



2026:DHC:3149



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ **W.P.(C) 4558/2026, CM APPL. 22224/2026 & CM APPL. 22225/2026**

Date of Decision: **07.04.2026**

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/S R.K. ROADLINE

.....Petitioner

Through: Mr Rahul Shukla and Ms Bachita Baruah Shukla, Advs.

versus

HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORP. LTD & ORS.Respondents

Through: Mr. Kamendra Mishra CGSC with Mr. Krishna Pandey, Adv. and Mr. Shaurya Aditya Singh, GP

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV

JUDGEMENT

PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)

1. The petition is for, *inter alia*, setting aside the order dated 30.03.2026, issued by respondent no. 1, whereby, the Letter of Acceptance dated 26.08.2025 awarded to the petitioner has been terminated.
2. A perusal of the impugned order indicates that the contract was for 'bulk transportation for Jammu and Kashmir-State'. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked on the ground that contract, impugned show-cause notice, and the impugned termination order have all been issued from Delhi and the seat of arbitration of disputes arising out of the contract being here.



3. In *M/s R.P. Transporters v. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Lts. And Ors.*,¹ this Court was faced with similar facts and dismissed the petition.

4. Even in the present case, the material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action arose outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the contract was entered into in Delhi and all the impugned communications were issued from here cannot be the determinative factor when the underlying work was for Jammu and Kashmir.

5. The Court in *Indure Pvt. Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors.*² in paragraphs 36 to 38 has held as under:

“36. A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision of an authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for the said decision lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make this High Court a mini-pan-India Superior Court exercising jurisdiction over all events which take place throughout this Country. There is no gainsaying with the proposition that every High Court is competent to adjudicate upon a lis which arises from events or actions taking place within its territory. Merely because the ultimate order, which is based on events taking place outside Delhi and takes cognizance of actions outside of Delhi, is passed within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition ought not be entertained by this Court.

37. Naturally, being the capital of the Country, various authorities and bodies having pan-India jurisdiction would be located within the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because the decision making authority happens to be in Delhi, ought not to be the sole reason to entertain a lis in this Court. The decision, no doubt, may be passed in the national capital, but it is usually against persons situated outside Delhi; and even more importantly, for actions which took place beyond the borders of this Court. The act of giving a hearing in Delhi, or the passing of an order in Delhi, is merely a result of a body/authority being situated in the national capital, it has nothing to do with the lis, the offending action, the legal injury or the foundational facts on the basis of which action is being taken.

38. The case-law cited above, makes repeated reference to “dominant facts”, and facts which are “material, essential and integral” to the lis in question. In most cases, the fact that the order is passed, or the head office is located, or that opportunity of hearing was afforded, within the

¹ 2026:DHC:2947

² 2026:DHC:1605



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jurisdiction of this Court is completely immaterial, non-essential, and non-integral to the dispute in question. Any of the aforementioned three aspects could very well have taken place in another part of the Country, it is for the sole reason that Delhi is the national capital, that, in most cases these factors get connected to the jurisdiction of this Court. From another lens, it may be seen that regardless of what the underlying facts or legal injury/infringement may be, the order impugned would, in an overwhelming number of cases be passed from Delhi. If this be the case, can this constant factum, which shall remain present in each case, be considered a “dominant fact” or a “material, essential and integral” fact? The answer must be in the negative.”

6. For all these reasons, the petition stands dismissed.
7. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to approach the jurisdictional High Court.
8. All rights and contentions are left open.

PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV, J

APRIL 7, 2026/p