



2026:DHC:5502



\$~10 to15

* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Date of decision: 09.07.2026

+ RC.REV. 248/2025, CM APPL. 51874/2025 (Stay), CM APPL. 51876/2025 (Delay of 98 days in Re-filing the petition) & CM APPL. 27177/2026 (Early Hearing)

SAT NARAYAN TAPARIAPetitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

SULEKH JAINRespondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

11

+ RC.REV. 251/2025, CM APPL. 52233/2025 (Stay), CM APPL. 52235/2025 (Delay of 98 days in Re-filing the petition) & CM APPL. 22479/2026 (Early Hearing)

SAT NARAYAN TAPARIAPetitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

SULEKH JAINRespondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

12

+ RC.REV. 256/2025, CM APPL. 53198/2025 (Stay) & CM APPL. 27540/2026 (Early Hearing)

SHYAM SUNDAR TAPARIAPetitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

SULEKH JAINRespondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

13

+ RC.REV. 262/2025, CM APPL. 53991/2025 (Stay) & CM



APPL. 24896/2026 (Early Hearing)

SRIKISHSAN TAPARIA

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

KIRAN JAIN

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

14

+ RC.REV. 263/2025, CM APPL. 54196/2025 (Stay) & CM APPL. 24894/2026 (Early Hearing)

SRIKISHSAN TAPARIA

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

SULEKH JAIN

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

15

+ RC.REV. 268/2025, CM APPL. 54370/2025 (Stay) & CM APPL. 26774/2026 (Early Hearing)

PRAKASH TAPARIA

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Kumar Vikram, Advocate.

versus

KIRAN JAIN

.....Respondent

Through: Mr. Sidhant Dhingra, Advocate.

CORAM:

**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR**

%

JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petitions, filed under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [**“DRC Act”**], seek setting aside of Impugned



Orders dated 25.02.2025, passed by Ms. Charu Asiwal, learned ARC, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [**“learned ARC”**], in six distinct Eviction Petitions, whereby the respective Applications seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioners were dismissed.

2. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that all the present Petitions arise in a substantially similar factual backdrop and involve issues of an identical nature, *namely*, the dismissal of the respective Applications seeking leave to defend. He submits that the distinction between the respective Petitions lies essentially in the fact that each pertains to a separate tenanted premises and has been instituted by different members of the same family, who are tenants in their respective premises.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, therefore, requests this Court that, from amongst the connected matters, **RC.REV. 263/2025** be taken up first for consideration. Accordingly, at his request, **RC.REV. 263/2025** is taken up for hearing and final disposal.

RC.REV. 263/2025

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that the Application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioner came to be rejected by the learned ARC vide Order dated 25.02.2025 [**“Impugned Order”**], consequent where to an Eviction Order was passed in favour of the Respondent and against the Petitioner in respect of Shop No. 4, IX/6379, Netaji Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 [**“subject premises”**].

5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner assails the Impugned Order primarily on three grounds, *viz.*, *firstly*, that the Respondent has failed to establish the existence of a *bona fide* requirement in respect of the



subject premises; *secondly*, that material facts were concealed by the Respondent from the learned ARC; and *thirdly*, that the alleged *bona fide* requirement is incapable of being satisfied by the subject premises.

6. Elaborating on the aforestated grounds, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the eviction of the Petitioner was sought on the ground that the subject premises were required for the son of the Respondent, whereas the said son was already a Director in three companies and was also engaged in the business of manufacturing garments. He, therefore, contends that no *bona fide* requirement in favour of the son of the Respondent could be said to exist.

7. Learned counsel further submits that the aforesaid facts, including the business activities of the son of the Respondent, were concealed from the learned ARC and that such concealment of material facts goes to the root of the claim of *bona fide* requirement and, consequently, vitiates the Impugned Order.

8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the requirement projected by the Respondent is, in any event, incapable of being satisfied by the subject premises. He submits that the Respondent seeks eviction of the Petitioner for the purpose of establishing a showroom for his son, whereas the area and dimensions of the subject premises are wholly inadequate for the said purpose.

