



2026:DHC:2691



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\* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**% *Judgment Delivered on: 20.03.2026*

+ CS(OS) 233/2026, I.A. 7427/2026, I.A. 7430/2026 &amp; I.A. 7431/2026

MR. NIDISH GOPALKRISHNAN NAIR .....Plaintiff

Through: Ms. Shyel Trehan, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Priyadarshini Dewan, Mr. Shankari Mishra, Ms. Niti Khanna, Ms. Vidhi Jain and Mr. Rohan Poddar, Adv.

versus

X &amp; ORS. ....Defendants

Through: Ms. Vanya Chhabra, Adv. for D-1. Mr. Madhav Khuranna, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Aman Raj Gandhi, Ms. Saloni Kumar, Mr. Chattanya Sharma, Mr. Amit Badesra and Mr. Lakshay Shehrawat, Adv. for D-7.

**CORAM:****HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN****JUDGMENT****VIKAS MAHAJAN, J (ORAL)****I.A. 7428/2026 (under Section 151 CPC seeking exemption from filing certified copy of document page no. 06 to 66 and dim page no. 06 to 66 and clean/typed copies of documents)**

1. This is an application on behalf of the plaintiff seeking exemption from filing certified/original documents.
2. The application is allowed, subject to the plaintiff granting inspection of the documents, as and when, he is required to do so, or filing the original documents at the stage of admission/denial.
3. The application stand disposed of.



**I.A. 7429/2026 (under Section 151 CPC seeking exemption from filing synopsis and list of dates within the prescribed page limit)**

4. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
5. The application stands disposed of.

**CS(OS) 233/2026**

6. The plaint be registered as suit.
7. Issue summons to the defendants. Ms. Vanya Chhabra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.1 and Mr. Aman Raj Gandhi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no.7, accept summons and waive formal service of summons.
8. They submit that copy of the plaint, I.A.s and documents have been received by them.
9. On plaintiff taking steps, summons be issued to defendant nos. 2 to 6 and 8 by all permissible modes.
10. The summons shall indicate that written statement must be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of summons.
11. The defendants shall also file an affidavit of admission/denial of the documents filed by the plaintiff, failing which the written statement shall not be taken on record.
12. The plaintiff is at liberty to file replication thereto within thirty days after filing of the written statement. The replication shall be accompanied by affidavit of admission/denial in respect of the documents filed by the defendants, failing which the replication shall not be taken on record.
13. It is made clear that any unjustified denial of documents may lead to an order of costs against the concerned party.
14. Any party seeking inspection of documents may do so in accordance



with the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.

15. List before the learned Joint Registrar for completion of service, pleadings, admission/denial of documents and marking of exhibits on 25.05.2026.

16. List before Court thereafter on a date to be assigned by the learned Joint Registrar.

**I.A. 7426/2026 (application by plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC for grant of ad interim injunction)**

17. This is an application filed by the plaintiff seeking grant of ad interim ex parte injunction.

18. Issue notice. Learned counsels for defendant nos. 1 and 7 accept notice.

19. On plaintiff taking steps, notice be issued to defendant nos. 2-6 and defendant no. 8 by all permissible modes.

20. The plaintiff has filed the present suit *inter alia* praying for decree of permanent injunction and damages.

21. The case set out in the plaint is that the plaintiff is a highly reputed corporate professional with an unblemished career spanning over two decades. The plaintiff has been associated with PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (hereinafter "PwC") since April 2006 and was elevated to the position of Partner in the year 2024.

22. The defendant no. 1 is an independent journalist who claims association with international media platforms. The other defendants include social media intermediaries X/defendant no. 2 (formerly known as Twitter); OBNews which is an online platform operating on Google LLC /defendant no. 5, Meta Platforms Inc./defendant no. 6; digital news platforms NDTV



Hindi/defendant no. 3; ABP Live/defendant no. 4; a public figure Ms. Richa Chadha/defendant no. 7 and; an airline operator InterGlobe Aviation Limited/IndiGo as defendant no. 8.

23. On 11.03.2026, the plaintiff was travelling from Delhi to Mumbai on IndiGo Flight No. 6E 6814, seated at a window seat (25A), while defendant no. 1 was seated adjacent to him at the middle seat (25B). Throughout the entire flight, the plaintiff never left his seat and maintained appropriate, standard passenger behaviour, doing nothing to give rise to any allegations.

