$~J * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment pronounced on: 20.02.2026 + W.P.(C) 14421/2022 and CM APPLs.2918/2023, 27873/2025, 40473/2025 RAVI PRAKASH MEHROTRA ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. Ankit Agarwal, Mr. Apoorv Srivastava and Mr. Koustabh Desai, Advocates. versus DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH THE VICE CHAIRMAN & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Ms. Pulak Gupta, Mr. Parvin Bansal and Ms. Aqsa, Advocates for DDA. Mr. Amit Gupta, SPC along with Mr. Vidur Dwivedi, Mr. Atik Gill and Mr. Karan Rawal, Advocates for UOI. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA JUDGMENT 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner, who is an Advocate, seeking appropriate directions against the respondents, to clear his outstanding professional fee bills. The prayers, as framed in the present petition, are as under:- “a. issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS, directing Respondent nos. 1 and 2 to settle the outstanding professional fee bills of the Petitioner, forthwith, and to compensate him with grant of interest for the inordinate delay and harassment caused; b. pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of equity, justice and fair play and in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. It is submitted that the petitioner was engaged as Special Counsel on 15.10.2013 by the Ministry of Urban Development (now Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs) to represent the said Ministry as well as the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) before the National Green Tribunal (‘NGT’) in O.A. No. 300/2013 titled as “Manoj Kumar Misra & Another v. Union of India & Others”. The engagement letter dated 15.10.2013 is in the following terms:- 3. The aforesaid communication clearly records the “decision” to engage the petitioner to represent the concerned Ministry and the DDA in the aforesaid case before the NGT. The engagement letter also encloses the vakalatanama that was to be signed by the Competent Authority of the DDA. The engagement letter further records that the fees of the petitioner would be borne by the DDA. 4. Thereafter, an email dated 15.10.2013 was addressed by the DDA to the petitioner. The same reads as follows:- 5. The aforesaid email was responded to by the petitioner in the following terms:- 6. The petitioner has placed on record a note-sheet which purportedly records the approval of the fees sought by the petitioner. The relevant extract of the said note-sheet, including the hand-written portion thereon whereby the fees of the petitioner are stated to have been approved, is reproduced as under:- 7. It is further submitted that on 29.01.2016, the petitioner was further engaged in connection with M.A. No.1346/2015 filed in O.A. No.300/2013. The relevant noting with regard thereto, as placed on record by the petitioner, is as under:- 8. On 11.11.2016, the DDA issued a communication informing the petitioner that his services were no longer required in the aforesaid matters, and thereby, the petitioner was formally disengaged from O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015. The said letter reads as under:- 9. It is the case of the petitioner that while DDA paid the petitioner for his appearances from 21.10.2013 to 25.01.2016, it failed to clear the petitioner’s professional fee for 34 appearances in O.A. No.300/2013 between 02.02.2016 and 17.10.2016; and for 10 appearances in M.A. No.1346/2015 from 21.03.2016 till the disposal of the matter on 26.07.2016. The outstanding fees of the petitioner was communicated by the petitioner to the DDA vide communication dated 28.11.2016 which is as follows: 10. The details of the outstanding fee bills, as on the said date/s, which are stated to be pending, are as under:- 11. Thereafter, protracted correspondence took place between the petitioner and the DDA for payment of the outstanding fee bills. However, the issue remained unresolved despite the petitioner escalating the matter to the Vice-Chairman, DDA. The petitioner is also stated to have approached the concerned Ministry on 14.08.2020 seeking necessary intervention; however, to no avail. 12. Certain documents/clarifications were sought by the DDA from the petitioner, which are stated to have been duly provided; however, the same did not result in a resolution of the matter. It is submitted that during the exchange of correspondence, no dispute regarding the fee structure was ever raised. 13. Having exhausted all channels and having engaged with several officers of the concerned Ministry and the DDA over a long period, the petitioner finally issued a legal notice on 18.04.2022 to the Vice-Chairman, DDA and the Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, calling upon them to settle his dues within a period of seven days. However, the same elicited no response. Consequently, the petitioner filed the present petition. 14. Vide order dated 11.01.2024, this Court referred the parties to mediation. The mediation proceedings are stated to have taken place on 21 dates between 19.02.2024 and 13.08.2024. However, no amicable resolution was arrived at. 15. In the above conspectus, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that there is no dispute as regards the terms of engagement or the quantum/rate at which the fee is payable to the petitioner, nor as regards the number of appearances. 