9. ***Per contra***, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submits that each of the aforesaid grounds had been specifically raised before and duly considered by the learned ARC. He submits that the learned ARC, upon consideration of the material available on record, has returned findings against the Petitioner on each of the aforesaid aspects and, therefore, the Impugned Order



warrants no interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

ANALYSIS:

10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material available on record.

11. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

12. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in **Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.**¹, **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh**², and, more recently, in **Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua**³, has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the *proviso* to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

13. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, *inter alia*, in **Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.**⁴, and **Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover**⁵.

14. In **Abid-Ul-Islam** (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

¹ (1998) 8 SCC 119

² (2014) 9 SCC 78

³ (2022) 6 SCC 30

⁴ 2024:DHC:9322

⁵ 2025:DHC:11285



an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court read as under:

“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

15. In ***Pankaj Pahwa*** (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in ***Abid-Ul-Islam*** (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the *proviso* to Section



25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be warranted.

17. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

18. At this juncture, before adverting to the discussion on merits of the present Petition, this Court deems it appropriate to first advert to the pleas raised by the Petitioner, before the learned ARC, in support of their Application for leave to defend, as recorded in the Impugned Order. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:

“Petitioner Case

2. The petition Sulekh Jain, S/o Late Sh. M. P. Jain has filed the instant eviction petition to oust the respondent Sh. Krishan Taparia, S/o Late Sh. Ganpat Rai Taparia from the tenanted premises Shop No. 04 Ground Floor, IX/6379, Netaji Gall, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 as the same is stated to be required for the bonafide need and requirement of himself and his younger son- Aman Jain. It is claimed that the the tenanted premises was purchased by the petitioner on 02.09.2002 from Smt. Vidhya Wanti, D/o Sh. Ram Lal, W/o Sh. Jaswant Rai and Sh. Darshan Lal, So Sh. Sukh Dayal by way of sale deed. It is averred that the respondent was inducted in the tenanted premises at a monthly rent of Rs.440/- per month excluding electricity charges.



3. Petitioner avers that his family comprises of his wife, two sons two daughters in law and two minor grand daughter and minor grand son. It is claimed by the petitioner that his younger son Sh. Aman Jain is completely unemployed and it is for the purpose of his financial well being that the tenanted. premises is required for establishing the wholesale cloth showroom.

4. Petitioner also avers that respondent is also repeatedly guilty of defaulting in payment of rent w.e.f. April, 2017 despite multiple requests to clear the rental dues, however to no avail. Compelled by the non payment of rent, petitioner also issued legal notice dated 11.02.2019 urging the respondent to pay the arrears of rent from 01.04.2017 to 31.01.2019 along with the enhanced rent at the rate of 10% (revised every three years, however, despite receiving the notice and replying to it, respondent failed to tender rent to the petitioner.

5. It is the version of the petitioner that he is not in possession of any other suitable commercial accommodation for setting up a wholesale cloth business for his son Amar Jain ,hence the present petition.”

19. Having taken note of the aforesaid pleas raised by the Petitioner, it would now be apposite to advert to the analysis undertaken and the findings returned by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:

“ **Finding and Analysis**

16. In order to succeed in a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (“DRC”) the landlord is required to establish three conditions:-

- i. There must be a relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant
- ii. The tenanted premises must be bonafidely required by the landlord either for himself or for his family members
- iii. There is no other alternate suitable accommodation available with the landlord.

17. The nub of the issue in the entire leave to defend application is the allegation that the supposed bonafide requirement of the son of the petitioner is a sham as Aman Jain is profitably engaged with his own business. Furthermore, the petitioner and his family members are owners of as many as twenty immovable properties and therefore even favourable alternate accommodation is readily available with them.