24. The plaint further sets out that the plaintiff, owing to professional fatigue, fell asleep in his assigned seat approximately 30 minutes prior to landing. It is alleged that during this time, defendant no. 1 abruptly awakened the plaintiff and levelled false and scandalous allegations accusing him of inappropriate conduct.

25. It is stated that at approximately 09:39 AM, defendant no. 1 launched a false, malicious, and defamatory attack on the plaintiff by publishing a post on the platform X (formerly Twitter). The said post publicly accused the plaintiff of improper conduct, alongside revealing his name, photograph, and his professional designation as a PwC Partner.

26. It is also expressed in the plaint that the defamatory narrative was subsequently amplified and sensationalized by other defendants without any independent verification. Specifically, on 11.03.2026 at 11:50 AM, defendant no. 7/Ms. Richa Chadha re-posted the allegations with the remark *Make him famous*. Thereafter, news platforms such as NDTV Hindi/defendant no. 3; ABP Live/defendant no. 4; and OBNews which is an online platform operating on Google LLC /defendant no. 5, published articles reproducing the unverified allegations, thereby subjecting the



plaintiff to a 'trial by media'.

27. It is stated that the posts published by the defendants are false, baseless, scandalous and defamatory in nature besides being lopsided and only act as a mouthpiece of the allegations levelled by the defendant no. 1, without verifying the facts of the case.

28. It is stated that the defendant no. 1 did not raise any complaint and it was only after the flight had landed and being aggrieved by the perceived lack of attention, did the defendant no. 1 fabricate a false narrative against the plaintiff and approached the crew members of the flight. Upon enquiry by the crew members, no co-passenger or crew member corroborated the allegations made by defendant No. 1, thereby conclusively demonstrating the absence of any independent evidence in support of the accusations.

29. The plaint further articulates that defendant No. 1, without following the due course of law, proceeded to publicise the same on social media platforms within approximately 20 minutes of the landing, and at around 09:39 AM published a post in the public domain. The said act resulted in a sudden and significant increase in her viewership, followers and public engagement, thereby clearly indicating the ulterior motive behind her actions. The entire episode appears to have been deliberately orchestrated and thereafter exploited by defendant No. 1 as a means to garner publicity, traction and professional visibility, at the direct cost of the plaintiff's reputation.

30. It is averred that the conduct of defendant no. 1 must be viewed in light of her self-proclaimed professional positioning as a freelance journalist deliberately sought to fabricate and sensationalise the alleged incident for ulterior motives.



31. It is alleged that defendant no. 1 had posted the defamatory post on the social media platform X at approximately 09:39 A.M., and defendant no. 7 reposted the tweet of defendant no. 1 at approximately 11:50 A.M., while the FIR was registered against the plaintiff at 12:27 P.M. The circumstances surrounding the immediate amplification of the post by defendant No. 7 give rise to a reasonable apprehension of prior communication, coordination or influence between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 7, particularly in light of the prompt re-publication and the nature of the accompanying remark. The said act of defendant No. 7 materially contributed to the virality of the content and directly led to further republication by other defendants, including media platforms, thereby aggravating the defamatory impact.

32. Ms. Shyel Trehan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff expounds on the fact that the defamatory posts published by the defendants (defendant nos. 1-7) have gone far and beyond the contents of the FIR registered because these posts have substantially acted as a mouthpiece of the post published by defendant no. 1 and only sensationalized the allegations.

33. She submits that entire above mentioned facts bears a striking resemblance to the narrative sought to be advanced by defendant No. 1 in her prior documentary project concerning alleged harassment in public transport, thereby indicating that the present incident has been deliberately exploited and projected to fit within a pre-conceived storyline, at the direct cost of the plaintiff's reputation and dignity.

34. Lastly, she submits that defendant no. 8 has in a wholly unauthorized and illegal manner, shared a photograph of the plaintiff's boarding pass with defendant No. 1, thereby disclosing his identity without consent. This act of



defendant no. 8 had armed defendant no. 1 to publish the defamatory post which had a domino effect on the online ridicule faced by the plaintiff along with his suspension order from his workplace i.e. PwC.

35. *Per contra*, Ms. Vanya Chhabra learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no. 1 states that the plaintiff is seeking a pre-emptive gag order against defendant no. 1 thereby restraining a woman from narrating her own first-person experience of sexual misconduct.

36. She submits that truth is the absolute defence in cases of defamation and the threshold for grant of interim injunction in defamation cases is extremely high and not met in the present case. Furthermore, no *prima facie* case is made out to grant injunction to the plaintiff.

