No. 62343/2026 THE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Appellants versus SHRI RANBIR SINGH & ORS. .....Respondents Advocates who appeared in these cases For the Appellants : Mr. Sanjay Diwan, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mrs. K.K. Kiran Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. Mohd. Sueb Akhtar & Mr. Kushagra Dexit, Advocates. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Standing Counsel along with Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. M.S. Akhtar, Mr. Kushagra Dixit & Ms. Musarrat B. Hasmi, Advocates in LPA 720/2026. For the Respondents : Mr. N.S. Dalal, Ms. Nidhi Dalal, Mr. Alok Kumar & Ms. Rachana Dalal, Advocates. Mr. Vivek Goyal, Senior Panel Counsel with Ms. Akanksha Suman, Government Pleader & Mr. Aryan Aggarwal, Advocates for Union of India. Mr. Tanishq Srivastava, Adv. for UoI. Ms. Shobhana Takiar, Standing Counsel for DDA. CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA ORDER TEJAS KARIA, J. 1. The present Applications have been filed under Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act (“Act”) and Section 151 of the CPC, seeking condonation of the delay in filing and re-filing the present Appeals. As all the Appeals are filed by the common Appellant assailing the common judgment dated 18.08.2022 (“Common Judgment”) passed in W.P.(C) No. 8823/2017 and connected matters, the Applications seeking condonation of delay in filing and re-filing these Appeals raise identical issues for adjudication and are, accordingly, being heard and decided by this common Order. 2. The particulars of the delay in filing and re-filing the Appeals, together with the details of the corresponding Applications, are set out below: Serial No. LPA. No. Application No. Case Particulars Days of delay 1. 18/2026 CM APPL. No. 3324/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) and CM APPL. No. 3326/2026 (delay in re-filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Hari Singh & Ors. 1182 days in filing 23 days in re-filing 2. 283/2026 CM APPL. No. 25522/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Ashwani Kumar & Ors. 1304 days in filing 3. 282/2026 CM APPL. No. 25517/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Sanjeev Kumar & Ors. 1306 days in filing 4. 676/2026 CM APPL. No. 58436/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Om Prakash & Ors. 1436 days in filing 5. 667/2026 CM APPL. No. 57289/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Ajay Kumar & Ors. 1427 days in filing 6. 646/2026 CM APPL. No. 55370/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Rohtas & Ors. 1427 days in filing 7. 652/2026 CM APPL. No. 55870/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Pradeep Kumar & Ors. 1427 days in filing 8. 681/2026 CM APPL. No. 59062/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Attar Singh & Ors. 1436 days in filing 9. 720/2026 CM APPL. No. 62342/2026 (delay in filing the Appeal) and CM APPL. No. 62344/2026 (delay in re-filing the Appeal) The Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Shri Ranbir Singh & Ors. 1412 days in filing 32 days in re-filing SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS 3. Mr. Sanjay Diwan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants made the following submissions: 3.1. The present Applications seek condonation of the delay in filing and re-filing the Appeals against the Common Judgment, whereby the Appellants were directed to recompute the Special Rehabilitation Package (“SRP”) payable to the Respondents on a basis equivalent to that applied to certain other villages, together with arrears and interest. 3.2. The delay in filing the present Appeals arose from the multi-tiered internal examination of the Common Judgment by the Senior Assistant, Legal Assistants, the Additional Standing Counsel (Writ Cell), and the Legal Advisor-cum-Standing Counsel during 2022 and 2023. The process was impeded by the non-receipt of the files pertaining to several connected writ petitions in the Branch. Thereafter, at a meeting chaired by the Additional Chief Secretary (L&B) on 04.04.2024, a considered policy decision was taken to challenge the computation. The brief was assigned to the Standing Counsel on 05.06.2024, whereupon Review Petition No. 417/2024 was filed and diligently prosecuted until its dismissal on 25.02.2025. 3.3. Thereafter, fresh administrative approvals were obtained such as opinion of Legal Advisor-cum-Standing Counsel on 17.04.2025; approval of Secretary (L&B) on 22.04.2025, a fresh brief was assigned to the Standing Counsel on 03.09.2025, and the matter was placed before the Lieutenant Governor (“LG”) of Delhi, who on 24.10.2025 directed an enquiry into the erroneous SRP calculation and fixation of responsibility for the resultant loss to the public exchequer. The appeals were thereafter drafted, approved and filed on 12.12.2025 and refiled on 15.01.2026 after curing defects, without further loss of time. The said unbroken chain of dated official notings, inter-departmental references, meetings and approvals is qualitatively different from cases of unexplained or laconic delay, and that at no stage was the file permitted to lie unaccounted for. 3.4. This Court has consistently adopted a liberal approach while considering applications for condonation of delay by the State or its instrumentalities where the explanation furnished is bona fide, notwithstanding the length of the delay. In such matters, the duration of the delay is not determinative; the sufficiency of the cause shown remains the paramount consideration. The expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Act is required to be construed liberally, particularly where the applicant is the State or its instrumentality, since governmental decision-making is inherently collective, layered and impersonal. 