* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment reserved on: 24.02.2026 Judgment delivered on: 10.03.2026 C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 34/2025 & I.A. 16734/2025 INFO EDGE (INDIA) LIMITED .....Appellant versus PRADEEP NAMDEO & ANR.     .....Respondents Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Appellant : Mr. Nikhil Sharma, Ms. Mehak Rahul Chaudhry, Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj and Mr. Hitesh Malik, Advocates. For the Respondents : Ms. Nidhi Raman, CGSC with Mr. Om Ram and Ms. Nikita Singh, Advocates for R-2. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA J U D G M E N T TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J. 1. Present appeal has been filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereafter referred to as “the Act”) on behalf of the appellant seeking quashing of the Order dated 25.03.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “impugned order”) passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks in the Opposition No.1303503 filed by the appellant against the trademark registration application of the respondent no.1 bearing application no.6212666 whereby the Registrar dismissed the said opposition, and allowed the registration of respondent no.1’s mark “NAUKRIYAN”. 2. The facts in brief as narrated in the appeal are as under: a) The appellant claims to have adopted the trademark “NAUKRI” and registered its domain name www.naukri.com on 27.03.1997 and commenced the use thereof. On 15.09.1999, the appellant also registered the domain name www.naukri.org. Appellant applied for and secured the registration of trademark “NAUKRI” bearing registration no.88594 in Class-09 on 29.11.1999. Subsequently, the appellant registered its subsidiary, bearing the name, Naukri Internet Services Private Limited on 09.12.1999. b) Sometime in the year 2000, the appellant claims to have adopted and commenced the use of the distinctive logo showing device of the man as. On an infringement by some persons, the appellant instituted a lawsuit in this Court and vide the Order dated 05.03.2002, this Court held the trademark “NAUKRI/NAUKRI.COM” to be inherently distinctive and having acquired secondary meaning as also a well-known trademark. In 2003, the appellant secured registration of the trademarkin Classes 35 and 42 bearing registration no. 1244668. c) Appellant claims to have also secured registration of the mark NAUKRI.COM in Class 42, NAUKRI.CO.IN and NAUKRI.ORG on 21.01.2004, 13.02.2004 and 17.02.2004 respectively. The appellant also registered the domain names www.naukri.co.in and www.naukrigulf.com in the year 2004 and 2006 respectively. Similarly, the appellant has quoted other registrations as well, which are annexed to the paperbook, running into five pages commencing from page no.73. d) In order to protect its trademark registrations, the appellant had filed various lawsuits, which are enlisted as under: (i) Info Edge (India) Ltd. and Ors. vs. Sumanta Bhacvttacharya and Ors. [2017:DHC:2190]: Defendant was restrained from using the mark NAUKRIE.COM. (ii) Info Edge (India) Ltd. and Ors. vs Mr Rakesh Kalia [CS(COMM) 36/2015]: Defendant was restrained from using the marks, NAUKRINEWS.COM, NAUKRINEWS.CO.IN, NAUKRINEWS.IN. (iii) Info Edge (India) Ltd vs Akash Deep & Ors. [CS(COMM) 366/2016]: Defendants were retrained from using the marks CVNAUKRI.COM, CVNAUKRI.CO.IN, CVNAUKRI.IN, CVNAUKRI.ORG and RESUMENAUKRI.COM. (iv) Info Edge (India) Ltd vs Ms Shruti Attre & Ors. [CS(COMM) 710/2016]: Defendants were restrained from using the mark "nownaukri.com". (v) Info Edge (India) Ltd. and Ors. vs Mr. Sanjeev Goyal [CS (OS) No. 783/2006]; Defendant was restrained from using the mark Noukri.com. e) It is stated that respondent no.1 filed application bearing no.6212666 for the mark in Class 35 on a proposed to be used basis on 09.12.2023, and was published in the Trade Marks Journal No.2136 on 25.12.2023. The appellant filed its notice of opposition under Opposition No.1303503 against the respondent no.1’s mark on 24.04.2024. The respondent no.1 filed its Counter Statement on 31.05.2024. On 14.11.2024, the appellant filed its evidence in support of the opposition under Rule 45 of the Trade Mark Rules, 2017 (hereafter referred to as “the Rules”), while the respondent no.1 filed its evidence in support of its application under Rule 46 of the Rules on 09.01.2025. Additional evidence was filed by the appellant on 10.02.2025 and hearing was conducted on 17.03.2025. Post hearing, written submissions by the respective parties are stated to have been filed. f) Vide the impugned order dated 25.03.2025, the Registrar dismissed the appellant’s Opposition No.1303503 against respondent no.1’s mark in Class-35, and allowed the application to proceed for registration. On the same day, the certificate of registration was issued in favour of the respondent no.1. g) Aggrieved thereof, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:- 3. Mr. Nikhil Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the outset contented that, the appellant was a prior adopter