$~ * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment reserved on: 16.10.2025 Judgment pronounced on: 04.11.2025 + W.P.(C) 1687/2025, CM APPL. 8218/2025 & CM APPL. 8219/2025 VINOD KUMAR KATARIA .....Petitioner Through: Mr. B.P. Vaishnav, Advocate with Petitioner in person versus CVO MOC AND ORS. .....Respondents Through: Dr. S.S. Hooda and Mr. Aayushman, Advocates for R-6. Mr. Yashpal Rangi, Advocate for R-8 and R-10. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL ?HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J U D G M E N T HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. 1. The present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India1 assails the Order dated 30.04.20242, passed by the learned Lokpal of India3 in C-12016/159/2023- Lokpal/463, whereby the complaint filed by the Petitioner alleging irregularities and corruption in the Centre for Cultural Resources and Training4, was disposed of on the ground that the allegations disclosed administrative irregularities and not acts of corruption within the meaning of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19885. BRIEF FACTS: 2. The Petitioner approached the learned Lokpal on 21.06.2023, by a Complaint No. 159/2023, alleging large-scale irregularities in the functioning of CCRT, including the appointment and promotion of officers, extensions and re-employments granted contrary to the Department of Personnel and Training6 guidelines, misuse of public funds and scholarship grants, and engagement of private counsel without requisite sanction from the competent authorities. 3. On 29.08.2023, the Full Bench of the learned Lokpal directed the Central Vigilance Commission7 to conduct a Preliminary Inquiry under Section 20(1)(a) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 20138, and submit a report within six weeks. 4. Pursuant to the directions of the learned Lokpal, the CVC, vide Office Memorandum dated 10.04.2024, forwarded a Preliminary Inquiry Report along with the comments of the Competent Authority. Upon consideration of the report and other materials placed on record, the learned Lokpal, vide its Order dated 30.04.2024, observed that the allegations primarily related to administrative and procedural lapses and did not disclose the commission of any offence under the PC Act. 5. Accordingly, the learned Lokpal disposed of the complaint, observing that no further investigation was warranted in the matter. 6. The Petitioner states that thereafter he sought relevant documents through applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Upon obtaining the fact-finding report and observing what he perceived as bias and procedural irregularities in the inquiry process, the Petitioner submitted a representation dated 29.07.2024 before the learned Lokpal seeking a review of the said order. 7. Since no response was received to his representation, the Petitioner, being aggrieved, has approached this Court invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: 8. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the learned Lokpal erred in disposing of the complaint without affording the Petitioner an opportunity of being heard and without furnishing a copy of the CVC’s report. 9. It would further be contended that the inquiry conducted by the Ministry of Culture is vitiated by the principle of nemo judex in causa sua, since the Ministry exercises direct administrative control over CCRT and based upon the Ministry’s report, the decision of the learned Lokpal is concluded. 10. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the fact-finding report and subsequent audits of CCRT disclose several instances of illegal appointments, misappropriation of funds, and procedural irregularities, all of which clearly fall within the ambit of “corruption” as defined under the PC Act. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT: 11. The learned Counsel for the Respondents would contend that the learned Lokpal, being a statutory authority, has acted strictly within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 12. It would further be submitted that the Impugned Order of the learned Lokpal is based on a thorough and reasoned consideration of the preliminary inquiry report submitted by the CVC, which, after due examination of the allegations and supporting materials, found no evidence suggesting the commission of any offence under the PC Act. 13. The learned Counsel for the Respondents would also submit that the grievances raised by the Petitioner essentially pertain to the internal service and administrative matters of CCRT, and such issues, even if they involve procedural irregularities, cannot automatically be construed as acts of criminal misconduct or corruption within the meaning of the PC Act. 14. It would further be contended that the Petitioner’s prayer for an investigation by a Special Investigation Team or the Central Bureau of Investigation is misconceived, particularly when the competent authority has already conducted an inquiry, found no material evidence of wrongdoing, and accordingly closed the matter. ANALYSIS: 15. Having heard the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for both parties, and upon a careful consideration of the pleadings, documents, and the impugned findings, this Court now proceeds to address the questions arising for determination. 16. The principal question that engages the attention of this Court is whether the Impugned Order of the learned Lokpal, disposing of the Petitioner’s complaint alleging corruption and administrative irregularities in the CCRT, warrants interference in the exercise of Writ Jurisdiction. 17. At the outset, we consider it appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the Impugned Order, which reads as follows: “1. This complaint was considered by the Full Bench on 29.08.2023. The order of the Full Bench delineates the several allegations made in the complaint. Considering those allegations, the Full Bench deemed it appropriate to direct the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to conduct a Preliminary Inquiry and submit its report in that regard. 