3.5. In the present case, the Appellants have accounted for each period of delay by reference to specific dates and events and have demonstrated continuous and bona fide administrative action directed towards safeguarding the public interest and ensuring the correct computation of the SRP, without any element of negligence, inaction or deliberate delay. 3.6. Reliance was placed upon Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, wherein it was held that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Act is sufficiently elastic to enable Courts to advance substantial justice; that refusal to condone delay may result in a meritorious matter being rejected at the threshold; and that, where substantial justice and technical considerations are in conflict, the former must prevail, since the opposite party acquires no vested right to benefit from a delay that is neither deliberate nor mala fide. 3.7. Reliance was further placed upon G. Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142, as reiterated in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132, Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634, and subsequent decisions, wherein it has repeatedly been held that a measure of latitude may be extended while considering delay attributable to the State, since the State represents the collective interests of the community and its decisions necessarily entail layered and time-consuming internal processes. The same principle was applied in favour of the present Appellant in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, (2008) 14 SCC 582, wherein the delay arising from the internal processing of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi was condoned, the Court observing that the application of an unduly strict standard of proof may defeat public justice and encourage tactical exploitation of procedural delay. 3.8. Reliance was also placed upon State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, wherein it was held that Courts must adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach, duly accounting for procedural red-tape within the State apparatus, since the impersonal machinery of government cannot be equated with an individual capable of taking decisions with comparable expedition. 3.9. Reliance was additionally placed upon Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives and Others v. Union of India and another, (2023) 10 SCC 531, wherein it was held that the length of the delay is not the determinative test; rather, it is the acceptability of the explanation that governs the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, even a substantial delay may be condoned where it is satisfactorily explained, whereas even a delay of one day may warrant refusal in the absence of a sufficient explanation. On this basis, the order of this Court condoning a delay of 479 days by the State was upheld. 3.10. The existence of a serious triable issue concerning alleged concealment, coupled with the substantial public funds involved, constitutes an additional factor warranting condonation of delay. Reliance was placed upon Union of India v. Giani, (2011) 11 SCC 480, wherein the application of the State for condonation of delay was allowed after taking into consideration the existence of a strong arguable case. 3.11. The Appeals raise a substantial and subsisting issue concerning public funds, namely, the correctness of the computational benchmark underlying the Respondents’ claim. If the Appeals are dismissed solely on the ground of delay, without adjudication on merits, the allegedly erroneous benchmark may attain judicial finality and be extended to other similarly situated claimants, thereby causing prejudice to the public exchequer. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 4. Mr. N.S. Dalal, learned Counsel for the Respondents made the following submissions: 4.1. The present Applications are wholly unsubstantiated and fail to disclose sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in preferring the present Appeals. Reliance was placed upon Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media Limited & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 563, wherein it was held that government departments and statutory bodies are not entitled to the application of a more liberal or distinct standard for condonation of delay merely by virtue of being instrumentalities of the State. It was further held that the customary explanation of bureaucratic red tape and movement of files, in the absence of a bona fide and cogent explanation, cannot be accepted, particularly in view of the technological advancements available to such bodies. 