16. In the circumstances, it is sought that appropriate directions be issued for payment of the outstanding amount to the petitioner, together with interest. 17. The contentions of the petitioner are vehemently opposed on behalf of the DDA. 18. It is submitted on behalf of the DDA that the engagement letter that came to be issued to the petitioner on 15.10.2013 did not set out the terms of engagement. On the contrary, it stated that the terms of the engagement would be informed later. 19. It is submitted that the petitioner, vide his email dated 15.10.2013, himself sought “approval” of his rates, which is indicative of the fact that no acceptance thereof could be presumed by the petitioner. 20. It is submitted that since there was no agreement between the parties as regards the terms of engagement, no contract came into existence between the parties inasmuch as the rates proposed by the petitioner were never accepted. 21. It is emphasized by the learned counsel appearing for DDA that the present petition is, in essence, a claim for recovery of alleged unpaid professional fees, for which the appropriate remedy is to file a civil suit, particularly in view of the underlying factual disputes. 22. It is submitted that the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable, given that disputes exist as regards entitlement, quantum, authorization or correctness of the bills. In this regard, reliance is placed on the following judgments:- a) Improvement Trust, Ropar (through its Chairman) v. S. Tejinder Singh Gujral and Others, 1995 SUPP (4) SCC 577; b) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. A.K. Saxena, (2004) 1 SCC 117; c) Vijay Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P. & Ors., Writ Petition(s) (Civil) No(s). 217/2018; d) Bareilly Development Authority and Another v. Ajai Pal Singh and Others, (1989) 2 SCC 116; 1989 SCC OnLine SC 104 at page 126; e) Sada Nand Shukla, Advocate v. State Of U.P. And Another, Writ-C No.-62715 of 2010 dated April 27, 2015; f) Ram Chandra Prasad v. Food Corporation of India & Ors., 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 148; g) Prasant Kumar Khuntia v. Union of India & Anr., 2008 SCC OnLine Ori 57 : AIR 2009 Ori 71; h) M/s. Central Coalfields Limited & Ors. v. Anil Kumar Lal, 2013 SCC OnLine Jhar 188 : (2013) 1 JLJR 468 (HC); and i) K.N Mishra v. State Of U.P & Ors., 2006 SCC OnLine All 334. 23. It is further submitted on behalf of the DDA that a sum of Rs.1.81 crores already stand paid by the DDA to the petitioner in respect of the appearances of the petitioner in O.A. No.300/2013 and O.A. No.89/2013. It is contended that the DDA has already paid excess amount to the petitioner. 24. Attention is drawn to the fact that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs issued a clarification dated 15.03.2021 directing that the petitioner’s fees be regulated strictly in accordance with the relevant Government of India Office Memorandum, including the Office Memorandum dated 01.10.2015. 25. It is submitted that vide DDA’s communication dated 31.10.2022 addressed to the petitioner, it was recorded that the total amount already released to the petitioner exceeds the amount admissible in terms of the aforesaid Office Memorandum and the petitioner was accordingly asked to refund the excess fees. 26. It is emphasized that the petitioner has not produced any document granting him a fee structure different from or higher than the Government prescribed rates. 27. It is further submitted that duplicate bills were submitted by the petitioner for the same dates of hearing. In this regard, it has been stated in the written submissions filed on behalf of the DDA as under:- “DUPLICATE BILLING FOR THE SAME DATES—O.A. 300/2013 & M.A. 1346/2015, RS 3 LAC PER HEARING CLAIMED FOR OA AS WELL FOR MA. 23. The Petitioner’s own “pending bills” list shows multiple dates billed twice— once under O.A. No. 300/2013 and again under M.A. No. 1346/2015— although both matters were listed together before the NGT. The Ministry’s 2021 clarification states that no separate fee is payable for OA and MA when heard together. Despite this, the Petitioner claims Rs. 1,50,000/- under each, totalling Rs. 3,00,000/- for a single hearing date. 24.Duplicated Billing Table (Extract from Petitioner’s Record): ” 28. It is further contended that the present petition is time-barred and ought not to be entertained. 29. Notably, it is also sought to be urged that the petitioner was never engaged in connection with O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015 filed in O.A. No.300/2013 and that his engagement was, instead, confined to M.A. No. 877/2013. FINDINGS I. ENGAGEMENT OF THE PETITIONER 30. A perusal of the record leaves no manner of doubt that the petitioner duly represented the DDA and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs in connection with O.A. No.300/2013. The same is evident from a perusal of the aforementioned engagement letter dated 15.10.2013. 