37. She further submits that the post/tweet published by defendant no. 1 is a first-person narration and therefore, is not defamation *per se*. She states that defendant no. 1 is not a neutral third party commentator and has only narrated her personal experience.

38. Ms. Chhabra contends that granting an interim injunction at this stage, wherein an FIR has already been registered against the plaintiff, will tantamount to a premature gag order and a restraint on the freedom to speech and expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

39. Responding to the submission of the plaintiff that he was suspended from his workplace due to the post published by the defendant no. 1 and the subsequent amplification through different channels, she submits that it was purely a management decision taken by PwC and not a consequence of any judicial order and cannot be attributed to the post published by defendant no.1 alone, given that independent media channels (defendant nos. 3-5) separately covered and amplified the story.



40. Mr. Madhav Khuranna, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant no. 7 submits that defendant no. 7 has already removed the tweet whereby she had remarked *Make him famous* while addressing the tweet posted by defendant no. 1. His statement is taken on record.

41. He further submits that the sole purpose why the plaintiff has arrayed defendant no. 7 as one of the parties in the instant suit is only to gain traction and publicise the entire case. It is pertinent to mention that there were more than thousand reposts of the tweet published by defendant no. 1 but the plaintiff conveniently chose to array defendant no. 7 owing to her celebrity status. He urges that since the post has been removed, the defendant no. 7 be deleted from the array of defendants.

42. He also asserts the fact that in the instant case, *prima facie*, it cannot be ascertained that it was the action of defendant no. 7 which directly led to the amplification of the tweet posted by defendant no. 1 as there were thousands of others who reposted the same tweet. Moreover, defendant no. 7 was only acting under her right of freedom of speech and expression and cannot be blamed for the further publication by the media houses i.e. defendant nos. 3-5.

43. I have heard the counsels for the parties and also perused the material on record.

44. This Court is conscious of the fact that the competing constitutional rights i.e. the defendants' right of freedom to speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the plaintiff's right to reputation and a fair trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, needs to be delicately balanced. In the context of the present case, when the FIR already stands registered against the plaintiff and the investigation is underway, the



defendants may be within their right to share or disseminate the contents of FIR or material which is informative but in public interest, but at the same time the defendants have to exercise restraint and refrain from publishing and circulating any material referring to the character of the plaintiff which creates an atmosphere of prejudice for him or mar his reputation and thereby causes prejudice to an ongoing investigation. The guiding principles in this regard have been articulated by the Bombay High Court in *Nilesh Navalakha and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 56*, while examining the impact of trial by media on pending investigation. The relevant excerpts from the said decision reads thus:

*“353. While not proposing to issue directions for postponement of news reporting for the reasons noted above, yet, bearing in mind the adverse impact that a trial by media could have on pending investigations (which was not the subject matter of consideration before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions), that an accused is entitled to Constitutional protections and invasion of his rights is to be zealously guarded, that there is an emerging need to foster a degree of responsibility as well as promote accountability and the reason in the paragraph that follows, we do not consider it to be either impermissible or imprudent in the present context to maintain a fine balance between competing rights as well as having regard to the ever-changing societal needs to suggest measures for exercise of restraint by the media in respect of certain specified matters, with a view to secure proper administration of justice, while it proceeds to exercise its right to report.*

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355. Having given our anxious consideration to all aspects of the matter, we are inclined to the opinion that the press/media ought \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ avoid/regulate \_\_\_\_\_ certain reports/discussions/debates/interviews in respect of and/or touching upon any on-going inquiry/investigation into a



*criminal offence and that only those items are presented for reading/viewing and otherwise perceiving through the senses which are merely informative but in public interest instead of what, according to the media, the public is interested in. No report/discussion/debate/interview should be presented by the press/media which could harm the interests of the accused being investigated or a witness in the case or any such person who may be relevant for any investigation, with a view to satiate the thirst of stealing a march over competitors in the field of reporting. Accordingly, we direct the press/media to exercise restraint and refrain from printing/displaying any news item and/or initiating any discussion/debate/interview of the nature, as indicated hereunder:*

*a. In relation to death by suicide, depicting the deceased as one having a weak character or intruding in any manner on the privacy of the deceased;*

*b. That causes prejudice to an ongoing inquiry/investigation by:*

*(i) Referring to the character of the accused/victim and creating an atmosphere of prejudice for both;*