of the trademark “NAUKRI” as also the domain names www.naukri.com and www.naukri.org as far back as in the year 1999. He would submit that even the distinctive logo showing device of a man as was adopted in the year 2000, for which the appellant also secured registration in Classes 35 and 42 in the year 2003. Similarly, the mark NAUKRI.COM, NAUKRI.CO.IN and NAUKRI.ORG were registered in Class 42 as far back as in the year 2004. Simultaneously, the domain names www.naukri.co.in and www.naukrigulf.com were registered in the year 2004 and 2006 respectively. Learned counsel would submit that the appellant also secured registration of the mark “naukrionmobile” in Class 42 in the year 2006 itself. He would contend that, having regard to the fact that the appellant had adopted and put into use not only the trademark “NAUKRI” but also the domain names and the device as far back as between the years 1997 and 2000-2004, the Registrar ought to have considered that the application of respondent no.1 for the mark “naukriyan” was neither honest nor bonafide, and rather a dishonest adoption of the registered trademark of the appellant. 4. Learned counsel would also emphasize that the Registrar completely overlooked the fact that not only was the word mark “naukriyan” almost identical but also deceptively similar not only to the mark “NAUKRI” and the device but the application of respondent no.1 was also on a proposed to be used basis. He would submit that all the relevant evidence in support of the contentions with documentary evidence was placed before the Registrar to simply overlook the overwhelming evidence, which would be fatal to the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel would also emphasize that the appellant was always vigilant and sensitive to protect its intellectual property rights and trademark which commenced as far back as in the year 2002 when this Court had recognized the mark “NAUKRI” as a well-known trademark. He would submit that once a mark has been declared as well-known, it mandates a higher degree of protection from the statutory authorities. He submitted that due to the open, long continuous and extensive use and the advertisement efforts taken by the appellant coupled with the superior quality of services provided by the appellant under the mark “NAUKRI”, the said mark has acquired wide and enviable goodwill and reputation and secondary meaning which services would be exclusively associated with the appellant. 6. Learned counsel submitted that the rival marks are almost identical and deceptively similar. In order to lay emphasis upon the similarities, the learned counsel submitted the following points: a. The impugned mark contains the whole of the appellant’s trademark “NAUKRI” as its leading, essential and memorable feature. Once the essential features of the earlier trademarks are shown to be present in the trademark in question, the alleged differences in the other parts of the mark would be immaterial; b. The work “naukriyan” in the impugned mark is nothing but a plural of the appellant’s trademark “NAUKRI”. This position is admitted by the respondent no.1 in its Counter Statement and evidence in support of the application. The mere distinction of singular and plural cannot be considered as any distinction at all; c. Respondent no.1 has copied even the manner of writing the word “naukriyan” from appellant i.e., Hindi word, written in English and depicted in lower case; d. The addition of the letters “yan” at the suffix is irrelevant since the appellant has also registered and is using “NAUKRI” marks with added suffix such as “onmobile”, “learning”, “gulf”, “premium”, “e-hire”, “RMS” etc. Thus, members of trade and public would assume that respondent no.1’s services under the impugned mark are another offerings of the appellant itself; e. Just like the appellant’s trademark, the impugned mark is preceded with a device of man shown in the form of an arch, having a separate head with a different colour. The changes made by respondent no.1 to its device mark are insignificant, considering that every intelligent copying introduces some changes. The rival device mark is closely and deceptively similar. In this behalf, the appellant relies on a list of judgments containing representations of device marks held to be deceptively similar. f. The words “Changing millions of lives” at top right side of the impugned mark in very small font, is barely visible and does not outweigh the striking similarities between the rival trademarks. The said words do not form part of the respondent no.1’s domain name “www.naukriyan.com”. g. The rival trademark is being used as domain names of websites viz., www.naukri.com and www.naukriyan.com accessed through computers, which have applications like autocorrect/auto spell and predictive text, and which suggest the word on first few alphabets thereof being typed/punched on the keypad, making human mind addictive thereto. It is, therefore, not unlikely that a user trying to visit the appellant’s website www.naukri.com ends up at respondent no.1’s website www.naukriyan.com