18. It is no longer *res integra* that the petitioner / landlord in eviction proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) DRC has merely to



show that he is something more than a tenant. Thus, the existence of landlord tenant relationship, is to be ascertained by applying the well settled and time tested propositions that (i) for the purpose of establishing landlord-tenant relationship, the onus of proof on the landlord is not akin to a title suit; (ii) as long as it is established that a landlord has a better title than that of a tenant, a tenant cannot resist a plea of existence of a landlord tenant relationship. In view of the same therefore, this Court finds favor with the assertions of the petitioner on this count. In addition the tenancy in the present case is categorically admitted by the respondent hence there does not even remain an iota of doubt that the petitioner has a better title to show as compared to the respondent.

19. With regards testing the *bonafide* need of the petitioner to obtain possession of the tenanted premises, it is well settled that the Court must presume the *bonafide* requirement of the landlord. The **Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,” [(1998) 8 SCC 119]** observed that:

“14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that! the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”

20. The landlord is only required to show that the requirement of the tenanted premises is a bonafide requirement and not merely a whimsical or a fanciful desire by him . The **Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark case of “Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal”[(2001) 5 SCC 705]** observed that:-

“15...The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bona fide which is intended to avoid a mere whim or desire. The “bona fide requirement” must be in present and must be manifested in actual need .which would evidence the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.”



21. In the present case as well, once the landlord has stated that he requires the tenanted premises for a particular use, the Court is required to believe the statement to be true and genuine, unless and until it is shown by the tenant through cogent material that the requirement is fanciful or whimsical. Examining on the said touchstone, this court is of the view that the petitioner has manifested a bonafide requirement of his son Aman Jain for opening wholesale cloth showroom. To refute such bonafide requirement, respondent has contended that the son of the petitioner is gainfully employed as a Director in three companies namely M/s Olive Infratech Pvt. Ltd., M/s Milestone Creators Pvt. Ltd. And Ms/ Olive Solution Pvt. Ltd. Having office at H-32/38, Sector-3, Rohini, Delhi and H. No. 318, Sector-3, Rohini Delhi. To substantiate such averments, respondent has filed company master data of the aforesaid companies as per which Aman Jain is named as one of the Directors along with the petitioner himself. On perusal of the companies master data filed by the respondent, it is found that two companies ie. Ms/ Olive Solution Pvt. Ltd. and Milestone Creators Pvt. Ltd. have been struck off from the Registrar of Companies therefore it is clear that the two companies are no longer active and generating any revenue to the benefit of Aman Jain. Regarding M/s; Olive Infratech Pvt. Ltd., it is seen from the company master data that the company status is "active". However, to discredit the viability and profitability of M/s Olive Infratech Pvt. Ltd. petitioner has filed company information along with Indian Income Tax return acknowledgment for the assessment year 2024-2025 wherein the revenue generated by the company is shown to be nil rather profits before remuneration is shown to be minus Rs.649/- Thus, it is clear that neither of the three companies is a profit making entity so as to conclude that Aman Jain is gainfully employed or running a profitable business along with the petitioner.

22. In addition, respondent also claims that Aman Jain is also running a business bearing GSTIN 24ABEFA8739RIZR namely Ashu Hosiery. Admittedly the said business established, in Surat, Gujarat wherein it is contended that the said business is run independently by Aman Jain. To emphasize the same, respondent has filed goods and service tax details of the aforesaid business in the form of Annexure-III. On perusal of Annexure-III, it is found that the aforesaid entity is constituted as a partnership, however, Annexure-III does not disclose the name of its partners, it is only by way of leave to defend that it is contended that it is run by Aman Jain. No other document has been put forth to prove or to even indicate that the aforesaid business is independently run by Aman Jain. Per contra, petitioner has denied such contention, it is claimed that business is not run by Aman Jain, rather during the course of arguments, it was submitted that the said business is run by the petitioner and his elder son namely Ashwini Jain.



Furthermore, it was also submitted that the aforesaid business is being run in the State of Gujarat and therefore even from the standpoint of **geographical viability**, said business is not suitable or feasible for the bonafide requirement of Aman Jain. On perusal of the entire factual matrix and material placed on record, it has come to pass that respondent has not provided sufficient material so as to cogently conclude that the business in the name of Ashu Hosiery is run by Sh. Aman Jin. Even for the sake of arguments if it is assumed that the said business in Gujarat does belong to Aman Jain it would not satisfy the bonafide requirement of starting a business in Delhi. Hence the assertion of respondent as to gainful employment of Aman Jain remain unconvincing.