*(ii) Holding interviews with the victim, the witnesses and/or any of their family members and displaying it on screen;*

*(iii) Analyzing versions of witnesses, whose evidence could be vital at the stage of trial;*

*(iv) Publishing a confession allegedly made to a police officer by an accused and trying to make the public believe that the same is a piece of evidence which is admissible before a Court and there is no reason for the Court not to act upon it, without letting the public know the nitty-gritty of the Evidence Act, 1872;*

*(v) Printing photographs of an accused and thereby facilitating his identification;*

*(vi) Criticizing the investigative agency based on half-baked information without proper research;*

*(vii) Pronouncing on the merits of the case, including pre-judging the guilt or innocence qua an accused or an individual not yet wanted in a case, as the case may be;*

*(viii) Recreating/reconstructing a crime scene and*



***depicting how the accused committed the crime;***

*(ix) Predicting the proposed/future course of action including steps that ought to be taken in a particular direction to complete the investigation; and*

*(x) Leaking sensitive and confidential information from materials collected by the investigating agency;*

*c. Acting in any manner so as to violate the provisions of the Programme Code as prescribed under section 5 of the CTVN Act read with rule 6 of the CTVN Rules and thereby inviting contempt of court; and*

***d. Indulging in character assassination of any individual and thereby mar his reputation.***

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***358. At the same time, while emphasizing on the need for a free, fair, effective and meaningful investigation of an FIR disclosing commission of cognizable offence by an accused be it a celebrity or an ordinary person to be conducted by the investigative agency, we also consider it appropriate to remind the investigative agencies that they are entitled to maintain secrecy in course of investigation and are under no obligation to divulge materials thus collected. If indeed there is leakage or disclosure of materials, which has the potential of stifling a proper investigation, it could pave the way for such information being laid before the competent court having powers to punish for criminal contempt under section 2(c) of the CoC Act and in an appropriate case, for being dealt with in accordance with law.”***

(emphasis supplied)

45. It is an admitted position that Defendant No. 1 resorted to broadcasting the allegations on a public social media platform prior to setting the criminal law in motion *vide* a First Information Report (FIR), inasmuch as the defendant no. 1 posted the incident on social media at about 09:39 A.M. whereas the FIR came to be registered at 12:27 P.M. Incidentally, the impugned post of defendant no. 1 and the FIR are at



variance as to the identity of the plaintiff. In the post circulated by the plaintiff at 09:39 A.M. prior to the registration of FIR there is a clear disclosure of plaintiff's name but intriguingly the FIR records the statement of defendant no.1 to the effect that '*After reaching the police station, the name of the person was found to be.....*'.

46. The overhasty public disclosure, *prima facie*, suggests an attempt to sensationalize the issue and subject the plaintiff to a trial by public opinion, rather than a *bona fide* pursuit of legal redress. While defendant no. 1 has an unhindered right to report a grievance, but using social media to circulate allegations of inappropriate touching and revealing the identity of the plaintiff along with his photograph before a formal investigation even commences, in a *prima facie* view of this Court, is a severe transgression of the plaintiff's fundamental right to live with dignity and have fair trial.

47. Likewise, a bare perusal of the impugned articles and social media posts published by the various other defendants reveal a disturbing trend. For reference, the article published by defendant no. 3 mentions the name of the plaintiff and states that he had inappropriately touched defendant no. 1 and was subsequently caught red-handed.

48. Similarly, articles published by defendant no. 4 and OBNews on the platform of defendant no. 5 details the social media allegations made by defendant no. 1, who claimed she was inappropriately touched by the plaintiff during her flight from Delhi to Mumbai. Crucially, these articles reiterate the tweet published by defendant no. 1 and highlight the viral amplification of the allegations done by defendant no. 7, and document the subsequent public reactions and digital commentary from other social media users. *Prima Facie*, the articles published by defendant nos. 4 and OBNews



on the platform of defendant no. 5 goes on to suggest that the plaintiff has indeed committed the offence as alleged by defendant no. 1, without verifying the facts of the case. Incidentally, re-posting of allegations by defendant no. 7 with the remark *Make him famous* is at about 11:50 A.M., which is again prior to the registration of FIR.

49. Axiomatically, the post published on the platform of defendant no. 6 by a page titled '*Pardafaash Media*' is probably the most outrageous and unwarranted usage of social media to sensationalize an issue without verifying the facts of the case. The post in question labels the plaintiff as a 'molester' prominently using that expression right above his photograph which also includes his and his employer's name, *prima facie*, constituting online defamation that could cause public ridicule and loss of reputation to the plaintiff.