4.2. The present Applications do not constitute the Appellant’s first attempt to circumvent the Common Judgment. An identical application seeking condonation of a delay of 777 days in relation to the Common Judgment already stands dismissed vide order dated 25.02.2025 passed in CM No. 65476/2024 in the connected Review Petition. The present Appeals, filed nearly eleven months thereafter and accompanied by cumulative and unexplained delays, therefore constitute a second and calculated attempt to reopen a judgment that has otherwise attained finality and amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 4.3. The conduct of the Appellant throughout the relevant period demonstrates a consistent pattern of deliberate default, rather than a merely bona fide procedural delay, as evidenced by: (i) non-compliance with the specific directions contained in the Common Judgment despite a period of nine months having been granted for compliance; (ii) complete and continued inaction upon the Respondents’ request dated 17.01.2023 seeking computation of the SRP in terms of the Common Judgment; (iii) the appearance of Standing Counsel on behalf of the Appellant in Contempt Case (C) No. 415/2024 (“Contempt Petition”) on 11.03.2024, with full knowledge of such non-compliance, without any subsequent step being taken either to comply with or to challenge the Common Judgment; and (iv) continued and unexplained inaction until December, 2025. Such conduct establishes wilful default and takes the present case beyond the limited latitude ordinarily extended to government bodies on account of bureaucratic red tape. Reliance was placed upon State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bheru Lal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, in support of the said submission. 4.4. Condonation of delay is not a vested right, but a discretionary relief that may be granted only where the applicant satisfies the Court as to the existence of sufficient cause and bona fide conduct. Although the length of the delay is not, by itself, determinative, it assumes considerable significance where, as in the present case, it is accompanied by the complete absence of an acceptable explanation and a demonstrable pattern of deliberate default. The Respondents, being land losers who have awaited payment of their legitimate dues under a judgment that has remained unimplemented for over three years, would suffer grave and irreversible prejudice if such delay were condoned at the instance of a party guilty of persistent default. Reliance was placed upon Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685, in support of the said submission. 4.5. The present Applications are founded upon vague and general averments and fail to disclose any cause, much less sufficient cause. Further, the Appellants’ conduct in contesting the Contempt Petition for several years, despite being aware from the outset of the period prescribed for compliance, and in taking no effective steps even after the lapse of approximately four years, demonstrates a complete absence of bona fides. 4.6. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present Applications be dismissed. REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS 5. Mr. Sanjay Diwan, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants made the following rejoinder submissions: 5.1. The decisions relied upon by the Respondents are distinguishable on facts and have no application to the circumstances of the present case. The decision in Postmaster General (supra) is distinguishable, as the delay therein was sought to be explained merely by a bald reference to procedural red tape, without any day-to-day chronology, whereas the Appellants herein have furnished a fully particularised and date-wise account. Even the said decision does not depart from the settled position that a degree of latitude may be extended to the State where the explanation furnished is neither unreasonable nor indicative of a casual or negligent approach. 5.2. The decision in Balwant Singh (Dead) (supra) is inapplicable, as it arose in the context of abatement resulting from the failure to bring the legal representatives on record under Order XXII Rule 9 of the CPC, which constitutes an entirely distinct statutory framework. The said decision has no bearing on an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal by a Government department. 5.3. The decision in Bheru Lal (supra) concerned a grossly inordinate and unexplained delay of 663 days, unsupported by any day-wise particulars, which led the Court to deprecate the filing of routine and template applications. The present case stands on an altogether different footing, as every stage in the movement of the file, the officers concerned, and the dates on which action was taken have been specifically pleaded and are verifiable from the departmental record. 5.4. The Respondents’ reliance upon the Appellants’ continued contest of the Contempt Petition, without simultaneously preferring the Appeals, is misconceived. Contempt proceedings are concerned with compliance with a judgment and not with the correctness thereof; participation in such proceedings does not amount to a waiver of the right to challenge the underlying judgment. The Review Petition was, in fact, diligently pursued but came to be dismissed on the ground of limitation without any adjudication on the merits, following which the present Appeals were filed along with the present Applications. 5.5. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present Applications be allowed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 6. