



2025:DHC:6605-DB



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\* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

*Date of Decision: 07.08.2025.*

+ W.P.(C) 11876/2025, CM APPL. 48480/2025 & CM APPL. 48481/2025

MOHAMMED JAVED

.....Petitioner

Through: Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Pyoli, Mr. Ejaz M. Qureshi, Ms. Saumya Dwivedi, Ms. Shashwati Parhi, Ms. Kashish Jain and Mr. Animesh Rajoriya, Advocates

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

....Respondents

Through: Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with Mr.Amit Tiwari, CGSC, Mr.Amit Gupta, Ms.Avshreya Pratap Singh Rudy, Mr.R.V.Prabhat, Mr.Vinay Yadav, Mr.Ayush Tanwar, Ms.Ayushi Srivastava, Mr.Naman, Advs, Mr.Shivam Sachdeva, G.P for UoI.

Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Pulkit Agarwal, Mr. Sudhanshu Kaushesh, Mr. Rajat Kumar, Mr.Neelmani Guha, Mr. Vaibhav Dabas, Mr. Vikas Tiwari, Mr. Ankur Kumar and Mr. Anubhav Lamba, Advocates for R-5.

**CORAM:**

**HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE**

**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA**



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**DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ (ORAL)**

1. Issue notice to the respondents.
2. On behalf of respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3, Sh. Chetan Sharma, learned Additional Solicitor General has put in his appearance and accepts notice, whereas for respondent no.5, Sh. Gaurav Bhatia, learned Senior Advocate appears and accepts notice.
3. Respondents shall file their counter affidavit within a period of four weeks. Two weeks' time thereafter shall be available to the petitioner to file the rejoinder affidavit, if any.
4. List on 16.10.2025 for hearing.
5. The proceedings of this petition have been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order dated 06.08.2025 passed by the Government of India in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, whereby the revision petition preferred by the petitioner under Section 6(2) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 [hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'] has been dismissed.

At this juncture itself, we may note that the revision petition, which has been dismissed by the Government of India by passing the impugned order dated 06.08.2025 was preferred against the certification of the film titled "*Udaipur Files : Kanhaiya Lal Tailor Murder*" for public exhibition under Section 5A of the Act.

Apart from seeking quashing of the impugned order dated 06.08.2025, the petitioner has also prayed that the certification for exhibition granted to the film by the Central Board of Film Certification [hereinafter referred to as the 'Board'] on 20.06.2025, be quashed.

6. Learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner, Dr. Menaka



Guruswamy has prayed that interim prayer made in the application, being CM APPL. 48480/2025, be granted after arranging exhibition of the film for the Court. The interim prayer made in the aforesaid application is to the effect that an ad-interim stay of release of the film be granted during the pendency of the writ petition.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties who have made lengthy submissions.

8. The sheet anchor of the argument of the learned senior counsel representing the petitioner is that exhibition of the film, in the form it has been certified by the Board, infringes right of the fair trial of the petitioner, who is an accused (accused no.8) in a criminal trial in as much as that the film has been made on a criminal incident in respect of which the petitioner is facing criminal trial, wherein charge-sheet has also been filed against accused persons including the petitioner.

9. In this regard, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that right of fair trial in a criminal case emanates from Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, which override any other fundamental right enshrined in Part-III of the Constitution including right contained in Article 19 (1)(a) and 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution. It has been submitted further that the very nomenclature of the film contains the words, "*Kanhaiya Lal Tailor Murder*" and it is in respect of the murder of Kanhaiya Lal Tailor that the petitioner is facing criminal trial as accused no. 8. Dr. Guruswamy, thus, contends that since the film is based on an incident in respect of which the petitioner is facing trial and further that even the contents of the charge-sheet have been depicted in the form of dialogues in the film, any exhibition of such a film will prejudice the fair trial for the reason that exhibition of the film has the



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potential of influencing the entire environment in which the criminal trials take place in our country. To buttress this contention, she has submitted that exhibition of the film will affect not only the rights of the petitioner to fair trial but also the witnesses and even the Court and its staff as well, which will seriously prejudice the petitioner's case in the trial.

10. Our attention in this regard has been drawn to certain portions of the charge-sheet, which have been read extensively by the learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner and it has been submitted that the said narrations in the charge-sheet are reflected in the dialogues in the film and accordingly exhibition of the film, if permitted, will have potential impact on the trial to the detriment of the petitioner. Dr. Guruswamy has, thus, urged for organizing exhibition of the film for the Court and stay its release by passing an interim order.

11. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India, Sh. Chetan Sharma appearing for respondent nos. 1 to 3, has opposed the prayer vehemently and has argued that the film has been certified by the Board after suggesting fifty-five (55) cuts and further that even the revision petition filed by the petitioner did not find favour with the Revisional Authority and therefore, once any film is certified under the relevant statutory provisions of the Act, there shall be legal presumption about the certificate having been issued validly. He has further submitted that the Board consists of experts of the area and performs its statutory functions and accordingly, the scope of judicially reviewing any decision of the Board certifying any film for public exhibition is very limited. It is also his contention that the producers of the film have incorporated all the fifty-five (55) cuts as ordered by the Board and in addition thereto they have also incorporated five (5) cuts and replaced the



disclaimer voluntarily, as was recommended by the Central Government by its order dated 21.07.2025, which was passed in the proceedings of an earlier revision petition where the petitioner had entered appearance. Sh. Sharma, thus, opposes the prayer for grant of interim relief on the aforesaid counts.

12. Learned Senior Advocate representing the respondent no.5/producer, Sh. Gaurav Bhatia, while adopting the submissions made by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India has additionally submitted that film is now scheduled to be released on 08.08.2025 and viewers have also booked their tickets and further that for public exhibition next dates in the cinema halls will be available only after six months and therefore, the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the petitioner. It has further been argued on behalf of the respondent no.5/producer that there is a legal presumption in favour of exhibition of film once a valid certificate by the Board in discharge of its statutory functions has been granted.

13. Sh. Bhatia, learned counsel for the respondent no.5/producer also stated that in the entire film, name of the petitioner, who is accused no. 8 in the trial, has not been mentioned even once, neither the film attributes any specific role to the petitioner. He has further submitted that having regard to the contents of film there does not exist any proximate link between the exhibition of the film and trial being specifically affected in any manner.

14. Further submission on behalf of the respondent no. 5 is that the film does not contain exact narration of the crime in terms of the charge-sheet, rather it is based on the incident and that the ultimate message, which the film conveys, is that of social harmony in the society and it does not in any manner vilify or condemn any community. He has reiterated the submission made by Sh. Chetan Sharma, learned ASG that the producer of the film has voluntarily



incorporated five (5) cuts and replaced the disclaimer as was recommended by the Central Government in its order dated 21.07.2025. For the aforesaid reasons, Sh. Bhatia has argued that the prayer made for grant of interim relief is misconceived, hence the same deserves to be rejected.

15. We have carefully considered the competing arguments made by learned counsel representing the respective parties. It is trite law that although the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure(hereinafter referred to as CPC) are, *ipso facto*, not applicable to the proceedings of a writ petition before the High Court, however, principles laid down for granting interim relief under Order XXXIX of the CPC should be kept in mind by the High Court. The said declaration of law can be found in para 6 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ***Union of India v. Era Educational Trust: (2000) 5 SCC 57***, which is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“6. It may be that Order XXXIX CPC would not be applicable at the stage of granting interim relief in a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, but at the same time various principles laid down under Order XXXIX for granting ad interim or interim reliefs are required to be taken into consideration. In the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das [(1994) 4 SCC 225] after considering the various authorities this Court laid down the guiding principles in relation to grant of an ad interim injunction which are as under: (SCC pp. 241-42, para 36)*

*“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are—*

*(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff;*

*(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;*



*(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented;*  
*(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction;*  
*(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application;*  
*(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time;*  
*(g) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court.”(Emphasis supplied by Court)*

16. Thus, for appropriately considering the prayer for grant of interim relief as argued on behalf of the petitioner, what needs to be first examined is as to whether the petitioner has been able to make out a prima facie case.

17. On an application preferred by the Producers, the film was certified by the Board on 20.06.2025 as per the requirement of Section 5A of the Act. Certification of films in terms of Section 5A of the Act can be granted only if, after examination, the film is found to be suitable for public exhibition by the Board. Section 5A of the Act further provides that in case the film is not found suitable for unrestricted public exhibition, but is otherwise found suitable for public exhibition restricted to adults or to members of any profession or any class of persons, the certificate shall be granted in respect of the film as “A” certificate or as the case may be, “S” certificate. Sub section 2 of Section 5A of the Act provides that the certificate granted shall be published in the Gazette of India. Sub-section 3 of the Act provides that a certificate granted by the Board shall be valid throughout India subject to



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other provisions of the Act.

