$~42 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of Decision: 16th February, 2026 + CS(COMM) 793/2023 & I.A. 14360/2017 M/S METRO BUILDTECH PRIVATE LIMITED .....Plaintiff Through: Mr. Ashim Shridhar and Ms. Maheen Khan, Advs. M: 8447564542 Email: chamberashimshridhar@gmail.com versus MR. SHRIDHAR Y. CHITALE & ANR. .....Defendants Through: Ms. Smiti Verma, Adv. for D-1 M: 8828446871 Email: smitiverma@cvassociates.in Mr. Sanjiv Kakra, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Akash Madan, Adv. for D-2 M: 7869611011 Email: kakra.associates@gmail.com CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA MINI PUSHKARNA, J. (ORAL) 1. The present suit is at the stage of framing of issues. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that defendant no. 2 is supporting the case of the plaintiff. 3. The present case has been filed by the plaintiff seeking specific performance of the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015, whereby, the defendants’ mother, i.e., Late Mrs. Sushama Yeshwant Chitale and the plaintiff company agreed to develop the property bearing B-111, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi-110049, and construct a new building thereon. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has handed over certain proposed issues, which are the common issues proposed by the plaintiff and defendant no. 2. 5. Learned counsel appearing for defendant no. 1 has no objection to the said common issues proposed by the plaintiff and defendant no. 2. However, she draws the attention of this Court to the averments made in the written statement of defendant no.1 dated 19th February, 2024, wherein, it is stated as follows: “xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 6. By referring to the aforesaid, learned counsel appearing for defendant no. 1 submits that the defendant no. 1 has clearly stated in the written statement that there was an oral partition of the suit property in the year 1994. She, thus, submits that at the time when the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015 was entered into between the mother of the defendants and the plaintiff, the mother of the defendants had no right, title and interest in the suit property, as the oral partition had already taken place. 7. However, the aforesaid submission is vehemently disputed by learned Senior Counsel appearing for defendant no. 2 as well as learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff. 8. Attention of this Court has been drawn to Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) to submit that defendant no. 1 cannot raise any claim qua the defendant no. 2. 9. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to documents with respect to the perpetual Sub-Lease Deed dated 21st July, 1973, in favour of the grandfather of the defendants, and the registered Gift Deed dated 19th September, 1983, in favour of the mother of the defendants. 10. Having heard learned counsels appearing for the parties, at the outset, this Court notes the provision of Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC, which reads as under: “xxx xxx xxx 6A. Counter-claim by defendant. (1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6, set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not: Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court. (2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. (3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as may be fixed by the Court. (4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by the rules applicable to plaints. xxx xxx xxx” 11. Reading of Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC clearly shows that a defendant has the right to raise a counter claim against the claim of the plaintiff. However, the CPC nowhere provides that a defendant can raise a counter claim against a co-defendant. 12. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the case of Rajul Manoj Shah Alias Rajeshwari Rsiklal Shah Versus Kiranbhai Shakrabhai Patel and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1958, wherein, the Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot file a counter claim against a co-defendant, in the following manner: “xxx xxx xxx 20. Rule 6A provides that counter-claim shall be against the claim of the plaintiff and such right or claim shall be in respect of cause of action accruing to defendant against the plaintiff. This Court in Rohit Singh (supra) held; “21. Normally, a counterclaim, though based on a different cause of action than the one put in suit by the plaintiff could be made. But, it appears to us that a counterclaim has necessarily to be directed against the plaintiff in the suit, though incidentally or along with it, it may also claim relief against the co-defendants in the suit. But a counterclaim directed solely against the co-defendants cannot be maintained. By filing a counterclaim the litigation cannot be converted into some sort of an interpleader suit…..” 21. The above observations have been reiterated with approval in subsequent pronouncement in Damodhar Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske8, by observing as under; “39. The decision of this Court in Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar also assumes relevance in the above context. This Court held that a defendant could not be permitted to raise counterclaim against co-defendant because by virtue of Order 8 Rule 6-A CPC, it could be raised by the defendant against the claim of the plaintiff.” 