31. More importantly, pursuant to the directions contained in the order dated 03.04.2025, the petitioner has placed on record vakalatnamas duly executed by the DDA and the Ministry of Urban Development (now Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs). The vakalatanama issued by the Ministry of Urban Development (now Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs) in favour of the petitioner is as under:- 32. The vakalatanama issued by the DDA in favour of the petitioner is as under:- 33. The contention of the respondents that the petitioner was engaged only in connection with certain miscellaneous application, inter-alia, M.A. No.877/2013 and not in connection with O.A. No.300/2013, cannot be countenanced upon a perusal of the aforesaid vakalatanamas. 34. The aforesaid vakalatanamas were clearly executed to authorize the petitioner to appear and represent the concerned parties (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs and DDA) in O.A. No.300/2013. 35. Necessarily, the same subsumes authorization in favour of the petitioner to appear in connection with all miscellaneous applications filed in the said O.A. No.300/2013 including M.A. No.1346/2015. In Suresh s/o Daduram Abnave v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Others, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1388, the Bombay High Court has observed as under:- “10. …………….. The parties represented through their Advocates. The vakalatnama, therefore, once filed by the Advocate and/or if the Advocate appears on behalf of the respective parties, the vakalatnama cannot be dissected and/or treated for filing only for Notice of Motion and not for any other proceedings. Considering the provisions so recorded above once the party appears through his Advocate and due vakalatnama is filed, it is for all the proceedings. Therefore, to say that a separate summons required to be served to the Respondents/Defendants is unacceptable. No fresh service of writ of summons is contemplated in such circumstances. The Advocate's appearance, not permitted for want of specific provision and/or instruction for a part of the proceeding arising out of the suit. The vakalatnama cannot be conditional and restricted to any part of the proceedings. …….” 36. Vide aforementioned communication dated 11.11.2016, the DDA informed the petitioner that his services were no longer required in O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015. The same implicitly recognizes the petitioner’s engagement in O.A. No.300/2013. 37. Thus, the fact that the petitioner was duly engaged to appear in connection with O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015 filed in O.A. No.300/2013 is amply clear. II. TERMS OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE PETITIONER 38. Although a doubt has been sought to be created by the respondents as to whether the terms of the engagement of the petitioner were agreed upon, what is crucial is that the respondents have admitted that a significant sum of money has already been paid to the petitioner. 39. It has also been pointed out by the petitioner that the DDA paid the petitioner for his appearances from 21.10.2013 to 25.01.2016; however, it failed to clear the petitioner’s professional fee for the appearances made thereafter in O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015. 40. The petitioner is right in contending that in the protracted correspondences exchanged between the parties, no dispute was ever raised by the respondents regarding the rates at which the petitioner was to be paid. 41. Moreover, in the present case, the understanding between the parties is evident from the very fact that the petitioner has already been paid for numerous appearances (without any dispute being raised as to the ‘per appearance rate’ claimed by the petitioner). III. SERVICES RENDERED BY THE PETITIONER 42. The petitioner seeks outstanding fees in respect of his appearances, the factum of which would be evident from the order-sheets issued in the proceedings before the NGT. Again, the fact that the petitioner did indeed appear on the dates for which he claims payment is not in dispute, since the same would be evident from a perusal of the concerned order sheet/s. 43. On the contrary, it is sought to be asserted by the DDA that the petitioner’s appearances were unauthorized. The said submission is unfortunate when admittedly, the disengagement of the petitioner took place only vide communication dated 11.11.2016. 44. Necessarily, it was incumbent on the petitioner to appear and pursue O.A. No.300/2013 (together with the miscellaneous applications therein). Since the petitioner’s authorization was withdrawn only by way of communication dated 11.11.2016, the petitioner cannot be denied the payment of his fee bills for his appearances / services rendered prior to the said date. 45. In the circumstances, it is untenable for the respondents to raise any controversy as regards (i) the authorization in favour of the petitioner; (ii) the services rendered by the petitioner; and (iii) the rate at which the petitioner is to be paid. 46. The attempt on the part of the respondents to create an unnecessary controversy in order to deny the legitimate entitlement of the petitioner is unfortunate. 