18. It is not that the power of the Board for grant of certification under Section 5A of the Act is unbridled or unchannelised. Section 5B of the Act contains principles for guidance in certifying the film, which *inter alia* provides that film shall not be certified if the film or any part of it is (i) against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) against the security of the State, (iii) against the friendly relations with foreign States, (iv) against the public order, (v) against the decency or morality, (vi) or it involves defamation or contempt of court or is likely to incite commission of any offence.

19. Sub-section 2 of the Section 5B of the Act empowers the Central Government to issue directions setting out the principles, which shall guide the competent authority to grant the certificate while sanctioning the film for public exhibition. The Central Government in exercise of its power vested in it under Section 5B(2) of the Act has issued certain guidelines which are embodied in the notification dated 06.12.1991. Thus the prayer for certification of films is to be considered by the Board on the principles for guidance as contained in Section 5B of the Act read with notification issued by the Central Government under Section 5B(2) of the Act.

20. The decision of the Board for grant of certification to the film was challenged by the petitioner by instituting a writ petition namely W.P.(C)647/2025 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The decision of the Board to certify the film was also challenged before this Court in W.P.(C)9362/2025, by another petitioner, which was finally disposed of by means of the judgment and order dated 10.07.2025, whereby the petitioner of the said writ petition was permitted to approach the Central Government by



invoking Section 6(2) of the Act with a further direction that, in case, the petitioner of the said petitioner approaches the Central Government by filing revision petition under Section 6(2) of the Act, the same shall be decided by the Central Government in accordance with law.

21. The said order dated 10.07.2025 was subjected to challenge before the Supreme Court in SLP(C) 18316/2025, which was heard and decided by the Supreme Court on 16.07.2025 along with W.P.(C)647/2025 filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court. By the said order dated 16.07.2025, the Supreme Court allowed the petitioner to enter appearance before the Central Government through counsel in the proceedings of the revision petition, which was instituted pursuant to the order of this Court dated 10.07.2025.

22. The revision petition was thus decided by the Central Government by means of an order dated 21.07.2025, which too became subject matter of challenge in two writ petitions, one filed by the petitioner [W.P.(C) 10949/2025] and the other filed by one Maulana Arshad Madani [W.P.(C)10951/2025]. Both the writ petitions were disposed of by this Court by means of order dated 01.08.2025 on the basis of statement made by learned ASG representing the Central Government as also the Board to the effect that the Central Government shall withdraw the order dated 21.07.2025 and take a decision on the revision petition afresh.

23. Pursuant to the order dated 01.08.2025 passed by this Court, the Central Government has now passed the impugned order on 06.08.2025, whereby the revision petition has been dismissed. It is this order dated 06.08.2025, which is under challenge herein before us in these proceedings.

24. It is also to be noticed that it is not only that the producers of the film have incorporated 55 cuts as was ordered by the Board while certifying the



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film, but have also incorporated 05 cuts voluntarily as suggested by the Central Government in its order dated 21.07.2025 along with replacing disclaimer. The replaced disclaimer reads as under:-

### Disclaimer

This film is a creative work of fiction inspired by certain real events. While based on true incidents, it is not ~~intended as a~~ complete or literal account of actual persons or occurrences. The filmmakers have liberally exercised ~~limited~~ artistic liberty to shape the narrative, respecting the essence of the subject. Certain elements have been adapted or dramatized and any resemblance to real persons or events is ~~partly intentional~~ unintentional and may not be ~~but not~~ an exact factual representation. The film does not endorse, justify, or glorify violence, vigilantism, extremism, or illegal acts. It has been made with social responsibility and does not intend ~~seek~~ to provoke, disturb public order, or defame any individual, community, religion, institution, or judicial body. Viewer discretion is advised. The film contains strong themes, including violence and trauma, which may not be suitable for all audiences.



25. In ***Viacom 18 Media (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 761*** Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that once the certificate has been issued there is a prima facie presumption that the authority concerned has taken into account all the guidelines. Para 16 of the said judgment is apposite to be quoted here which reads as under:-

*“16. It has to be borne in mind, expression of an idea by any one through the medium of cinema which is a public medium has its own status under the Constitution and the statute. There is a Censor Board under the Act which allows grant of certificate for screening of the movies. As we scan the language of the Act and the Guidelines framed thereunder, it prohibits use and presentation of visuals or words contemptuous of racial, religious or other groups. Be that as it may. As advised at present, once the certificate has been issued, there is prima facie a presumption that the authority concerned has taken into account all the Guidelines including public order.”*