22. In the present case, defendant no. 2 sought to raise a counter-claim primarily for the relief of specific performance of agreement dated 21.10.2011 executed in his favour by deceased original defendant no. 1 with respect to her undivided share in the suit property, by a direction to the Nazir, the substituted representative of defendant no. 1, to execute a sale deed in pursuance of the agreement to sell. The relief of specific performance as sought to be raised by defendant no. 2 cannot be set up by way of a counter-claim since the same is not directed against the appellant/plaintiff, but is instead directed solely against the co-defendant. In view of this, defendant no. 2 is held to be disentitled to raise prayer of specific performance by way of counter-claim. This is simply not permissible, and this position is no more res-integra in view of the decision of this Court in Rohit Singh (supra). xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis Supplied) 13. Thus, as per Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC, no issue can be framed by this Court allowing the defendant no. 1 to raise a counter claim against the defendant no. 2. In case such a course of action is allowed, the same will have the effect of converting the present suit for specific performance to a title dispute between the defendants. This would be impermissible, as the nature of the suit cannot be changed from that of suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff to a suit regarding title dispute between the defendants. 14. Further, this Court takes note of the perpetual Sub-Lease Deed dated 21st July, 1973, executed by the Land and Building Department of the erstwhile Delhi Administration in favour of the grandfather of the defendants. 15. This Court also takes note of the registered Gift Deed dated 19th September, 1983, executed by the grandmother of the defendants in favour of the mother of the defendants. Thus, it is clear that prima facie, the mother of the defendants, on the basis of the documents on record, was the exclusive owner of the suit property. 16. Therefore, in case, the defendant no. 1 intends to raise any issue with regard to the title and ownership of their mother over the suit property, the same would be the subject matter of another suit. 17. In this regard, reliance is placed on the case of Kasturi Versus Iyyamperumal and Others, (2005) 6 SCC 733, wherein, the Supreme Court held that a Court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract into a suit for title, in the following manner: “xxx xxx xxx 16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved in the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff-appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis Supplied) 18. Thus, no issue can be framed by this Court with regard to the claim set up by defendant no. 1 against defendant no. 2 as regards the oral partition, or their mother not having any right, title or interest over the suit property at the time when the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015, was executed. 19. It is clarified that the aforesaid observation is only with respect to the adjudication of the issue before this Court, regarding the framing of issues as proposed by defendant no. 1. 20. In case, defendant no. 1 intends to file a fresh suit in that regard, pressing for oral partition of the suit property as averred in the written statement, the defendant no. 1 is free to his pursue remedies, in accordance with law. 21. Needless to state, in case such a suit is filed by defendant no. 1, the other parties, including, defendant no. 2 or plaintiff, will have the right to raise any objections with regard thereto. 22. Accordingly, the following issues are framed: I. Whether the plaintiff and the defendants’ mother namely Late Mrs. Sushama Yeshwant Chitale entered into a Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015 qua the suit property, i.e., B-111, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi-110049? (OPP) II. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015? (OPP) III. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of mandatory injunction for conversion of the suit property from leasehold to freehold by the defendants? (OPP) IV. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from creating third-party interests? (OPP) V. Whether the defendants’ mother entered into an Agreement to Sell with respect to the ground floor of the suit property along with 22.5% undivided share in the suit property by way of Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015? (OPP) VI. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- along with interest, and if so, from which of the defendants? (OPP) VII. Whether the suit for specific performance of the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015 is maintainable? (OPD1) VIII. Whether the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015 does not entitle the plaintiff to any right, title or interest in the suit property being a non-registered document as per sections 17 and 49 of The Registration Act, 1908? (OPD1) IX. Whether the Collaboration Agreement dated 14th July, 2015 is non-enforceable for being executed without the prior written permission of the lessor under the perpetual Sub-Lease Deed dated 21st July, 1973 and restrictions contained in the Gift Deed dated 19th September, 1983? (OPD1) X. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court Fees and jurisdiction, and is therefore liable to be dismissed? (OPD1) XI. Relief, if any. 23. All the parties are directed to file list of witnesses, within a period of four weeks, from today. 24. The plaintiff shall file Evidence Affidavit of its witnesses, within a period of ten weeks, from today. 25. Since the matter is now at the stage of evidence, the interim order dated 05th December, 2017 is made absolute during the pendency of the present suit. 26. Accordingly, I.A. 14360/2017 is disposed of. 27. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) for further proceedings on 04th May, 2026. MINI PUSHKARNA, J FEBRUARY 16, 2026/KR Page 1 of 12