47. In Pabitra Roychaudhuri v. Commissioner of Vat and Another, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3571, it has been observed by this Court as under:- “7. Lawyers and counsels who are engaged by various Governments / Departments render their professional services to the said Departments and Governments. The respective Governments / Departments are expected to clear the professional bills of the lawyers within a reasonable time. Under no circumstances should a counsel who has been engaged by the Government / Department be forced to sue his/her own client, especially a government or its agency, and seek legal remedies for seeking clearance of his/her professional fee. 8. The fact that the Petitioner was forced to approach this Court is extremely unfortunate. Though the professional bills of the Petitioner are stated to have now been cleared, his retainership fee is still not being paid. Since there is no dispute on the factum that retainership fee is to be paid, this Court directs the GNCTD to clear the pending retainership payments to the Petitioner within one month from today.” 48. Again, in The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Gopal K. Verma, Civil Appeal No(s). 2142-2143 of 2024 [@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No(s). 19629-19630 of 2023], it has been observed by the Supreme Court as under:- “2. ………………….. If this scenario of creating a situation where the Advocate is compelled to approach the Court of law to recover fees from the State of Uttar Pradesh continues, it will discourage the talented Members of the Bar from appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh. We, therefore, hope and trust that a proper and rational policy is effectively implemented so that the fees of the Advocates representing the State will be paid promptly and within a reasonable time.” 49. Vide order dated 23.03.2023 passed in Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat v. State of Punjab & Ors., W.P. (C) 2522 of 2021, this Court while dealing with the issue of non-payment of outstanding invoices raised towards professional services rendered by the petitioner therein, observed as under – “6. The question has also been raised as to the maintainability of the present writ petition and reliance has been placed upon two orders of the Supreme Court. 7. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the Petitioner relies upon the recent decisions passed by this Court which in turn rely upon the orders of the Supreme Court in ‘State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Luna Ram & Ors.’[Criminal Appeal No. 1718/1995]. 8. After having perused the record and the documents which have been filed, it is clear that there cannot be any dispute as to the fact that the counsel was engaged, as the correspondence confirms the same. Further, in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in ‘State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Luna Ram & Ors.’, and in ‘GP. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati v. State of Rajasthan’, payment of advocate’s bills has been dealt with by the Supreme Court and payments have been directed. 9. In the overall facts and circumstances, it is, accordingly, directed that all the pending invoices of the Petitioner except invoice at serial no.3, be cleared and the payment be made within by the State of Punjab within 3 months.” 50. In Mathew B. Kurian, Partner, M/S Peter and Karunakar, Lawyers v. National Council for Teacher Education and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3462, the Kerela High Court has observed as under – 1. The petitioner, Mathew B. Kurian, an advocate representing M/s Peter & Karunakar and the son of the late Advocate V.M. Kurian, who passed away on 7-6-2018, seek intervention regarding the respondents' failure to settle pending legal fees. The first respondent, the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE), a statutory body under the 1993 Act, is a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution and subject to writ jurisdiction. The petitioner states that NCTE appointed Sri V.M. Kurian as Standing Counsel in 2000, who handled over 590 cases for nearly two decades, with bills totalling Rs 12,11,770 remaining unpaid despite regular invoicing. After the appointment of a new counsel in April 2018, the petitioner informed NCTE of pending bills and case files, which were delivered to the new counsel in July 2018, who assured payment. Despite repeated requests, bills from 2004 remain unpaid, with no response from NCTE. xxx xxx xxx 9. The respondents' counsel argued that the writ petition is not maintainable due to disputed questions of fact. In State of T.N. v. R. Thillaivillalan2 and James Koshy v. Kerala SRTC3 courts have held that petitions by Advocates for unpaid professional fees against State instrumentalities are maintainable under Article 226, unless complex factual issues prevent adjudication. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the presence of disputed questions of fact does not by itself bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The proposition that a petition under Article 226 must be rejected simply on the ground that it cannot be decided without determining the disputed question of fact is not warranted by any provisions of law nor by any decision of court and such a proposition as an inflexible rule of law or of discretion will necessarily make the provisions of Article 226 wholly illusory and ineffective, and that on occasions, such an approach is dictated by considerations of convenience, rather than a rigid rule calling for universal application. 