*(Emphasis supplied by Court)*

26. We may further refer to certain observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Viacom 18 Media (P) Ltd. (supra)*** in para 15 of the report, wherein it has been observed that, “once the parliamentary legislation confers the responsibility and the power on a statutory Board and the Board grants certification, non-exhibition of the film by the States would be contrary to the statutory provisions and infringe fundamental rights”. Para 15 of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“15. For the present, we are considering the prayer for grant of interim relief i.e. whether the notifications/orders prohibiting the exhibition of the film should be stayed or not. The creative content is an insegregable aspect of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Needless to emphasise, this right is not absolute. There can be regulatory measures. Regulatory measures are reflectible from the language employed under Section 5-B of the Act and the Guidelines issued by*



*the Central Government. Once the parliamentary legislation confers the responsibility and the power on a statutory Board and the Board grants certification, non-exhibition of the film by the States would be contrary to the statutory provisions and infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners. That apart, as we understand at present from para 27 of the judgment in Prakash Jha Productions [Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 372] , it is the duty and obligation of the State to maintain law and order in the State. We may also note here with profit that the Guidelines are to be kept in mind by CBFC. For the sake of completeness, we reproduce the relevant part of the Guidelines:*

*“2. In pursuance of the above objectives, the Central Board of Film Certification shall ensure that—*

*\*\*\**

*(viii) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity;*

*\*\*\**

*(x) scenes degrading or denigrating women in any manner are not presented;*

*\*\*\**

*(xiii) visuals or words contemptuous of racial, religious or other groups are not presented;*

*(xiv) visuals or words which promote communal, obscurantist, anti-scientific and anti-national attitude are not presented;*

*\*\*\**

*(xviii) public order is not endangered;”*

27. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court as quoted above, we reiterate that once the Board has certified the film, that too after 55 cuts, and the decision by the Board to certify the film has been upheld by the revisional authority under Section 6(2) of the Act, the legal presumption about the film being fit for public exhibition shall operate in this case as well.

28. For ascertaining as to whether the petitioner has been able to make out



a prima facie case, we may also refer to certain observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574***, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that our commitment of freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless situations created by allowing such freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. Further observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case is that anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched, rather it should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression and that expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest. The said observations made in para 45 of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“45. The problem of defining the area of freedom of expression when it appears to conflict with the various social interests enumerated under Article 19(2) may briefly be touched upon here. There does indeed have to be a compromise between the interest of freedom of expression and special interests. But we cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are of equal weight. Our commitment of freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched. It should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest. In other words, the expression should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in a power keg”. ”*

29. If the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is analysed in the light of the above observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court what we find is that merely because the name of the film contains the name of the person, who was murdered in respect of which the petitioner is facing trial it cannot be treated to be a ground to conclude that there is any proximate or direct nexus between the exhibition of the film and its impact on the trial.



30. In ***Indibily Creative Private Limited & Ors. v. Government of West Bengal and Ors.***, (2020) 12 SCC 436 Hon'ble Supreme Court has quoted certain observations made by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court with approval in para 35.1 of the said judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“35.1. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court quashed the orders of the Central Board of Film Certification (“CBFC”) as well as the appellate authority. One of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) observed : (SCC OnLine Bom para 12)*

*“12. ... Films which deal with controversial issues necessarily have to portray what is controversial. A film which is set in the backdrop of communal violence cannot be expected to eschew a portrayal of violence. ... The director has available to him all the tools of trade. Satire, humour and the ability to shock each one out of the mundane levels of existence is what embellishes art forms. The Constitution protects the right of the artist to portray social reality in all its forms. Some of that portrayal may take the form of questioning values and mores that are prevalent in society. The power of literature lies in the ability of the writer to criticise commonly held beliefs and ordinary human foibles. Equally, a writer, producer and director of a film have the discretion to depict the horrors of social reality.”*

31. As regards the apprehended impact or influence of exhibition of the film on the trial being faced by the petitioner, we may refer to the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Zee News v. Navjot Sandhu & Ors.***, 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1288, wherein it has been opined that Judges by their judicial training and the kind of office they hold are not expected to be influenced by any such broadcast of such film. The said observations have been made in para 8 of the judgment, which is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“8. After we heard the matter, we find that there was neither any prima facie case nor balance of convenience in favour of the respondents for passing the interim order nor an irreparable injury*