and vice-versa. Predicated on the above, learned counsel would forcefully submit that having regard to the deceptively similar features, the Registrar ought to have rejected the application for registration filed by respondent no.1 under Section 11 of the Act. 7. Learned counsel would also stoutly contend that the Registrar committed a gross error by overlooking and ignoring the judgments passed by this Court in various lawsuits protecting its intellectual rights over the subject trademarks and more importantly completely ignored the judgment of this Court recognizing the trademark “NAUKRI” as a well-known mark. Additionally, he contended that other judgments of this Court passed in favour of the appellant also ought to have persuaded the Registrar to reject the application of the respondent no.1. He submitted that in both the rival trademarks the essential feature is the word “NAUKRI” and that merely by adding the letters “yan” would by itself not make it so distinctive as to not confuse an unwary customer with average intelligence who may get deceived as to whether the services are those of the plaintiff or are at least associated with the plaintiff’s. This would be more so, since both the appellant as also the respondent no.1 are providing the same services. 8. Learned counsel also emphatically argued that the respondent no.1 has clearly made admissions which itself would disentitle respondent no.1 from asserting that there is a clear distinction between the trademarks “NAUKRI” and “naukriyan” along with their respective device marks. In support thereof, learned counsel invited attention of this Court to the counter statement of respondent no.1 filed before the Registrar and appearing at page 162 of the paperbook which reads, “Although, the applicant’s claim the said mark as a whole and which is the plural form of common word Naukri, which means job.” He would submit that the said admission is reiterated by the respondent no.1 in the affidavit of evidence filed before the Registrar and mentioned in para 8 of the said affidavit, appearing at page 2301 of the paperbook, which reads, “However, the claim of the said mark as a whole that is the plural form of the common word Naukri, which means job”. Learned counsel forcefully contended that in view of the fact that the respondent no.1 himself agrees and admits that there is no palpable difference between the two rival marks and the letters “yan” added to the word “NAUKRI” would only depict plurality of the word “job” or “naukri” in Hindi, the registration of mark “naukriyan” cannot be sustained. 9. In such circumstances, he would contend that on the basis of the admission, the registration of the respondent no.1’s trademark “naukriyan” along with the device mark, which too is deceptively similar, the impugned order ought to be set aside and the registration so granted to the respondent no.1 be rejected. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2:- 10. On the other hand, Ms. Nidhi Raman, learned CGSC staunchly supported the impugned order and contended that the Registrar has passed a reasoned and speaking order. 11. Referring to the application of respondent no.1 she would submit that the mark applied for is absolutely distinct not only phonetically but visually too. Even the device mark adopted by the respondent no.1 is absolute distinct from that of the appellant. She would submit that this is not a case where the Registrar did not compare the rival marks or has overlooked any essentiality or distinctiveness between the marks. Delving further, she took this Court through the entire impugned order. She stated that the word ‘NAUKRI’ and ‘naukriyan’ are absolutely distinct, be that pronunciation or phonetic or visual and cannot be stated to be similar or deceptively similar. She would submit that the impugned mark when considered as a whole appears as a stylised label featuring distinctive typographic characters displayed in a colour scheme comprising dark blue with white colour background with a device of a man and a tagline “Changing million lives” placed upon the word ‘naukriyan’. In contradistinction, the markof the appellant prominently features the element in blue colour over the word mark ‘NAUKRI’. Thus, there is no similarity and no likelihood of any confusion at all. 12. Dilating further, Ms Raman would submit that apart from the above, the overall perception of the impugned mark, including its colour, font style, and design employed in the label has a significant difference and this pronounced dissimilarity renders both marks distinct from each other and thus, respondent no.1’s mark is entitled to be registered. Merely because the word ‘NAUKRI’ features common to both, it cannot be said that a person with average intelligence and imperfect recollection would be deceived or confused. Moreover, according to her, the marks ought to be considered as a whole without dissecting it as the marks and/or device marks, and when viewed in that manner, both marks are distinct. 