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Diwan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants, and Mr. N.S. Dalal, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, and have carefully perused the pleadings, the material placed on record, and the authorities cited at the Bar. The principal question that arises for our consideration is whether the Appellants have disclosed sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing and re-filing the present Appeals. 7. The principles governing condonation of delay are well settled. The length of the delay, though relevant, is not by itself determinative; the controlling consideration is whether the explanation furnished is genuine, reasonable, and sufficient. Thus, a substantial delay may be condoned where every material period is satisfactorily accounted for, whereas even a comparatively brief delay may warrant refusal where the explanation is casual, negligent, or an afterthought. 8. This position has repeatedly been affirmed by the Supreme Court, including in Mst. Katiji (supra) and, more recently, in Sheo Raj Singh (supra). The Courts are required to adopt a justice-oriented approach and, where circumstances so warrant, to prefer adjudication on merits over a purely technical objection founded upon limitation, provided that the party seeking condonation has acted with due diligence and has not been shown to be negligent or lacking in bona fides. 9. Learned Counsel for the Respondents placed reliance upon Post Master General (supra) and Bheru Lal (supra) to contend that Government departments cannot seek condonation merely by invoking bureaucratic red tape or the routine movement of files. There is no quarrel with the principle enunciated in those decisions that the State is not entitled to preferential treatment in the absence of a cogent and particularised explanation. The facts of each case have to be examined to determine whether the party seeking condonation of delay has sufficiently explained the cause of the delay. Each of the authorities relied upon by the Respondents, the State had failed to furnish a day-to-day or stage-wise account and had instead relied upon broad and unspecified assertions concerning administrative delay. 10. In the present case, the Appellants have placed on record a continuous and date-specific chronology commencing with the examination of the Common Judgment by the Senior Assistant, the Legal Assistants, the Additional Standing Counsel (Writ Cell), and the Legal Advisor-cum-Standing Counsel. The chronology thereafter records the decision taken at the meeting chaired by the Additional Chief Secretary (L&B) on 04.04.2024; the filing and prosecution of the Review Petition until its dismissal on 25.02.2025; the obtaining of a fresh legal opinion and approval at the level of the Secretary; the renewed briefing of counsel; and the direction issued by the LG on 24.10.2025 for an enquiry into the allegedly erroneous computation of the SRP. These steps culminated in the filing of the Appeals on 12.12.2025 and their re-filing on 15.01.2026. The record, therefore, does not disclose a file that remained dormant, unexplained, or wholly unaccounted for. Each material stage is supported by a date and is attributable to an identifiable officer or authority. The principal infirmity noticed in Post Master General (supra) and Bheru Lal (supra), namely the absence of a particularised and verifiable explanation, is thus not present in the case before us. 11. The Respondents’ reliance upon Balwant Singh (Dead) (supra) is misplaced as that decision arose in the context of abatement occasioned by the failure to bring the legal representatives of a deceased party on record within the period prescribed under Order XXII Rule 9 of the CPC, upon which a distinct legal consequence and a corresponding right accrued in favour of the opposite party. The statutory setting, the nature of the default, and the consequences considered therein are materially different from those arising in an application for condonation of delay in filing a first appeal. The said decision, therefore, is not helpful to the Respondents. 12. The contention of the Respondents that the institution of the present Appeals, subsequent to the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay in the Review Petition, constitutes a second and calculated attempt to reopen the Common Judgment or amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court cannot be accepted. An appeal and a review are distinct and independent remedies, governed by different statutory parameters, periods of limitation, and scopes of scrutiny. The dismissal of an application for condonation of delay in one proceeding does not, by itself, create a legal bar against recourse to the other, provided that the delay attending the subsequent remedy is independently and satisfactorily explained. 13. In the present case, the Appellants have explained the delay in filing the Appeals by reference to subsequent dates, administrative decisions, and procedural steps that require consideration on their own merits. Where the earlier remedy failed on a procedural ground and without adjudication of the substantive controversy, recourse to another remedy available in law cannot, in the absence of additional circumstances demonstrating misuse, be characterised as an abuse of process or an impermissible attempt to unsettle a concluded matter. 