*was likely to be caused to the respondents if interim order had not been passed. It may be noted that the Sessions Court on 25th November, 2002 notified that the judgment would be delivered on 11th December, 2002. The petitioner on 5th December, 2002 advertised that it would broadcast the telefilm on 13th December, 2002. The aforesaid dates show that the telecast of the film was not for the purpose, in any way, to influence the mind of the Judge. Further, we find that the Judges by their judicial training and the kind of office they hold are not expected to be influenced by any such broadcast of such film. For the aforesaid reasons we stay the operation of the order under challenge.”*

*(Emphasis supplied by Court)*

32. Further, reference may also be made to what has been opined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 7 of the judgment in ***Nachiketa Walhekar v. Central Board of Film Certification & Anr.*** (2018) 1 SCC 778. Para 7 of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“7. Needless to emphasise, the apprehension of the petitioner that this documentary would be used as evidence during the trial is not to be commented upon as that would be for the trial court to adjudge under the Evidence Act and we are sure, the trial court should exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law.”*

33. We may also refer to the observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 15 of ***Adarsh Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.*** (2018) 17 SCC 516, which is extracted hereinbelow:-

*“15. At this juncture, we may also state that the doctrine of sub judice may not be elevated to such an extent that some kind of reference or allusion to a member of a society would warrant the negation of the right to freedom of speech and expression which is an extremely cherished right enshrined under the Constitution. The moment the right to freedom of speech and expression is atrophied, not only the right but also the person having the right gets into a semi-coma. We may hasten to add that the said right is not absolute*



*but any restriction imposed thereon has to be extremely narrow and within reasonable parameters. In the case at hand, we are obligated to think that the grant of certificate by the CBFC, after consulting with the authorities of the Army, should dispel any apprehension of the members of the Society.”*

34. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment opined that doctrine of sub judice may not be elevated to an extent that some kind of reference to a member of the society (which was the petitioner in the said matter) will warrant negation of right of freedom of speech and expression, which is extremely cherished right enshrined under the Constitution.

35. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has attempted to distinguish the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein it has been observed that the Judges conducting the trial do not get impacted by exhibition of a film by dint of their training, by stating that these cases related to civil trials and not a criminal trial, where right of fair trial has to be kept on a higher pedestal. The said submission, of the learned counsel for the petitioner, prima facie fails to impress the Court.

36. Civil Trials may result in very serious consequences against a contesting party like the criminal trials and, accordingly, what we are concerned with, at the moment while considering the prayer for grant of interim relief, is the principle of law and, in our opinion, the principle, as discussed above, regarding the Courts not being affected by exhibition of film will apply to the trials, be it a civil or a criminal trial.

37. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioner has not been able to establish a prima facie case in his favour.

38. The second aspect which we need to reflect upon for considering the



prayer for grant of interim relief is the principle of “balance of convenience”. This principle requires the Court to weigh the comparative potential harm and inconvenience to both the parties. We have already held in our discussion in the preceding paragraphs that petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case and also that the exhibition of film is not likely to cause any harm to the right of the petitioner to seek fair trial inasmuch as the trial will be conducted by the learned Judge uninfluenced by what is being depicted in the film on account of his training as a professional judge. The producer has already invested huge amount in producing the film, (as submitted by the learned counsel representing the producer he has spent his lifetime earning in producing the film). Thus, in case the exhibition of the film is stayed at this juncture, the balance of convenience will be disturbed which in our opinion lies in favour of the producer.

39. The third aspect for grant of interim relief is to ascertain as to whether by not granting the interim relief any irreparable loss is going to be caused to the petitioner. In this regard, we may again refer to our opinion recorded above that the petitioner has failed to establish prima facie case, especially in view of the legal presumption that once a film has been certified by the Board which is a statutory body comprising of experts, and also to the effect that trial is not likely to be affected by exhibition of the film and thus, we also opine that petitioner has failed to establish that any irreparable loss is going to be caused to him in case the release of the film is not stayed by the Court.

40. In view of the discussions made and reasons given above, we find ourselves unable to agree with the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner for grant of interim relief. Accordingly, the prayer made for staying the release of the film is hereby declined.



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41. As regards the submission made on behalf of the petitioner for exhibition of the film for the Court, the said prayer will be considered at the time of final hearing of the matter. We may also observe that though various judgments have been cited by learned counsel for the respective parties in respect of their respective case, however we do not find it necessary to refer to all of them for the purposes of considering the prayer for grant of interim relief.

42. The CM APPL. 48480/2025 thus stands rejected.

**DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ**

**TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J**

**AUGUST 7, 2025**

*“shailndra”/S.Rawat/YRJ*