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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ ARB.P. 1405/2025

Date of Decision: **17.10.2025**

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/S MONEYWISE FINANCIAL
SERVICES PVT. LTD.

.....Petitioner

Through: Ms. Preeti Kumari, Adv.

versus

DINESH BEADS COLLECTION THROUGH ITS PROPRIETOR
AND ANR

.....Respondent

Through: None.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

JUDGEMENT

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act), seeking appointment of an Arbitrator, to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen between the parties.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed the service affidavit on record. The same is extracted as under:

“1. That I am the Counsel of the Petitioner Company in the present petition and as such I am fully competent to swear this affidavit.

2. That I have served the notice issued by the Hon'ble Delhi High court along with the copy of the petition with annexures to all the Respondents on behalf of the Petitioner Company through e-mail dineshbeadscollection@gmail.com on 15.10.2025 through my e-mail i.e.advocatepreetyln@gmail.com. It is submitted that mail have not



bounced backed. The copy of the e-mail is enclosed herewith Annexure A.

3. That I have served the notice issued by the Hon'ble Delhi High court along with the copy of the petition along with annexures to the Respondent on behalf of the Petitioner Company through Whatsapp on Mobile No. 9899936060, 8860947094 through my Mobile No. 9711615978 on 15.10.2025. The screenshot of the Whatsapp is annexed herewith Annexure B.

4. That I have sent the notice issued by this Hon'ble Delhi High Court along with copy of petition with annexures to the Respondent No 1 on behalf of the Petitioner Company via Speed post & Courier to the following addresses:

<i>S. NO.</i>	<i>Address</i>	<i>Speed Post</i>	<i>Courier</i>
<i>1.</i>	<i>Ground Floor, 2826 Chailpuri Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Central Delhi, Delhi- 11006</i>	<i>Served</i>	<i>Served</i>
<i>2.</i>	<i>2840, Chailpuri Kinari Bazar, Chandni Chowk, Central Delhi, Delhi - 110006</i>	<i>Served</i>	<i>Served</i>
<i>3.</i>	<i>House No. – O, C Block, Sarla Vihar, Alapur, Loni Ghaziabad, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh 201102</i>	<i>Not served</i>	<i>Not served</i>

5 That I have sent the notice issued by this Hon'ble Court along with copy of petition with annexures to the Respondent No. 2 on behalf of the Petitioner Company via Speed Post & Courier to the following addresses:

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Address</i>	<i>Speed Post</i>	<i>Courier</i>
<i>1.</i>	<i>House No. – O, C Block, Sarla Vihar, Alapur, Loni Ghaziabad, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh – 201102</i>	<i>Not Served</i>	<i>Not Served</i>

The Speed post and Courier Receipts along with their tracking reports are annexed with Annexure C. ”

3. It is, thus, seen that despite service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of the respondents.

4. The facts of the case indicate that the disputes that have arisen



between the parties in terms of the Master Loan Agreement dated 31.08.2023. Petitioner, a registered Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC), advanced a loan facility of Rs. 16,14,286/- to the respondents for the purpose of business expansion. The loan was to be repaid in 36 equal monthly installments along with interest at the rate of 19.5% per annum. It is the case of the petitioner that, despite initial payments, the respondents defaulted in making further payments without assigning any reason. Subsequent to repeated reminders and assurances, the petitioner issued a demand-cum-loan recall notice dated 09.08.2024, calling upon the respondents to clear the outstanding dues, but no payment was made by them, thereby giving rise to the present dispute.

5. Furthermore it is contended by the petitioner that after the respondents failed to comply with the demand notice, the petitioner was constrained to issue a notice under Section 21 of the Act, 1996, invoking the arbitration clause contained in Clause 8.2 of the Loan Agreement dated 31.08.2023. The same is extracted as under:

“8.2 "Arbitration: Any disputes, differences, controversies and questions directly or indirectly arising at any time hereafter between the Parties or their respective representatives or assigns, arising out of or in connection with this Agreement (or the subject matter of this Agreement), including, without limitation, any question regarding its existence, validity, interpretation, construction, performance, enforcement, rights and liabilities of the Parties, or termination ("Dispute"), thereof shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as amended ("Arbitration Act"). The Dispute shall be referred to a sole arbitrator duly appointed by the Parties with mutual consent failing which the sole arbitrator shall be appointed in accordance with the Arbitration Act. The language of the arbitration shall be English. The seat of the arbitration shall be at New Delhi and the language of proceedings shall be English. The award rendered shall be in writing and shall set out the reasons for the arbitrator's decision. The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne equally by each Party, with each Party paying for its own fees and costs including attorney fees, except as



may be determined by the arbitration tribunal. Any award by the arbitration tribunal shall be final and binding”

6. Further, petitioner contended that despite service of the said notice through registered post and email, the respondents failed to respond or nominate an arbitrator. In view of the respondents’ continued default and the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties, the petitioner submits that there is no impediment to the appointment of an arbitrator by this Court.

7. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act has been fairly well settled. This Court in ***Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt Ltd***¹, as well, has extensively dealt with the scope of interference at the stage of Section 11. Furthermore, this Court, recently, in ***Axis Finance Limited Vs. Mr. Agam Ishwar Trimbak***² has held that the scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the Act has been limited to a *prima facie* examination of the *existence* of an arbitration agreement. Further, it was also reiterated that the Objections relating to the arbitrability of disputes are not to be entertained by a referral Court acting under Section 8 or 11 of the Act. The relevant extract of the aforesaid decision reads as under: -

19. In In Re: Interplay, the Supreme Court confined the analysis under Section 11 of the Act to the existence of an arbitration agreement and under Section 8 of the Act to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. Under both the provisions, examination was to be made at the touchstone of Section 7 of the Act. Further, issues pertaining to the arbitrability of the dispute fell outside the scope of both Section 11(6A) and Section 8 of the Act. The material part of the judgement of the Supreme Court in In Re: Interplay reads as under:

164. The 2015 Amendment Act has laid down different

¹ 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022

² 2025:DHC:7477



parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and Section 11. Where Section 8 requires the referral Court to look into the prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Section 11 confines the Court's jurisdiction to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Although the object and purpose behind both Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to abide by their contractual understanding, the scope of power of the referral Courts under the said provisions is intended to be different. The same is also evident from the fact that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows an appeal from the order of an arbitral tribunal refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8, but not from Section 11. Thus, the 2015 Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engineering (supra) where it was held that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in nature. Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read as laying down a similar standard. 165. The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section 11(6A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the term "examination" in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination. Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the requirement of "existence" of an arbitration agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera (supra), this Court held that the referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement – whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6A) should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement to be decided by arbitral tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly clarify the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia (supra) in the context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. 166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the referral Court. The referral Court is not the appropriate forum to



conduct a minitrial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the arbitral tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged from the plain language of the statute. 167. Section 11(6A) uses the expression “examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.” The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the referral Court has to inspect or scrutinize the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the arbitral tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the referral Court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the arbitral tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in *Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.*” [Emphasis supplied]

20. The effect of *In Re: Interplay* was further explained by a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning*³ wherein the Court declared *Vidya Drolia* and *NTPC Ltd.*’s findings qua scope of inquiry under Section 8 and Section 11 of the Act to no longer be compatible with modern principles of arbitration. The material portions of the judgement read as under:

“114. In view of the observations made by this Court in *In Re : Interplay* (supra), it is clear that the scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to hold that the observations made in *Vidya Drolia* (supra) and adopted in *NTPC v. SPML* (supra) that the jurisdiction of the referral Court when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent decision in *In Re : Interplay* (supra). ... 118. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex-facie meritless”, although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they require the referral Court

³ 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754



to examine contested facts and appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.” [Emphasis supplied]

21. Similarly, in *BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd*⁴ the Supreme Court succinctly explained the effect of *In Re: Interplay on a Referral Court’s powers under Section 11 of the Act*. The relevant part of the judgement is as under:

15. ...

(a) Section 11 confines the Court’s jurisdiction to the examination regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement.

(b) The use of the term “examination” in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination.

(c) Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement — whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements.

(d) The purport of using the word “examination” connotes that the legislature intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. However, the expression “examination” does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry.

(e) The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. Only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal.

(f) Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can “rule” on

⁴ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471



its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, when the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court enforcing the arbitral award is bound by such a prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is taken by the Referral Court, it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in depth.

[Emphasis supplied]

22. Thus from the above-mentioned authorities it is clear that a Court’s scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the Act has been limited to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement while the adjudication under Section 8 is to be made for both existence and validity. Further, the examination so undertaken under both the said provisions must be within the confines of Section 7 of the Act. Objections relating to arbitrability of disputes are not to be entertained by a referral Court acting under Section 8 or 11 of the Act.”

8. It is, thus, seen that a dispute has arisen between the parties and there exists an arbitration clause, therefore, there is no impediment in appointing the Arbitrator.

9. In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties and there is an arbitration clause in the contract, this Court appoints Ms. Kaarunya Lakshmi, Advocate (Mobile No: +91 8586801514, e-mail id: kaarunya38@gmail.com)) as the sole Arbitrator.

10. The Sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite disclosures as required under Section 12 of the Act.

11. The Sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fee in accordance with the IVth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to between the parties and the learned Sole Arbitrator.

12. The parties shall share the arbitrator's fee and arbitral cost, equally.



13. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the Sole Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.

14. Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy. All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved. Let the copy of the said order be sent to the Sole Arbitrator through the electronic mode as well.

15. Accordingly, the instant petition stands disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J

OCTOBER 17, 2025

aks/sph