23. Another issue vehemently pressed by the respondent is regarding the dimension of the space in the tenanted premises i.e. 8X5.5 sq. feet being insufficient for running a wholesale cloth showroom. To this, it is submitted by the petitioner that petitioner and his family members have filed multiple petitions U/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act before Rent Controllers and in the event all the adjoining shops are vacated, the entire space shall be utilized for the purpose of starting a wholesale cloth showroom. On perusal of record, it is found that petitioner and his family members have filed as many as six petition U/s 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act seeking vacation of adjoining premises which is pending adjudication before this court, all 06 petitions are running simultaneously on same date, wherein argument on leave to defend were also advanced on same date. Accordingly, there is merit to the assertion of the petitioner that the entire space can be effectively used for the purpose of running a wholesale cloth showroom. Further, it also could not be shown that the space of the tenanted premises would not supplement in starting a wholesale cloth showroom. Therefore the contention of the respondent that the space of an individual shop is insufficient is found to be immaterial against the bonafide need of the petitioner.

24. Considering the same, it is held that the petitioner has successfully shown his *bonafide* requirement of the tenanted premises for his son Aman Jain and there is nothing on the record to suggest otherwise. However, at the stage, it is pertinent to record that though the petition speaks of bonafide requirement of the petitioner as well as his son Aman Jain, however, petitioner has not made a compelling case to showcase his own bonafide requirement.

25. With regards the requirement of there being alternative accommodation being available with the petitioner, it is to be noted that it has been repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be best utilised by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and the best person to decide which property is to be utilised in what way is the landlord himself. In addition, the respondent also cannot dictate as to how the



landlord is to utilise his property. The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Essentially, the courts should refrain from prescribing any standard or guidelines for the landlord's residential/commercial choices. In **“Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co.” [(2000) 1 SCC 679]** the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that:-

“10...It is true that the plaintiff landlord in his evidence stated that there were a number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that the suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353] .) In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted.”

26. The respondent has stated that in paragraph No. 10 above, that the petitioner and his family members are owners of as many as 20 immovable properties in the country out of which seven properties are stated to be owned by Aman Jain himself and three properties are owned by the petitioner. It is worth noting that except for the aforesaid list, respondent has not filed any title documents so to substantiate that the aforesaid properties are owned by the petitioner and his son Aman Jain. It is worth pointing out that during the course of arguments, respondent was given multiple opportunities to bring on record the title documents of the aforesaid properties allegedly in the name of the petitioner, however, such opportunities remained unavailed. It is contended that the respondent has generated the aforesaid list by a simple search with the name of the family members of the petitioner and the properties as populated in the list pertain to other persons, bearing the same names as the petitioner and his family members. During the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner had submitted that except for one, the petitioner and his family members have no relations whatsoever with any of the properties mentioned in the list. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner had argued that the property at plot No. 304, GIDC, Pandesara, Surat, Gujarat belongs to the elder son of the petitioner i.e. Ashwini Jain and such ownership does not qualify as an alternate accommodation for the bonafide need of the petitioner and his younger son Aman Jain. The above observation and argument shows that the aforesaid list is merely a list and does not in any shape or form prove that the 20 immovable properties as contended by the respondent is owned by the petitioner or his son



Aman Jain. It is a matter of record that opportunities were granted to the respondent to furnish the title documents of the aforesaid properties, however, despite the title documents being a public record, respondent could not furnish the same. Therefore, it cannot be held that the filing of list of immovable property would ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the properties are owned by the petitioner and in turn manifest a triable issue. Further owning of an immovable properties by the other son of petitioner cannot deem to be an alternate accommodation to fulfill bonafide requirement of Aman Jain. All in all, more attending details were required to be furnished by the respondent with regards the same which have not been furnished discussed above therefore, this Court is of the view that the petitioner landlord has successfully shown that the tenanted premises is best suitable accommodation for petitioner needs and that he is the landlord of the same. Accordingly, application seeking leave to defend is dismissed and eviction order with regards property bearing no. Shop No. 04, Ground Floor, IX/6379, Netaji Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 (shown in red in site plan) is passed in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent.