13. So far as the device mark of the appellant and that of respondent no.1 is concerned, she would rely upon the observations of the Registrar in the impugned order in para 13 and 12 (as numbered in the impugned order), and the same have been reproduced hereunder: “13. The opponent also pressed the objection that the representation of the prominent element in the applicant’s mark closely resembles, and is purportedly derived from, the opponent’s registered mark. Upon initial examination, there exists a prima facie lack of similarity between the element of applicant’s mark and the opponent’s mark. Indeed, the element of applicant’s mark stands notably distinct from the aforementioned opponent’s registered mark, both in visual appearance and structural composition. The element featured in the applicant’s mark is very artistic element in the shape of a walking human figure carrying a briefcase and wearing tie, which is fundamentally disparate from the opponent’s aforementioned mark , which is a blue curve having a orange dot over it. Based on a discerning examination of the marks, it becomes evident that the element of applicant’s mark does not exhibit any substantial resemblance to, nor does it appear to have been influenced by, the design incorporated in the opponent’s mark. In light of these observations, it is not tenable to assert that the element of the applicant’s mark has been derived or copied from the opponent’s mark. 12. Based on the analysis and reasoning presented above, it is clear that there is no evidence on record to show that either the applicants have copied or dishonestly adopted the impugned mark, I have no hesitation to hold that the applicant’s mark is visually, structurally and phonetically different from the Opponent’s mark. I uphold the proprietary claims of the applicants under Section 18(1) of the Act. The applicant’s adoption of the impugned mark is honest and there is no likelihood of confusion or deception in the public and therefore, the application is entitled to registration.” 14. On the aforesaid basis she would submit that the appeal has no merits and ought to be dismissed. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:- 15. At the outset this Court may note that respondent no.1 was served on 18.11.2025, however, was proceeded ex-parte on 19.11.2025, thus, there is no opposition on record on his behalf. 16. Since, the lis germane to this appeal is whether the rival marks are similar or deceptively similar or are distinct so as to not cause confusion or deception in the mind of an unwary consumer with average intelligence, it would be in fitness of things to first set out the comparison table between the two marks which is as under: Impugned Mark Appellant’s Trademarks Examination of the marks indicates that the word ‘NAUKRI’ of the appellant is subsumed within the mark ‘naukriyan’ of the respondent no.1. The font is very similar if not identical; the small font is common to both marks; the only essential and dominant feature of the appellant i.e., ‘NAUKRI’ is fully contained in the mark ‘naukriyan’; the word ‘NAUKRI’ is a Hindi word but written in English which too is common; both words depict only ‘job’ or ‘jobs’, which are not distinct by themselves in the sense of the common vernacular parlance, where one (naukriyan) is the plural of the other (NAUKRI); the image deployed in both marks may cause confusion looked at from the viewpoint of a common man with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, even if it is assumed that there are minor differences between both. 17. Another essential aspect that needs consideration is whether any distinctiveness is achieved by the mark of the respondent no.1 by merely adding “yan” to the word ‘NAUKRI’. It does not seem to be plausible. When two marks are to be compared, it is trite that essentially the similarities or deceptive similarities are to be looked at, first from the common man’s point of view and not the distinctive features. If the comparison of similarities do not appeal or are not likely to cause any confusion or deception in the mind of the consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, the mark opposed may be registered. However, if such confusion or deception is likely, then registration of such marks ought to be refused. 18. Undoubtedly, the word ‘NAUKRI’ is a Hindi word for ‘job’ in English, while ‘naukriyan’ is a plural for the Hindi word ‘NAUKRI’ and would connote ‘jobs’ in English, which by itself cannot be said to be such an essential distinctive feature so as to not create confusion or deception in the mind of the general public. Thus, the mark ‘naukriyan’ is deceptively similar and most likely to confuse the general public. (See: New Balance Athletics Inc vs. “Nine” Plus Shoes Private Limited, 2023:DHC:5342, H-D U.S.A., LLC vs. Vijaypal Dhayal Owner/Proprietor of Red Rose Industries, 2025:DHC:2849, Louis Vuitton Malletier vs. Spread Home Products Private Limited & Ors., dated 04.12.2024 in CS(COMM) 1079/2024). 