2. The Under Secretary to the Government of India, CVC, vide Office Memorandum (OM), dated 10.04.2024, has forwarded an original copy of the Preliminary Inquiry Report, including the comments of the Competent Authority. We have carefully considered the Preliminary Inquiry Report and all other relevant materials. 3. We are in agreement with the findings recorded therein, concerning the respective allegations. We find that the stated allegations inquired into are essentially about the irregularities and do not touch upon the act of commission and omission of offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In regard to the allegation of irregular payments of scholarship and engaging a private advocate for defending the matter in the court and despite such irregularities the named public servant was promoted and given extension in service in violation of the regulations of the DoPT, the Inquiry Report rightly finds that the matter was thoroughly investigated by the Investigating Agency and nothing was found against the named public servant. In other words, the RPS was absolved and not even charge-sheeted. Taking any view of the matter, nothing more needs to be done in this case. Therefore, we accept the findings given in the Preliminary Inquiry Report in toto, concerning all the allegations in the complaint and dispose of this Complaint. 4. Accordingly, this complaint is disposed of.” (emphasis supplied) 18. It is pertinent to observe that the Lokpal Act establishes a self-contained and comprehensive statutory mechanism exclusively for the inquiry and investigation into allegations of corruption against public servants. The scheme ensures that the jurisdiction of the learned Lokpal is invoked in matters pertaining to alleged corrupt conduct. 19. A conjoint reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Lokpal Act, and the principles embodied in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption9, to which India is a party, makes the legislative intent abundantly clear. The UNCAC, and in particular Article 36, obliges signatory States to establish autonomous bodies for the investigation of corrupt practices, including bribery and misuse of authority. 20. In furtherance of these international obligations, and by virtue of the enabling power under Article 25310 of the Constitution of India, the Parliament enacted the Lokpal Act to give domestic effect to the commitments arising under the UNCAC. The Lokpal Act thus constitutes a legislative measure directed solely at offences involving dishonest gain and corrupt practices by persons occupying public office(s). The enactment was conceived to create an independent and credible institution to combat serious acts of corruption and abuse of public office and not to examine matters of mere procedural deviation or administrative lapse. 21. A learned Single Judge of this Court, in Shibu Soren v. Lokpal of India11, undertook an examination of the background, object, and scheme of the Lokpal Act, as well as the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction while scrutinizing the mechanisms and procedures established under the said Act. The findings and reasoning in that judgment were subsequently affirmed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. We consider it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the said judgment, which reads as under: “9. The Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 has defined that corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time, is sure to maliganise the polity of the country leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as a plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti-people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence — shaking of the socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society. 30. It has also been held by the Apex Court that the efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. [Refer to:— Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana, (1997) 4 SCC 14; K.C. Sareen v. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584; Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64; State of Gujarat v. Justice R.A. Mehta(Retd.), (2013) 3 SCC 1]. 31. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 has been brought for establishment of a body of Lokpal for the Union and Lokayukta for the States to inquire into allegations of corruption against public functionaries. A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act indicates that the Administrative Reforms Commission way back in the year 1966 gave a report “Terms of Redressal of Citizens Grievances” recommending setting up of an institution of Lokpal at the Centre. The introduction to the Act reveals that the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act is an anti-corruption law in India which has been established and the office of the Lokpal and Lokayukta has been established to inquire into corruption against public functionaries and for matters connecting them. The Act creates a mechanism for receiving and initiating complaints against public functionaries including the Prime Minister, Ministers etc. and prosecute them in a time bound manner. ***** 33. A perusal of the above Section indicates the establishment of a Lokpal consisting of a Chairperson who is or has been a Chief Justice of India or is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court or an eminent person who fulfills the eligibility specified in Section 3(3)(b) and the Members have to be judicial members, i.e., the Person must be either a sitting or a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or a sitting or retired Chief Justice of a High Court. The Chairperson of the Lokpal has to be a sitting or retired Chief Justice of India or a sitting or a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or a person of impeccable integrity and outstanding ability having special knowledge and expertise of not less than 25 years in the matters of anti-corruption policy, public administration, vigilance, finance including insurance, banking, law and management. 