14. We also do not find any merit in the submission that the Appellants’ continued participation in the Contempt Petition, without simultaneously instituting the present Appeals, evidences an absence of bona fides or establishes a deliberate pattern of default. Contempt jurisdiction is principally concerned with securing obedience to, and examining compliance with, a subsisting judicial command; it does not ordinarily involve reconsideration of the correctness of the judgment itself. Participation in contempt proceedings is, therefore, neither inconsistent with nor tantamount to a waiver of the independent right to challenge the underlying judgment in accordance with law. 15. The record further indicates that the Appellants did pursue their remedies available under law by first filing Review Petition, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation without an adjudication on merits, and subsequently through the present Appeals. Viewed cumulatively, the conduct of the Appellants reflects efforts to avail the available legal remedy, albeit with considerable delay, rather than wilful abandonment or deliberate defiance of the directions contained in the Common Judgement. 16. The Appeals raise a substantial question of law concerning the correctness of the methodology adopted for computation of the SRP payable to the Respondents and its potential application to similarly situated persons in other villages. The Appellants have contended that the adopted benchmark may involve an error with significant consequences for the public exchequer. As an enquiry has been directed into the computation and the fixation of responsibility for the alleged resultant loss, the Appeals require consideration on merits and foreclosing examination of this important issue on the ground of limitation may have consequences extending beyond the parties to the present proceedings. The inconvenience occasioned to the Respondents by permitting adjudication on merits must therefore be balanced against the broader public interest in securing an authoritative determination of the disputed computational basis. 17. As regards the prejudice asserted by the Respondents, the Common Judgment already directs payment of arrears together with simple interest until realisation. Their pecuniary interest is, to that extent, protected during the pendency of the Appeals, as the interest component continues to accrue in their favour. Condonation of the delay does not extinguish or dilute that protection; it merely enables the Appellants to secure an adjudication on the correctness of the disputed computation. The prejudice caused by the passage of time can, moreover, be appropriately addressed through an order as to costs. 18. Upon an overall consideration of the material placed before us, we are satisfied that the delay in filing and re-filing the present Appeals has been sufficiently explained by providing particulars. The grounds for seeking condonation of delay does not indicate deliberate inaction, or want of bona fides on the part of the Appellants. 19. Having regard to the nature of the controversy, the explanation furnished, the public interest involved, and the compensable nature of the prejudice caused to the Respondents, the balance of justice favours adjudication of the Appeals on merits rather than their rejection at the threshold on the ground of limitation. 20. The question of costs requires separate consideration. Condonation of delay, even where the explanation is ultimately found to be bona fide and sufficient, remains an exercise of judicial discretion in favour of a party that has failed to approach the Court within the prescribed period. Such indulgence may appropriately be made conditional upon payment of costs to balance the equities between the parties. 21. The Respondents are private individuals and have awaited the benefit of the Common Judgment rendered in their favour. The delay in filing and re-filing the present Appeals have been occasioned solely on account of the Appellants. Further, the Appellants have had to contest the present Applications and incur additional expense at this preliminary stage of the proceedings. 22. Although the explanation furnished by the Appellants is found to be sufficient to warrant condonation of delay, the imposition of costs is justified both to compensate the Respondents for the delay and the additional litigation occasioned thereby, and to promote institutional diligence on the part of government departments in pursuing legal remedies within the prescribed period. Such an order appropriately balances the Respondents’ legitimate entitlement to compensation against the requirement that the Appeals be adjudicated on merits. 23. Accordingly, the Applications seeking condonation of delay in filing and refiling the present Appeals are allowed, subject to the Appellants paying costs of ?15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) in each of the Applications to Delhi High Court Bar Clerks’ Association (A/c No. 15530100006282: IFSC Code: UCBA0001553) within a period of four weeks from today. 24. Consequently, the delays in filing and re-filing the present Appeals, as particularised in Paragraph No. 2 of this Order stand condoned and the Applications are allowed, subject to payment of costs in the terms set out above. 25. List LPA No. 18/2026, along with the connected matters, for hearing on 08.12.2026. TEJAS KARIA, J DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ SEPTEMBER 30, 2026 N / ap LPA 18/2026 & Connected Matters Page 2 of 2