50. The narrative set by the media houses and digital platforms has clearly breached the contours of the FIR. The publications do not merely report the allegations in the FIR; they prematurely adjudicate the matter. By suggesting the plaintiff to be the 'culprit' and categorically labelling him a 'molester', the defendants have effectively usurped the adjudicatory function of the competent courts. Such pronouncements grossly violate the foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence *viz.* the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and create an unwarranted parallel investigation that has the potential of severely prejudicing the ongoing investigation in the aforesaid FIR.

51. Turning to the role of defendant No. 7, the Court must emphasize the heightened duty of care that accompanies significant public influence. Defendant No. 7 is undeniably a public figure having a massive active



digital footprint. The endorsement and amplification of an unverified allegation, accompanied by the instigatory text ‘*Make him famous*’, transcends mere free expression and acts as a catalyst for public shaming and digital vigilantism. A public figure, such as defendant no. 7, bears a legal and moral responsibility to verify the veracity of facts before leveraging her platform to amplify grave accusations. The Court is *prima facie* of the view that endorsement of unverified allegations has inflicted immediate, exponential, and incalculable harm on the plaintiff's reputation. However, this Court is cognizant of the submission made by Mr. Khuranna with regard to the taking down of the tweet posted by defendant no. 7 and expects defendant no. 7 not to precipitate the issue in future.

52. As regards, Mr. Khuranna's oral prayer to delete defendant no. 7 from the array of defendants, at this stage suffice it to state that *prima facie* the plaint does disclose cause of action against defendant no. 7 *qua* the prayer of permanent injunction and damages, and she also appears to be a necessary party. Nevertheless, such a prayer will be considered on its own merits as and when an appropriate application is filed by defendant no. 7 in that behalf.

53. At this juncture it would also be apt would be to refer a decision of the coordinate bench of this Court in *Lakshmi Murdeshwar Puri v. Saket Gokhale (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 23*, wherein it was held as under:

**“29. Reputations, nourished and nurtured over years of selfless service and toil, may crumble in an instant; one thoughtless barb is sufficient. It has been held, by the Supreme Court, that the right to life, consecrated by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, infuses the reputation of the individual. [Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 8 SCC 1; Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry, (1989) 1**



*SCC 494; Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni, (1983) 1 SCC 124] Reputation, it is well settled, precedes the man. In a similar vein, para 18 of the report in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna [Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, (1986) 4 SCC 537] observes thus:*

*‘For instance, as in the present case, where a member of a highly respected an (sic) publicly trusted profession is found guilty of misconduct and suffers penalty, the damage to his professional reputation can be immediate and far-reaching. ‘Not all the King’s horses and all the King’s men’ can ever salvage the situation completely, notwithstanding the widest scope provided to an appeal. To many a man, his professional reputation is his most valuable possession. It affects his standing and dignity among his fellow members in the profession, and guarantees the esteem of his clientele. It is often the carefully garnered fruit of a long period of scrupulous, conscientious and diligent industry. It is the portrait of his professional honour. In a world said to be notorious for its blase attitude towards the noble values of an earlier generation, a man’s professional reputation is still his most sensitive pride. In such a case, after the blow suffered by the initial decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete restitution through an appellate decision.’*

***30. In the age of social media, desecration of the reputation of a public figure has become child’s play. All that is needed is the opening of a social media account and, thereafter, the posting of messages on the account. Thousands of responses are received and, in the process, the reputation of the man, who is targeted, becomes mud...”***

(emphasis supplied)

54. Similarly, reference may also be advantageously made to a decision of this Court in ***Gaurav Bhatia v. Naveen Kumar 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2704*** wherein in the context of balancing the right of freedom of speech *vis-a-vis* right to have dignity and reputation, it has been held as under:-

*“42. The facts of the present case may now be considered in the*



*light of aforesaid principles to ascertain whether the injunctive relief is justified in the circumstances as made out in the plaint. It is not disputed that the plaintiff is not only holding a distinguished position of Senior Advocate and is acknowledged for his expertise and experience in the legal field, but is also the Spokesperson for one of the most prominent political entity of this Country and being its Spokesperson, plays a crucial role in presenting the views of the party and communicating about its policies and initiatives in public. As has been discussed in the aforementioned judgments, while the threshold of public criticism and alleged defamatory X posts/Tweets on social media platforms is much higher, but the individual dignity and honour of a person cannot be allowed to be defamed or disrepute brought to him on the ground of Right of Free Speech and Expression. A thin line of distinction exists between defamation and public criticism and an onerous task lies with the Courts to maintain this delicate balance between the competing claims and rights.”*