34. The Act also provides that the Chairperson or a Member of the Lokpal shall not be Member of Parliament or a Member of the Legislature of any State or Union Territory and shall not be a person convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude and any person who is appointed as a Member of the Panchayat or Municipality or a person who has been removed or dismissed from service of the Union or the State or any person who is affiliated with the political party or carries on business or practice any profession is ineligible to be appointed as Lokpal unless the person resigns from the said practice or profession. 35. A perusal of the above Section shows that the institution of Lokpal is insulated from any outside pressure and it is a completely independent body and acts uninfluenced by any kind of pressure. A reading of the Act shows that the Act has been primarily brought in to instill confidence in the public regarding the integrity of persons holding high offices in the country including the Prime Minister. The Act provides for checks and balances also to ensure that persons holding high offices are not unnecessarily harassed by making stale complaints. Chapter VII of the Act deals with the procedure in respect of the preliminary inquiry and investigation. ***** 37. A perusal of Section 20 of the Act shows that the Lokpal on the receipt of the complaint does not immediately order for investigation by an agency including CBI unless there exists a prima facie case. A perusal of Section 20 of the Act also indicates that instead of ordering the investigation, the Lokpal first orders for a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case or not. 38. On receipt of the direction to conduct a preliminary inquiry, the agency appointed conducts preliminary inquiry on the basis of the material information and documents which it can collect. The agency also can seek comments on the allegations made against the public servant. The agency has to give a report within a period of 90 days and can seek for further time of 90 days. Section 20(1)(a) and Section 20 (3)(a) of the Act both mandates that before directing investigation to be done by any agency or the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the Lokpal has to call for explanation from the public servants so as to determine whether there exists a prima facie case for investigation. After hearing the public servant it is always open for the Lokpal to direct closure of the proceedings against the public servant and proceed against the complainant under Section 46(1) of the Act against the complainant for filing a false complaint. The facts of the present case reveal that a notice has been given to the Petitioner under Section 20(3) of the Act when the Petitioner chose to approach this Court by filing the instant writ petition. The contention of the Petitioner primarily is that the complaint on the face of it does not disclose any offence which can be prosecuted under the Act. ***** 43. The whole purpose of the Act is to ensure purity in public service. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it and the attempt should always be to further the approach of the Act and to make it workable. It is trite law that if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which will fail to achieve the purpose of Legislation then such construction or interpretation of the Act must be avoided as it will reduce the Legislation to futility. The Statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof of a Court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end untenable. [Refer to:— Whitney v. Inland Revenue Commissioner, [1926] A.C. 37]. ***** 47. It is well settled that writ courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India do not interfere if the matter is pending adjudication before an authority unless it is a case of patent lack of jurisdiction or where the nature of inquiry is for allegations which are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can reach a just conclusion or where the proceedings have been initiated are so manifestly attended with malice or the proceedings are initiated with the intention of wrecking vengeance on a person with a view to spite him due to any political or oblique motives. 48. It is also well settled that the writ courts while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not impinge on the mechanism provided under the Act unless as stated earlier when there is a patent lack of jurisdiction or that the complaint is vexatious which requires interference. Writ Courts cannot substitute themselves as an authority which has been vested with a duty under the Statute to consider as to whether there is material in it or not for ordering investigation. The writ petition, therefore, is premature in nature.” (emphasis supplied) 22. The Lokpal Act provides a complete and self-contained mechanism for inquiry into allegations of corruption against public servants. The scheme of the Act contemplates a Preliminary Inquiry under Section 20(1), to be followed by an Investigation only if the learned Lokpal, upon examination of the preliminary material, is satisfied that sufficient grounds exist to proceed further. The subsequent provisions of Section 20 of the Lokpal Act deal with the contingencies that may arise during such inquiries and investigations and prescribe the manner in which the proceedings are to be conducted both during and after the investigation by the competent authority. 