10. Judicial review remains warranted in cases of perceived arbitrariness, regardless of contractual complexity or factual disputes. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs which turns on entertainability and not maintainability. Thus, the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitions involving factual disputes, especially when State agencies act arbitrarily or violate constitutional guarantees. The authority to issue writs under Article 226 is plenary, and limitations only arise where explicitly provided by the Constitution. Courts can, on occasion, assess disputed facts where justice demands, underscoring that the so-called “hands-off” approach is not absolute, but context-dependent. 11. Adopting any other position would imply that an advocate, who has diligently represented a client throughout the entirety of a case, would be compelled to initiate a separate suit against his own client, incurring court fees and navigating the constraints of the period of limitation. Such an approach would impose an unwarranted burden on legal professionals, forcing them into such strained circumstances unless the matter involves complex issues requiring factual adjudication. This would undermine the very essence of legal practice, where the advocate's role is to serve the client's interests without the needless complication of parallel proceedings, save for circumstances that genuinely demand detailed factual examination. 12. In the instant case, there is no dispute that there was an engagement by NCTE. There is no dispute that 590 cases have been disposed of. There is no allegation that the lawyer concerned had not appeared or that the cases had not been disposed of. Only ten cases are shown where the NCTE is not a party. Under such circumstances, there is no justification at all for non-payment of the agreed fees to the petitioner for the services rendered. Nothing on record shows any communication issued by the NCTE to Late Adv. V.M. Kurian calling for any details or complaining that the disposal of the cases was not intimated or that the certified copies were not given. 51. In view of the aforesaid observations in Mathew B. Kurian, Partner, M/S Peter and Karunakar, Lawyers v. National Council for Teacher Education and Others (supra), there is no merit in the objections/ s sought to be raised by the respondent as regards maintainability of the present petition. This is particularly so, in the light of the factual matrix of the present case. 52. It is indeed unfortunate that the petitioner has been made to run from pillar to post for his legitimate dues. It does not behove the DDA or any other public authority to avail the services of an Advocate and then seek to deny payment of fees / emoluments on frivolous grounds. 53. This Court is constrained to observe that the public authorities, such as the DDA, are not expected to act in a dishonourable and unscrupulous manner in their dealings with their own Advocates by seeking to evade payment of fees and emoluments. Such conduct, not only brings disrepute to the public authority concerned but also strikes at the very foundation of the rule of law, since the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship constitutes the most fundamental aspect thereof. This Court is constrained to express its deep dismay at the conduct of the concerned officials who have sought to deny the petitioner’s legitimate entitlement. 54. In the circumstances, the respondent no. 1 / DDA is directed to forthwith make payment of the petitioner’s outstanding fee bills. 55. It is, however, clarified that the DDA shall be entitled to deduct / exclude the duplicate fee bills viz. those fee bills where the petitioner has claimed separate hearing fees for appearing in O.A. No.300/2013 and M.A. No.1346/2015, on the same date of hearing. These have been set out in paragraphs 231 and 242 of the written submissions filed on behalf of the DDA. 56. The petitioner shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of each outstanding fee bill till the date of payment thereof. 57. The petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending applications also stand disposed of. SACHIN DATTA, J FEBRUARY 20, 2026 r, sv 1 “23. The Petitioner’s own “pending bills” list shows multiple dates billed twice— once under O.A. No. 300/2013 and again under M.A. No. 1346/2015— although both matters were listed together before the NGT. The Ministry’s 2021 clarification states that no separate fee is payable for OA and MA when heard together. Despite this, the Petitioner claims Rs. 1,50,000/- under each, totalling Rs. 3,00,000/- for a single hearing date.” 2 “Duplicated Billing Table (Extract from Petitioner’s Record): Date of Hearing in which claim was made for OA hearing as well as claim for MA in that OA hearing (Rs. 1.5 Lac per hearing) 21.03.2016 04.04.2016 18.05.2016 24.05.2016 30.05.2016 31.05.2016 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ W.P.(C) 14421/2022 Page 1 of 23