(emphasis supplied)

55. Likewise, reference may also be had to the decision of this Court in the case of *Amit Malviya v. Samajwadi Party Media CS (OS) 643/2024, decided on 16.08.2024*, wherein this Court observed that an individual's reputation is an integral part of his/her personality and cannot be unjustly tarnished under the guise of freedom of speech.

56. Having noticed the aforesaid *dicta* as well as the material on record, this Court is of *prima facie* view that the allegations in the post published by defendant no. 1 alongwith disclosure of plaintiff's identity and his photograph; article published by defendant nos. 3; post/article published by 'OBNews' and 'Pardafassh Media' on the social media platforms of defendant nos. 5 and 6 respectively; and the tweet reposted by defendant no. 7 (which now stands deleted as per the submissions made by Mr. Khuranna) sensationalize the issue at hand and have prematurely labelled the plaintiff



as the culprit even when an FIR has been registered and the matter is under investigation. Some of the impugned posts/articles go beyond the realm of the contents of the FIR registered, thereby harming the reputation of the plaintiff who now stands suspended from his workplace i.e. PwC even after having an unblemished career of over 20 years, as claimed.

57. This Court is satisfied that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and injury in case an *ad interim* order of injunction in favour of the plaintiff is not granted. The balance of convenience is also in favour of an interim order of *status quo* being passed.

58. Under the circumstances, it is deemed appropriate to direct the defendant no. 1; defendant nos. 3 and 4; online platform operating under the name 'OBNews' on the platform of defendant no. 5; and an Instagram page named '*Pardafaash Media*' operating on the platform of defendant no. 6, not to publish any post making identical or similar defamatory allegations against the plaintiff, till the next date of hearing. Ordered accordingly. Further, the following defendants are directed to forthwith take down/remove the defamatory posts published on the social media platforms, namely X (defendant no. 2), Google LLC (defendant no. 5) and Meta Platforms LLC (defendant no. 6), as tabulated below, and maintain that position, till the next date of hearing.

| S. No. | Defendant no(s) who are directed | URLs to be removed  |
|--------|----------------------------------|---|
| 1.     | 1                                | <a href="https://x.com/khansa_juned/status/2031583314134638607?s=12&amp;t=BdXK39amWKNemF6T4Z_mjA">https://x.com/khansa_juned/status/2031583314134638607?s=12&amp;t=BdXK39amWKNemF6T4Z_mjA</a> |
| 2.     | 7                                | <a href="https://x.com/RichaChadha/status/2031616265853550986">https://x.com/RichaChadha/status/2031616265853550986</a> , if not  |



2026:DHC:2691



|    |    |   |
|----|----|---|
|    |    | already removed   |
| 3. | 3  | <a href="https://ndtv.in/india/i-was-sleeping-and-he-was-touching-meinappropriately-female-journalist-molested-on-indigo-flight-11199142">https://ndtv.in/india/i-was-sleeping-and-he-was-touching-meinappropriately-female-journalist-molested-on-indigo-flight-11199142</a> |
| 4. | 4  | <a href="https://share.google/mBahcx6bq9Kh47yOH">https://share.google/mBahcx6bq9Kh47yOH</a>   |
| 5. | 5  | <a href="https://share.google/vCy0LuROQ939mC7DT">https://share.google/vCy0LuROQ939mC7DT</a>   |
| 6. | 6. | <a href="https://www.instagram.com/reel/DVxAKAPE5GI/?igsh=NTdudzNsMWJjd3dl">https://www.instagram.com/reel/DVxAKAPE5GI/?igsh=NTdudzNsMWJjd3dl</a>   |

59. Provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC be complied with by the plaintiff *qua* defendant nos. 2 to 6 and 8, within a period of three weeks from today and affidavit of compliance be filed within a period of one week thereafter.

60. Let reply to the application be filed within a period of 04 weeks.

61. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within a period of two weeks thereafter.

62. List before the learned Joint Registrar for completion of service and pleadings on 25.05.2026.

**VIKAS MAHAJAN, J**

**MARCH 20, 2026/dss**