19. It may be significant to note that respondent no.1 in his Counter Statement and evidence submitted before the Registrar had clearly stated that “Although, the applicant’s claim the said mark as a whole and which is the plural form of common word Naukri, which means job.” and “However, the claim of the said mark as a whole that is the plural form of the common word Naukri, which means job”, respectively. This indicates that respondent no.1 also understood that both the marks connote the same meaning except that the word “naukriyan” is only the plural of the word ‘NAUKRI’. In such circumstances, adoption of the word ‘naukriyan’ does not appear to be bonafide. 20. It is also to be borne in mind that the appellant as well as the respondent no.1 are providing similar/common services, which too would mean that the consumer base is common. It can be also noted that the services availed of by the class of persons may not really be vigilant as to whose services they seek to avail, which too propels this Court to disagree with the findings of the Registrar. 21. The Registrar as well as Ms. Raman had laid great emphasis on the device mark of respondent no.1 to submit that the colour scheme; the placement; man with a head; holding a briefcase are the essential distinctive features and would thus not create any confusion. This Court is unable to accede to the said observation and submission. When the above analysis and observations in the preceding paragraphs are taken as a whole, the adoption of the arching design of a man with a tie and a suitcase in a hand does not seem to draw any essential distinction from the arching design of a man adopted by the appellant. On that score too, the argument of learned counsel for respondent no.2/Registrar does not appeal to this Court. 22. The Registrar also failed to take into consideration the judgments and orders passed by this Court in appellants own case whereby infringers using different forms of the word ‘NAUKRI’ registered in the name of the appellant were injuncted from such infringement and protected the appellant’s rights by construing the said word mark as essential and prominent and exclusive to the appellant. Having regard to the previous decisions of this Court too, the impugned order is unsustainable. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgement in South India Beverages Private Limited vs. General Mills Marketing Inc. & Anr., (2014) SCC OnLine Del 1953 to submit that the word ‘NAUKRI’ in the registered trademark of the appellant and that of the respondent no.1 is the only essential and dominant part, and thus, is not hit by the anti-dissection rule on which the Registrar relied. The relevant paragraph reads thus: “19. Though it bears no reiteration that while a mark is to be considered in entirety, yet it is permissible to accord more or less importance or ‘dominance’ to a particular portion or element of a mark in cases of composite marks. Thus, a particular element of a composite mark which enjoys greater prominence vis-à-vis other constituent elements, may be termed as a ‘dominant mark’. 20. At this juncture it would be apposite to refer to a recent decision of this Court reported as 211 (2014) DLT 296 Stiefel Laborataries v. Ajanta Pharma Ltd. The Court whilst expounding upon the principle of ‘anti-dissection’ cited with approval the views of the eminent author on the subject comprised in his authoritative treatise-McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition. It was observed: “41. The anti-dissection rule which is under these circumstances required to be applied in India is really based upon nature of customer. It has been rightly set out in McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition about the said rule particularly in Para 23.15 which is reproduced hereunder: 23.15 Comparing Marks : Differences v. Similarities [1] The Anti-Dissection Rule [a] Compare composites as a Whole : Conflicting composite marks are to be compared by looking at them as a whole, rather than breaking the marks up into their component parts for comparison. This is the “anti dissection” rule. The rationale for the rule is that the commercial impression of a composite trademark on an ordinary prospective buyer is created by the mark as a whole, not by its component parts. However, it is not a violation of the anti-dissection rule to view the component parts of conflicting composite marks as a preliminary step on the way to an ultimate determination of probable customer reaction to the conflicting composites as a whole. Thus, conflicting marks must be compared in their entireties. A mark should not be dissected or split up into its component parts and each part then compared with corresponding parts of the conflicting mark to determine the likelihood of confusion. It is the impression that the mark as a whole creates on the average reasonably prudent buyer and not the parts thereof, that is important. As the Supreme Court observed:“The commercial impression of a trademark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail. For this reason it should be considered in its entirety.” The anti-dissection rule is based upon a common sense observation of customer behavior : the typical shopper does not retain all of the individual details of a composite mark