27. The petitioner landlord shall not be entitled to get possession of the tenanted premises before the expiry of six months from today as per Section 14(7) of the DRC Act.”

20. A conjoint reading of the pleas raised by the Petitioner and the findings returned in the Impugned Order, particularly Paragraph Nos. 17 to 23 thereof, makes it manifest that the learned ARC has adverted to each of the principal grounds sought by the Petitioner and has returned specific findings thereon upon consideration of the material placed before it.

21. The principal contention of the Petitioner that the *bona fide* requirement pleaded by the Respondent was not genuine, since his son, Aman Jain, was already engaged in business activities and was a Director in three companies, has been specifically considered by the learned ARC in Paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 of the Impugned Order. Upon consideration of the material placed before it, the learned ARC returned a finding, particularly in Paragraph No. 24 thereof, that the Respondent had successfully established the bona fide requirement of



the tenanted premises for his son.

22. Insofar as the contention regarding the dimensions of the tenanted premises and its alleged unsuitability for establishing a wholesale cloth showroom is concerned, the same has been specifically considered and rejected by the learned ARC in Paragraph No. 23 of the Impugned Order.

23. Similarly, the plea regarding the alleged availability of alternative suitable accommodation with the Respondent and his family members has been considered in Paragraph Nos. 25 and 26 of the Impugned Order, wherein the learned ARC, upon examining the material placed before it, concluded that the Petitioner had failed to raise a triable issue in respect thereof.

24. It is, therefore, evident that the present case is not one where any material plea raised by the Petitioner has escaped consideration or remained unadjudicated. Each of the grounds sought to be urged before this Court was raised before the learned ARC, duly considered in the Impugned Order and rejected for reasons recorded therein.

25. The challenge mounted by the Petitioner before this Court, in substance, seeks a reconsideration of the very same pleas and a re-appreciation of the material already examined by the learned ARC, with a view to persuade this Court to arrive at a conclusion different from that recorded in the Impugned Order.

26. This Court is unable to discern any jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record in the decision-making process adopted by the learned ARC. Equally, this is not a case where any material plea raised by the Petitioner has been left unconsidered so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.



27. In view of the foregoing discussion and having regard to the limited scope of interference under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the Impugned Order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned ARC. Therefore, the present Petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

28. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any, is disposed of.

29. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.

RC.REV. 248/2025, RC.REV. 251/2025, RC.REV. 256/2025, RC.REV. 262/2025, RC.REV. 268/2025

30. This Court now proceeds to consider the aforementioned connected Revision Petitions.

31. At this stage, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the grounds of challenge to the respective Impugned Orders, by way of the present connected Revision Petitions, are substantially same and that he would be advancing identical submissions in each of the present connected Revision Petitions.

32. This Court takes note of the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, as recorded hereinbefore, that all the connected Petitions arise in a substantially same factual backdrop and involve issues of an identical nature, *namely*, the dismissal of the respective Applications seeking leave to defend. The only distinction between the respective connected Petitions lies in the fact that each pertains to a separate tenanted premises and has been instituted by different members of the same family, who are tenants in their respective premises.

33. This Court further takes note of the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that he would be advancing identical



2026:DHC:5502



submissions in all the present connected Revision Petitions.

34. In view of the foregoing submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, the decision rendered in **RC.REV. 263/2025**, herein above, would *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the remaining connected Revision Petitions as well.

35. Accordingly, in view of the findings returned hereinabove, while deciding **RC.REV. 263/2025**, and for the reasons recorded therein, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the respective Impugned Orders passed by the learned ARC in the present connected Revision Petitions, and therefore, the present Petitions are dismissed.

36. Accordingly, the present Petitions, along with respective pending Application(s), if any, are disposed of.

37. A photocopy of this Order be kept in the connected matters.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 09, 2026/nd/DJ