23. In the present case, the Full Bench of the learned Lokpal, after obtaining the Preliminary Inquiry Report from the CVC and examining other relevant materials, has categorically recorded that the allegations levelled by the Petitioner pertain merely to administrative “irregularities” and do not disclose any “act of commission or omission” constituting an offence under the PC Act. 24. It must be borne in mind that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally distinct from that of an appellate jurisdiction. The power conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 is primarily supervisory in nature, intended to ensure that statutory or quasi-judicial authorities act within the bounds of their jurisdiction, adhere to the principles of natural justice, and exercise their powers in a fair, reasonable, and lawful manner. It is not designed to enable the Court to reappreciate evidence, reassess factual findings, or substitute its own view for that of a competent authority merely because another view is possible. 25. The Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, does not sit as a court of appeal over the decision of an expert or specialized body. The judicial function in such cases is confined to examining whether the decision-making process was fair, rational, and in accordance with law, and not whether the conclusion reached by the authority is factually or technically correct. Where a decision has been rendered by a statutory expert body, such as in the present case, by the learned Lokpal after due consideration of the CVC’s Preliminary Inquiry Report, this restraint assumes even greater significance. Judicial interference is warranted only in cases where the authority has acted without jurisdiction, committed a grave procedural irregularity, ignored the basic tenets of natural justice, or arrived at a conclusion that is manifestly arbitrary, perverse, or unsupported by any material on record. 26. Consequently, while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, it would be neither prudent nor appropriate for this Court to delve into the merits of the allegations or undertake a fresh assessment of the factual matrix. Unless the matter before the Court raises issues of grave illegality, jurisdictional error, or palpable mala fides warranting judicial intervention, the Court must defer to the findings of the competent statutory and expert authorities entrusted by law to inquire into such allegations of corruption and administrative misconduct. 27. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vishal Tiwari (Adani Group Investigation) v. Union of India12, has comprehensively summarized the parameters governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly in cases where expert and technically equipped bodies are entrusted with specific statutory duties. Although the observations in that case were made in the context of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the principles laid down are of general application and provide valuable guidance on the limits of judicial intervention in matters involving specialized authorities. The relevant portion of the said Judgment is reproduced below: “17. From the above exposition of law, the following principles emerge: (a) Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability, and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to expert regulatory agencies on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate; (b) The scope of judicial review, when examining a policy framed by a specialised regulator, is to scrutinise whether it : (i) violates the fundamental rights of the citizens; (ii) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution; (iii) is opposed to a statutory provision; or (iv) is manifestly arbitrary. The legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review; (c) When technical questions arise — particularly in the domain of economic or financial matters — and experts in the field have expressed their views and such views are duly considered by the statutory regulator, the resultant policies or subordinate legislative framework ought not to be interfered with; (d) SEBI's wide powers, coupled with its expertise and robust information-gathering mechanism, lend a high level of credibility to its decisions as a regulatory, adjudicatory and prosecuting agency; and (e) This Court must be mindful of the public interest that guides the functioning of SEBI and refrains from substituting its own wisdom in place of the actions of SEBI. We have made a conscious effort to keep the above principles in mind while adjudicating the petitions, which contain several prayers that require the Court to enter SEBI's domain.” 28. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again reiterated the settled scope and ambit of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in Ajay Singh v. Khacheru13. The Court, while emphasizing judicial restraint in matters involving factual determinations by competent authorities, clearly delineated the limited grounds on which interference under Article 226 may be justified. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: “16. It is a well-established principle that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the evidence and arrive at a finding of facts unless the authorities below had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely. 17. On the said settled proposition of law, we must make reference to the judgment of this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447]. The relevant portion thereof reads as under: (SCC p. 458, para 16) “16. … It is well settled that the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate court if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the courts below have come or in other words a finding which was perverse in law. This principle is well settled. InD.