in his or her mind, but retains only an overall, general impression created by the composite as a whole. It is the overall impression created by the mark from the ordinary shopper's cursory observation in the marketplace that will or will not lead to a likelihood of confusion, not the impression created from a meticulous comparison as expressed in carefully weighed analysis in legal briefs. In litigation over the alleged similarity of marks, the owner will emphasize the similarities and the alleged infringer will emphasize the differences. The point is that the two marks should not be examined with a microscope to find the differences, for this is not the way the average purchaser views the marks. To the average buyer, the points of similarity are more important that minor points of difference. A court should not engage in “technical gymnastics” in an attempt to find some minor differences between conflicting marks. However, where there are both similarities and differences in the marks, there must be weighed against one another to see which predominate. The rationale of the anti-dissection rule is based upon this assumption:“An average purchaser does not retain all the details of a mark, but rather the mental impression of the mark creates in its totality. It has been held to be a violation of the anti-dissection rule to focus upon the “prominent” feature of a mark and decide likely confusion solely upon that feature, ignoring all other elements of the mark. Similarly, it is improper to find that one portion of a composite mark has no trademark significance, leading to a direct comparison between only that which remains.”[Emphasis Supplied] 21. The view of the author makes it scintillatingly clear, beyond pale of doubt, that the principle of ‘anti dissection’ does not impose an absolute embargo upon the consideration of the constituent elements of a composite mark. The said elements may be viewed as a preliminary step on the way to an ultimate determination of probable customer reaction to the conflicting composites as a whole. Thus, the principle of ‘anti-dissection’ and identification of ‘dominant mark’ are not antithetical to one another and if viewed in a holistic perspective, the said principles rather compliment each other. 22. We may refer to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reported as 380 F.3d 1340 Re Chatam Int’l, Inc, wherein the Court enunciated the interplay between the principle of ‘anti dissection’ and identification of ‘dominant mark’. The Court, while ascertaining whether the mark ‘JOSE GASPAR GOLD’ was similar to the registered mark ‘GASPAR’S ALE’, held that ‘GASPAR’ was clearly the dominant element in the two marks and resembled the relevant mark enough to cause a likelihood of confusion, to cause a mistake or to deceive. Relevant would it be to note that the defendant in the said case urged that the approach of splitting of the marks was in violation of the anti-dissection rule. The said contention was repelled by the Court and it was pertinently observed that there was no violation of anti-dissection rule because the marks were any way examined in entirety, and each individual term in the marks were given more or less weightage depending on the overall impression it appeared to create. The Court was of the view that both marks convey the commercial impression that a name, GASPAR, is the source of related alcoholic beverages, tequila or ale. In other words, the commercial significance of ALE in the registered mark ‘GASPAR'S ALE’ and JOSE and GOLD in appellant's mark ‘JOSE'S GASPAR GOLD’ assumed less significance in the opinion of the Court. xx xx xx 26. Dominant features are significant because they attract attention and consumers are more likely to remember and rely on them for purposes of identification of the product. Usually, the dominant portion of a mark is that which has the greater strength or carries more weight. Descriptive or generic components, having little or no source identifying significance, are generally less significant in the analysis. However, words that are arbitrary and distinct possess greater strength and are thus accorded greater protection.[174 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corporation].” [Emphasis supplied: Bold and Underlined] There cannot be a quarrel with the said proposition and having regard to the analysis above, it is clear that the word ‘NAUKRI’ is in fact an essential and dominant part of the rival marks, and thus, the rule of anti- dissection may not apply to the facts of the present case. 24. As an upshot, the impugned order dated 25.03.2025 of the Registrar is quashed and set aside, resultantly, the Registration Certificate dated 25.03.2025 issued to the respondent no.1 is also quashed and the Register of Trade Marks be rectified by removing the impugned trademark within four weeks from date of receipt of this order. 25. Thus, the appeal is allowed in the above terms, however, without any order as to costs. Pending application also stands disposed of. TUSHAR RAO GEDELA FEBRUARY 12, 2026/anj/rl CA(COMM.IPD-TM)34/2025 Page 1 of 19