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, (1952) 2 SCC 619] it was laid down by this Court that unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authorities.” (emphasis supplied) 18. The abovesaid proposition of law was reiterated in Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj [Shamshad Ahmad v. Tilak Raj Bajaj, (2008) 9 SCC 1], wherein it was observed that: (SCC pp. 10-11, para 38) “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 19. Observations similar in nature were made in Krishnanand v. State of U.P. [Krishnanand v. State of U.P., (2015) 1 SCC 553: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 584], wherein it was held that: (SCC p. 557, para 12) “12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the conclusion that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled law that such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating the evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless the authority which passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is patently perverse.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In our considered view, the High Court has committed an error of law and facts in setting aside the concurrent findings in both the impugned judgment and order [Khacheru v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC OnLine All 16168] , [Khacheru v. State of U.P., 2013 SCC OnLine All 16169] . There was no basis for the High Court to ignore the findings of the authorities and come to its own conclusion by appreciating the evidence on record. The same was outside the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the absence of any perversity or illegality afflicting the findings of the authorities.” 29. The Petitioner’s contention that the inquiry was biased merely because the Ministry of Culture participated in the process is untenable. The CVC, being an independent statutory body, was the nodal agency entrusted with the inquiry, and the participation of the Ministry was confined to furnishing factual inputs during the preparation of the Preliminary Inquiry Report. Such inputs can, at best, be treated as information placed before the CVC and not as findings rendered by the Ministry on the merits of the allegations. 30. Based on the inputs received from the Ministry of Culture and other relevant materials, the CVC, constituted under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 200314, prepared its report strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the statutes. It is pertinent to note that the CVC Act lays down a detailed and structured framework for the functioning of the CVC, including the manner in which it is required to conduct inquiries or cause inquiries to be conducted into offences alleged to have been committed under the PC Act, by specified categories of public servants of the Central Government. The CVC Act entrusts the CVC with the responsibility of ensuring fairness, objectivity, and procedural compliance in all vigilance inquiries and investigations undertaken under its supervision. 31. The report and accompanying materials furnished by the CVC were thereafter placed before the learned Lokpal for consideration. Upon a comprehensive examination of the entire record, the learned Lokpal concluded that the allegations made in the complaint did not disclose any act of corruption but, at best, reflected certain administrative and procedural irregularities devoid of any criminal element. 32. In particular, with respect to the allegations concerning irregular disbursement of scholarships, the engagement of a private advocate to represent the organization before the court, and the subsequent promotion and extension in service granted to the concerned public servant allegedly in violation of the Department of Personnel and Training regulations, the learned Lokpal noted that these issues had already been thoroughly examined during the fact-finding inquiry conducted by the CVC. 33. The inquiry report, as considered by the learned Lokpal, specifically recorded that no evidence of misconduct or corrupt practice was found as alleged by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the learned Lokpal concluded that the allegations, even if true in part, amounted only to procedural lapses and did not warrant any further investigation under the provisions of the PC Act. 34. We are of the considered view that the Petitioner has been unable to point out any procedural infirmity or irregularity in the manner in which either the CVC or the learned Lokpal conducted the inquiry. Nor has the Petitioner demonstrated any violation of statutory provisions governing the functions or procedures of these authorities. 35. In the present case, as discussed above, no such infirmity or illegality has been shown to exist. The decision of the learned Lokpal in the Impugned Order is based on material available on record, and the reasons recorded are neither arbitrary nor perverse. Consequently, no ground for interference is made out before this Court. CONCLUSION: 36. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon a careful examination of the material placed on record, we are of the considered opinion that the Impugned Order dated 30.04.2024 passed by the learned Lokpal does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, or procedural infirmity. The learned Lokpal has acted within the scope of its statutory powers and upon due consideration of the findings of the CVC as well as other relevant materials. The conclusions drawn by the learned Lokpal are supported by reasons and do not disclose any perversity warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 37. Accordingly, we find no ground to interfere with the decision of the learned Lokpal, and the Writ Petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. 38. The present petition, along with pending application(s), if any is disposed of in the above terms. 39. No Order as to costs. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. NOVEMBER 4, 2025/sm/kr 1 Constitution 2 Impugned Order 3 Lokpal 4 CCRT 5 PC ACT 6 DoPT 7 CVC 8 Lokpal Act. 9 UNCAC 10 Legislation for giving effect to international agreements 11 2024 SCC OnLine Del 392 12 (2024) 4 SCC 115 13 (2025) 3 SCC 266 14 CVC Act --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ W.P.(C) 1687/2025 Page 17 of 17